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which established firms leverage the knowledge accessed from startup firms. I focus on loosely coupled
partnerships that involve established firms paying a research partner for access to specific knowledge. While
prior research has questioned the ability of firms to devise new and innovative solutions based on such
partnerships, I find that innovation benefits from loosely coupled partnerships do not necessarily stem from
the sourcing relationship per se but instead are contingent on the established firm's experimental orientation
to pursuing risky projects and its availability of financial and managerial resources.
Overall, my dissertation enriches our understanding of the unique interdependencies between established
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ABSTRACT 
 
SEARCHING FOR NEEDLES IN A HAYSTACK:  
THREE ESSAYS ON THE ROLE OF R&D PARTNERSHIPS  
IN THE BIO-PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Thomas Klueter 
Raphael Amit 
 
This dissertation examines the relationships of established and young startup 
firms in environments characterized by rapid technological change in which exploration, 
i.e., moving away from current organizational routines and knowledge bases, is crucial 
for success. 
In the first essay, I combine perspectives on organizational myopia and 
organizational learning to examine how prior successes and prior failures solving R&D 
problems shape whether established firms go beyond “local search” in partnerships 
formations with startup firms. In line with the myopia perspective, I find that established 
firms tend to “overlook” partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge as 
well as opportunities that do not promise payoffs in the immediate future. The study 
further reveals that prior successes and failures very differently shape these myopic 
tendencies. While prior failures lead firms to pursue partnerships with novel elements of 
knowledge, prior successes make firms more receptive to partnerships with payoffs in the 
distant future. 
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In the second essay, I draw on the literature on organizational learning and inter-
organizational partnering to examine the relationship between startup innovation and 
startup market valuations. I find that startups pursuing innovations that substantially 
differ from the solutions pursued by established firms may face severe market value 
penalties as they lack both legitimacy and access to vital complementary assets. This 
penalty, however, is attenuated if startups commercialize their innovations through 
partnerships or if they pursue innovations in areas where established firms have failed in 
their own internal R&D attempts.  
The final essay draws on the literature on inter-organizational learning to more 
closely examine the ways in which established firms leverage the knowledge accessed 
from startup firms. I focus on loosely coupled partnerships that involve established firms 
paying a research partner for access to specific knowledge. While prior research has 
questioned the ability of firms to devise new and innovative solutions based on such 
partnerships, I find that innovation benefits from loosely coupled partnerships do not 
necessarily stem from the sourcing relationship per se but instead are contingent on the 
established firm’s experimental orientation to pursuing risky projects and its availability 
of financial and managerial resources.  
Overall, my dissertation enriches our understanding of the unique 
interdependencies between established and startup firms in environments characterized 
by rapid technological change.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Now big companies, and not just Big Pharma, big companies I believe, are not any 
good at doing innovation. There has to be some element of disruptive thinking to have 
innovation and I can tell you that big companies do everything to avoid any disruptive 
thinking in their companies. So, you want to work with companies that are a little bit 
more disruptive in thinking, but bring those competencies together.”(Chris Viehbacher, 
CEO, Sanofi, 2012) 
 
Overview 
In rapidly changing technological environments, exploitation, i.e., the refinement 
of current organizational routines and knowledge bases, does not necessarily lead to 
success, as existing ways of solving problems become obsolete quickly (March, 1991; 
Steensma & Corley, 2000). Instead, researchers have stressed that firms in such 
environments require elements of exploration, i.e., a conscious effort to move away from 
current organizational routines and knowledge bases (Katila & Ahuja, 2002:1184; 
March, 1991). 
Extant research indicates that startup firms, unencumbered by aging and 
embedded competencies, have advantages in exploration over established industry 
players
1
 (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986; 
Henderson, 1993; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). At the same time, established firms are 
not necessarily replaced by the emerging startups as they may retain possession of 
specialized complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel, 2001; Taylor & 
Helfat, 2009; Teece, 1986), which results in unique interdependencies between 
                                                          
1
 Established firms in this dissertation are incumbent and mostly older firms, with substantial commercial 
success in their respective industries with respect to revenue and profits. Conversely, startup firms tend to 
be much younger and smaller as they have not attained substantial commercial success and, in the context 
of this dissertation, have not yet commercialized products on the market. 
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established and emerging startup firms (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Hagedoorn, 2002; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Steensma & Corley, 2000). 
This dissertation takes an in-depth view of the relationships of established and 
young startup firms in environments that are characterized by both strong demands for 
exploration and the retention of specialized complementary assets by established firms. 
Examples of such industries include the pharmaceutical industry, with the emerging 
technologies’ solutions from biotechnology or the telecommunication industry, 
confronted with the emergence of wireless telephony (Rothaermel & Hill, 2005).  
In three distinct dissertation essays, I examine the relationships of established 
firms and startups to explicate antecedents and outcomes of their innovation activities. 
Each of the three essays is a separate piece of research but all are connected, drawing on 
organizational learning as an important lens to study innovation, clarifying the unique 
role of partnerships between established and startup firms for innovation, and using the 
bio-pharmaceutical industry as a common research setting.   
I begin each essay by identifying a challenge in established and startup firms’ 
innovation activities, which closely resonates with March’s seminal idea that exploration 
(1991:71), i.e., variation, risk taking and experimentation, may be difficult to achieve. 
For all papers, in a second step, I consider under which conditions firms more readily 
pursue exploration or under which conditions challenges associated with exploration may 
be attenuated. 
I will next draw on some of the fundamental theoretical lenses to illuminate the 
theoretical gaps that motivate my dissertation agenda. At the same time, I will explain 
why all three essays also have managerial relevance in the bio-pharmaceutical industry.  
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Relevance – Theory & Practice 
Starting with the original work of March and Simon (1958) and the behavioral 
theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), organizational search processes are considered 
an important lens through which to study technological innovations and inter-
organizational partnerships. Subsequent work on evolutionary economics (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982) and organizational learning (Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; March, 
1991) have substantially expanded our understanding of organizations’ search and 
innovation activities, while remaining close to the original tenets of the behavioral theory 
of the firm. 
Central to my dissertation is March’s (1991) seminal work in distinguishing 
exploration from exploitation as a unique lens to study innovations activities by 
established and startup firms. Exploration includes elements of variation and 
experimentation while exploitation emphasizes efficiency and refinements (March, 
1991). The exploration-exploitation framework has been applied to a wide range of 
innovation activities.
2
 For example, in the domain of technological search, exploitation 
refers to the usage of solutions which utilize familiar (or local) elements of knowledge, 
while exploration utilizes knowledge which is different from what the firms already know 
(e.g. Benner & Tushman, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Stuart 
& Podolny, 1996).
3
 Researchers have also applied the exploration-exploitation 
framework to the actual locus of innovation activities in the value chain (upstream and 
downstream) (e.g. Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), reflecting 
                                                          
2
 Not discussed in this dissertation is the geographic dimension (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000b) and the 
familiarity with partners (Li & Rowley, 2002). 
3 Exploration and exploitation are commonly operationalized through patent data. Distant technologies are 
those not previously cited by the focal firms, whereas similar technologies have build on patents previously 
cited by the focal firms (e.g., Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) 
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firms’ preferences to exploit payoffs in the immediate future (Levinthal & March, 1993; 
March, 1991).  
Following these perspectives, exploration in general is often associated with 
lower returns than exploitation, because exploration is non-routine and hence riskier 
(March, 1991; Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). At the same time, exploration can lead to 
substantial benefits, in particular in environments in which old competences quickly 
become obsolete (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001). Extant research 
indicates that new startup firms may have advantages in exploration and have taken an 
important role in the generation of new ideas and in pushing an industry’s technological 
change forward (Foster, 1986; Rothaermel, 2001; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). 
Established firms respond by opening up to external ideas and crossing organizational 
boundaries to access new and potentially disruptive technological opportunities, as 
exemplified by the formation of partnerships (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004). Value creation by established and startup firms hence stems from 
combining relevant resources and knowledge bases in innovation (Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008; Teece, 1986).   
Despite the increased use of partnerships between established and startup firms 
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), important challenges to 
exploration remain and are the focus of this dissertation. I begin my dissertation focusing 
on established firms that are exposed to a wide range of emerging technological 
opportunities and examining the partnerships that established firms ultimately pursue. 
Exploration in forming partnerships may be challenging as the interpretation of external 
information is guided by firms’ histories of knowledge, prior experiences and 
5 
 
 
 
organizational routines (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & 
March, 1988).  Hence, even when established firms go beyond their boundaries to access 
external knowledge (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), they may have myopic tendencies as 
they “overlook” partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge and 
partnering opportunities that do not promise payoffs in the immediate future. 
It is important to note that all experience is not created equal. The recognition and 
interpretation of external opportunities in partnerships formation may also be influenced 
by prior successes and failures in solving R&D problems, which are known to shape 
search intensity and organizational learning (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000; Kim, Kim, & 
Miner, 2009; Madsen & Desai, 2010). Following all arguments, I examine in essay 1 
(chapter 2) how myopia and prior successes and failures may shape partnership 
formations by established firms by examining the following research question:  
Do firms follow myopic tendencies in their choices of startup partners and how 
are these tendencies shaped by prior failures and successes in R&D?  
 
This question is highly relevant for established firms in the bio-pharmaceutical 
industry which, in the last decades, has observed an overall decline in R&D productivity 
(DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003; Scannell, Blanckley, Boldon, & Warrington, 
2012; Taylor, 2003). This is demonstrated in Figure 1 (Sources: FDA; PhRMA) as the 
newly approved molecular entities in the US (drugs approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration – FDA) relative to R&D spending have declined. At the same time, the 
proportion of drugs originating in new startup firms or universities has increased 
substantially (Figure 2 – dashed line, Sources: FDA, Recap). 
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Figure 1: Output Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry  
in the US 1991-2010 
 
 
Figure 2: Originators & Commercializers of  
US Approved Drugs  
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
Combining Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveals substantial challenges to established 
firms in discovering new innovative solutions. As a result, understanding how established 
firms search for and recognize emerging partnering opportunities has become 
increasingly important for established firms (Tyler & Steensma, 1995).  
The second essay (chapter 3) examines exploration from the perspective of the 
startup firms. Following the idea of evolutionary economics and technological change 
(Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Henderson & Clark, 1990; Tripsas, 1997), exploration is 
captured by examining how innovations pursued by startup firms differ from the 
solutions pursued by established industry players (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Govindarajan 
& Kopalle, 2006). I distinguish startups pursuing innovations incremental (local to the 
established firms) versus startups pursuing more exploratory innovations using 
knowledge and technologies different from the established firms innovation, which I 
label radical innovations (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). 
Startups pursuing such radical innovations face an important quandary. On one 
hand, they have the unique ability to explore and push technological change forward, 
which may allow them to gain the “attacker’s advantage” (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 
1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986). On the other hand, pursuing radical 
innovations may adversely affect the legitimacy associated with new startups and 
constrain them from accessing important complementary resources to develop and 
commercialize their technological solutions. Using market valuations as an important 
lens to view how a startup is perceived by external actors (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009; 
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DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999; Zott & Amit, 2008), I 
examine the following research question in essay 2 (chapter 3):  
What is the relationship between innovation radicalness and startup market 
valuation and what are the conditions under which startups pursuing radical 
innovations have higher market valuations? 
 
The question is highly relevant to the bio-pharmaceutical industry for the 
following reasons. First, we observe that in the last 20 years, established firms were not 
replaced by emerging startup firms, which has been ascribed to their retention of 
specialized downstream complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Teece, 1986). 
This is reflected in Figure 2 (solid line) – the percentage of drugs which were ultimately 
marketed solely by startup firms has risen much less steeply compared to the number of 
drugs which were originated by those startup firms. Hence, understanding performance 
consequences for startups pursuing radical innovative solutions is very important. 
In a final dissertation essay, I revert to the perspective of the established firms and 
examine value creation through research partnerships with startup firms. The intent 
behind these exploration types of partnerships (Koza & Lewin, 1998) is to accelerate the 
yield from research assets by reducing innovation cycle times and gaining access to 
valuable new elements of knowledge (Laursen, Leone, & Torrisi, 2010; Leone & 
Reichstein, 2012; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003) . 
While prior studies have outlined the benefits accrued by firms that engage in 
tightly coupled partnerships in the form of joint ventures or alliances (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Rothaermel, 2001), loosely coupled 
partnerships, which involve one firm paying to add or have access to specific knowledge 
from another firm and to reuse such knowledge created by the research partner (e.g., a 
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research contract or in-licensing deal), have received limited attention and quite often are 
not thought to allow firms to reap substantial innovation benefits (Fey & Birkinshaw, 
2005; Keil, Maula, Schildt, & Zahra, 2008; Luo, 2008; Mowery et al., 1996). Yet, 
established firms use the latter type of partnerships intensively (Arora, Fosfuri, & 
Gambardella, 2001; Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & 
Reichstein, 2012), leading to research question 3: 
Is a firm’s innovative performance influenced by loosely coupled research 
partnerships, and what are the conditions under which such partnerships increase 
an established firm’s innovative performance? 
 
I have already highlighted the difficulties of established firms in the recent 
decades to conceive of innovative new solutions in the form of marketable products 
(Figure 1 and Figure 2). Hence, understanding how firms may accrue innovation benefit 
from accessing knowledge from external partners is crucial. We observe that over the last 
decades, established firms have substantially increased their partnering with startup 
firms
4
 (Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002), which is shown in Figure 3.  
The figure indicates that loosely coupled partnerships (licensing and research 
contracts) have increased and remain quite prevalent in the industry. It is hence important 
to understand the benefits that established firms may accrue when engaging in such 
partnerships.  
Next, I provide a more detailed outline for each chapter of the dissertation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 The figure also includes partnerships with universities. 
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Figure 3: Adaptive Responses by Established Pharmaceutical Firms (Source Recap) 
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Dissertation Outline 
The dissertation comprises three papers probing into innovation and partnering by 
established and startup firms in environments characterized by rapid technological 
change.  
 
Chapter 2:      Opening Up But Staying Local - Insights from Partnership   
  Formations between Established and Startup Firms 
In chapter 2, I begin my investigation of how established firms make sense of 
emerging external technological opportunities by startups. I take into consideration 
research on organizational myopia (Levinthal & March, 1993), which suggests that, even 
when opening up to external opportunities, established firms tend to search “locally” 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) as they overlook distant “places,” 
i.e., opportunities that contain novel elements of knowledge and as well as distant 
“times,” i.e., opportunities that are distant from commercialization and immediate 
payoffs. While this perspective provides important insights into the challenges faced by 
firms searching for new technologies, it is not explicit when firms would go beyond local 
search. At the same time, research on organizational learning suggests that organizational 
actions and search are influenced by events of successes and failures (Argote & Greve, 
2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010).
5
 This perspective proposes that prior successes and 
failures may affect search intensity and learning but is imprecise or ambiguous about the 
type of search (local or distant) in which successes and failures ultimately result (Audia et 
al., 2000; Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).  
                                                          
5
 Failure and success in this study relate to events in R&D which are rare and substantially shape the 
organizational context as they lead to situations of crisis (failure) or long term commercial success 
(Lampel, Shamsie, & Shapira, 2009; Rerup, 2009). 
12 
 
 
 
In chapter 2, I combine both perspectives and investigate how successes and 
failures shape the reaction of established firms to external partnering opportunities which 
differ in their degree of technological novelty and distance to commercialization. In a 
first step, I investigate the “myopia” perspective to verify if established firms indeed tend 
to “search locally,” i.e., overlook solutions with novel elements of knowledge and that 
are distant from commercialization. More importantly, in a second step, I examine how 
prior successes and failures in solving R&D problems may determine whether firms go 
beyond “local search” and pursue partnerships with novel elements of knowledge and 
opportunities that only promise payoffs in the distant future. I argue that both failures and 
successes shape a firm’s receptivity for distinct external partnering opportunities in very 
different ways. 
I test my predictions by examining partnership formations between the Top 40 
established bio-pharmaceutical firms between 1998 and 2007. With this study, I intend to 
provide insights into how established firms notice, interpret, and respond to emerging 
exploratory partnering opportunities and explicate the role of prior failures and successes 
in affecting myopic tendencies in organizational search. 
 
Chapter 3:     Swimming Against the Current - Examining the Relationship Between  
  Radical Innovation and Startup Firm Market Value 
In the next chapter (chapter 3), I examine how innovations by startup firms differ 
from those pursued by established industry players. On one hand, startups pursuing 
radical product innovations, i.e., innovations that “involve methods and materials that 
are novel to incumbents” (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003), are at the heart of Schumpeter’s 
(1942) theory of creative destruction, which suggests that startup firms nimbly push 
13 
 
 
 
technological change forward and gain the “attacker’s” advantages (Christensen & 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986; Henderson, 1993; Li & 
Atuahene-Gima, 2001). At the same time, however, established firms often retain 
possession of specialized downstream complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; 
Rothaermel, 2001; Taylor & Helfat, 2009), which leads to challenges for startup firms 
pursuing innovations different from the existing industry conventions and recipes 
(Spender, 1989).  
In this dissertation chapter, I first examine if pursuing radical product innovations 
generates higher or lower market valuations, a key performance measure for startup firms 
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Zott & Amit, 2008). Next, I take into 
account the unique dependencies between startups and established firms and then, in a 
third step, examine under which conditions pursuing radical product innovation may be 
associated with higher market valuations for startups.  
Drawing on the literature on technological change and inter-organizational 
partnering (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000a; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart et al., 
1999; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), I argue that pursuing radical ways of solving 
problems compounds legitimacy issues and resource constraints, leading to lower market 
valuations for startups. Considering the unique interdependencies between startups and 
established firms, however, suggests that under distinct conditions, startups pursuing 
radical innovations may mitigate these constraints. In particular, I examine the formation 
of commercialization partnerships (Baum et al., 2000a; Stuart et al., 1999) and the 
maturity of technologies in development (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) by the startup, as 
well as failure in R&D efforts by established firms (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & 
14 
 
 
 
Desai, 2010) as important conditions mitigating legitimacy and resource constraints for 
startups pursuing radical innovations.  
I test my predictions in a sample of 144 US startups active in drug development 
with an IPO 1991 and 1999. With this study, I aim to further our understanding of how 
radical innovations influence startup performance and the unique role played by 
established firms in shaping this relationship. 
 
Chapter 4:   No Strings Attached: Examining the Relationship between Loosely  
  Coupled Research Partnerships and Innovative Performance 
In the final essay chapter (chapter 4), I turn to how established firms and startup 
firms exchange knowledge and technologies to generate new innovative solutions. I focus 
on loosely coupled partnerships (Orton & Weick, 1990; Steensma & Corley, 2000; 
Thompson, 1967), which involve one firm paying to have access to specific knowledge 
from another firm and to reuse such knowledge created by the research partner, as in a 
research contract or in-licensing deal (Murray & O’Mahony, 2007)
6
.  
Previous studies have consistently shown that the benefits of tightly coupled 
partnerships are based on the fact that more often than not, innovation requires a 
reciprocal exchange and recombination of knowledge from the cooperating parts (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996). In a related vein, it has also been suggested that 
simply “handing off” research from one partner to another (as in loosely coupled 
partnerships) may not be enough to allow the in-sourcing firm to innovate (Eisenhardt & 
                                                          
6
 Conversely, tightly coupled partnerships (Steensma & Corley, 2000) are characterized by the reciprocal 
exchange of knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), high levels of commitment among the partners 
and the generation of partnership-specific assets (e.g., joint product development agreements or equity joint 
ventures) (Sampson, 2007). 
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Schoonhoven, 1996). It is striking, then, that loosely coupled partnerships are 
increasingly prevalent in many industries, as exemplified by the widespread use and rapid 
growth of research contracts and licensing deals in very early stages of the innovation 
cycle (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). Intrigued by the 
mismatch between previous findings pointing to the limited potential of loosely coupled 
partnerships to generate innovations on the one hand, and their prevalence in many 
industries on the other, I examine in this chapter whether, why and when loosely coupled 
research partnerships may increase a firm’s innovative performance.  
I argue that innovation benefits from loosely coupled partnerships not only stem 
from the sourcing relationship per se, but are also closely linked to the in-sourcing firm’s 
experimental orientation to pursue risky projects and its availability of financial slack and 
managerial resources. I test these hypotheses in the global pharmaceutical industry, using 
a panel dataset covering the world’s Top 50 global pharmaceutical firms between 1998 
and 2007. The goal of this study is to demonstrate that, under certain circumstances, 
loosely coupled research partnerships may provide benefits similar to those attributed 
only to tightly coupled partnerships. 
 
Chapter 5:   Conclusion and Outlook  
In the final chapter of this dissertation, I provide a summary of the most important 
insights gained through this dissertation and integrate their findings. I also provide a 
road-map for future research opportunities arising from the dissertation. 
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Details of Empirical Context 
The empirical context for all my dissertation essays is the bio-pharmaceutical 
industry which, in the 1990s and 2000s, was characterized by a high degree of knowledge 
intensity, innovation and partnering (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). From the 
1980s to 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry also witnessed the emergence of 
revolutionary therapeutic approaches based on genetic engineering – including but not 
limited to recombinant proteins, monoclonal antibodies and gene therapy (Sosa, 2011). 
Hundreds of new Biotechnology firms (NBFs) entrants (labeled startups in this 
dissertation) pursued these emerging technologies in the hope of dramatically altering the 
industry landscape (Schweizer, 2005). 
Throughout my dissertation, I exploit the unique empirical advantages offered by 
the bio-pharmaceutical industry, which has clear steps in research and product 
development (Figure 4).  
Figure 4: The Drug Development Process in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
The research stage usually ends with the generation of a molecule or biologic 
solution, at which time firms tend to file patents for their new innovations. In the 
development stage, the industry is fairly regulated and includes preclinical trials (clinical 
development candidate selection and investigation of a new drug preparation), Phase 1 
trials (evaluation of drug stability, side effects and dosage), Phase 2 trials (drug’s 
efficacy) and Phase 3 trials (large scale clinical testing). Innovation concludes with the 
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commercialization of the drug into the market, which starts product life cycle 
management. 
Focusing on innovation associated with compounds in development in all of the 
essays allows me to capture information in the innovation process, which cannot be 
derived from patent-based studies. For example, I am able to unambiguously identify if a 
technology (i.e., a compound) was or was not available for partnering, while, for patents, 
it is often not clear which patents are already licensed to other parties and hence not 
available. Patents also do not allow us to identify how far in the development process the 
technologies are, which is possible through observing the stages of development of 
compounds. Finally, compounds are at the nexus of research and commercialization and 
hence represent an important area where managerial decisions (e.g., the allocation of 
resources) are made. The resources required and committed to products in development 
far exceed the resources necessary for patenting and in some cases (e.g., in Phase III) can 
reach 100s of millions of dollars. I note, however, that a downside of focusing on 
products in development is that the study is harder to replicate in other industries, which 
do not have product development information as readily available. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the data sources used in the dissertation, which apply to all dissertation 
chapters. 
Table 1: Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry – Data Sources  
  Activity Data Source Volume 
Internal 
R&D 
Patenting Derwent Innovation Index Millions of patents 
  Drug Development Pharmaprojects 
Adis 
>51000 drug profiles (PP) 
>26000 drug profiles (Adis) 
External 
R&D 
Partnering, Acquisitions Recombinant Capital 
Pharmaprojects 
>35000 announcements 
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Partnerships in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry 
In this dissertation, partnering between established and startup firms is defined in 
a broad way as it considers all purposive relationships between two or more independent 
firms that involves the exchange, sharing, or joint development of technological 
resources or capabilities  (Gulati, 1995; Kale & Singh, 2009). Firms can choose among a 
range of modes to organize such partnerships, from in-licensing of a technology to the 
joint collaboration in research or development between the partners. While in chapter 2 
and chapter 3, I consider partnering per se and am agnostic as to their how these 
partnerships are organized, I take the mode of partnering more closely into account in 
chapter 4 by differentiating partnerships emphasizing joint development (labeled tightly 
coupled partnerships) partnerships without strong reciprocity between the partners 
(labeled loosely coupled partnerships). Appendix 1 provides some examples of the 
different types of partnerships which are used in this dissertation. 
Within this dissertation, I also consider partnerships between startups and 
established firms that span different parts of the value chain. Referring back to Figure 4, 
partnerships can be in the research stage with the intention of coming up with new 
treatments to be put into development but also at later stages (preclinical and clinical 
development) when partnerships are pursued for existing technological solutions.
7
 The 
inclusion of distinct stages depends on the research question asked in each chapter. For 
example, chapter 2 examines the reaction of established firms to emerging partnering 
opportunities. Startup opportunities in the bio-pharmaceutical industry become highly 
                                                          
7
 Given that startups in all essays are young and nascent firms, we very rarely observe them engaging in 
partnerships to only market approved products, which is why in general we theorize about partnerships, in 
which either new knowledge is generated or needs further development until it can be commercialized. 
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visible once a compound is in development in preclinical or clinical trials. I hence focus 
in chapter 2 on all partnerships formed in these stages (see Table 2 for an overview). To 
that end, we carefully combine partnering (Recap) and product development 
(Pharmaprojects) data to unambiguously identify if a partnerships was made for a specific 
compound in development. Conversely, chapter 4 focuses on value creation from startups 
and established firms’ research partnerships to generate new innovative ideas. It hence 
centers on partnerships at an earlier stage (the research stage) between established and 
startup firms. 
Table 2: Partnerships used in dissertation chapters  
 Chapter 2 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 
Partnerships examined as Dependent Variable Moderator Independent Variable 
Value chain activities  
observed in partnering  
Development Stage 
(Preclinical-Phase III) 
All stages Early Stage (Research) 
Distinguish Modes in 
Analysis 
No No Yes (Loosely Coupled) 
Partnerships 451 1432 770 
    
Types of Partnerships 
included: 
   
Pure Licensing Yes Yes Yes 
Research Contracts Yes Yes Yes 
Joint R&D (Alliance) Yes Yes Control 
Joint Venture Out of scope Yes Control 
Pure Equity investments Out of scope Control Control 
Robustness test excludes  
pure licensing 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
In each paper, I acknowledge and discuss the limitations of focusing on specific 
partnerships, which, at the same time, opens up avenues for future research. Generally 
out of scope for all dissertation essays are pure equity investments, as in corporate 
venture capital investments (without evidence that knowledge in the form of patents or 
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compounds was actually transferred from one firm to the other). Along the same 
argument, I do not consider option type deals as partnerships.  
Scope and Limitations 
Two important factors limit the scope of concepts and theory developed in this 
dissertation. First, the dissertation was conducted in the context of a single industry and 
the generalizability of the findings and their boundary conditions would require 
validation through explorations in other empirical contexts.  
Moreover, I predominantly focus on partnering as a way through which 
established and startup firms exchange knowledge and technology. Subsequent studies 
may take into account alternative modes of knowledge exchange, including acquisitions 
or corporate venture investments.  
Cognizant of these and other limitations, I conclude each essay chapter by 
outlining the limitations of the specific study. 
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CHAPTER 2: OPENING UP BUT STAYING LOCAL:  
INSIGHTS FROM PARTNERSHIP FORMATIONS BETWEEN ESTABLISHED AND 
STARTUP FIRMS 
We are very picky and selective in our due diligence about which opportunities we select. 
But, failure can come as a surprise and change our perspective of what ultimately works 
to address a therapeutic need. 
(Associate Director, Johnson & Johnson, Business Development, 2012).  
 
An important line of inquiry within the innovation literature highlights that 
established firms increasingly partner with young and nascent startup firms to gain access 
to emerging and potentially disruptive technological solutions (e.g. Aldrich, 1999; 
Anand, Oriani, & Vassolo, 2010; Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Hagedoorn, 2002; Jiang, 
Tan, & Thursby, 2011; Rothaermel, 2001; Steensma & Corley, 2000). As a result, 
understanding how established firms search for and recognize emerging partnering 
opportunities has become increasingly important (Tyler & Steensma, 1995).  
It is helpful to model established firms as interpretive systems (Daft & Weick, 
1984) that need to recognize and understand the technological opportunities generated by 
startups (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). Two important 
streams of research may inform our understanding of how established firms make sense 
of their environment and select emerging opportunities for partnering. The first 
perspective focuses on the challenges of established firms managing technological 
change (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) as the very competencies 
that established firms worked hard to attain may lead to myopia, i.e. favoring more 
familiar approaches in solving problems (Levinthal & March, 1993; Levitt & March, 
1988). Applying this notion of myopia to emerging partnering opportunities suggests that 
established firms tend to search “local” (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 
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2001) as they have the tendency to overlook distant “places,” i.e., opportunities that 
contain novel
8
 elements of knowledge and to overlook distant “times,” i.e., opportunities 
that are temporally distant from commercialization and immediate payoffs (Levinthal & 
March, 1993).
9
 While this perspective provides important insights into the challenges 
faced by firms searching for new technologies, it is not explicit as to when firms would 
go beyond local search and consider opportunities with novel elements of knowledge or 
with distant payoffs.  
A second perspective highlights that not all experiences are created equal and 
demonstrates how prior successes and failures influence organizational actions and search 
(Argote & Greve, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010).
10
 This perspective outlines that 
successes and failures may affect search intensity and organizational learning but is 
imprecise or ambiguous about the type of search (local or distant) successes and failures 
ultimately result in (Audia et al., 2000; Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012; Staw et al., 1981). 
Applying these ideas to emerging partnering opportunities suggests that prior successes 
and failures in solving R&D problems may inherently influence how firms notice, 
interpret, and respond to emerging partnering opportunities.  
In this paper, we combine both perspectives and investigate how successes and 
failures shape the reactions of established firms to external partnering opportunities 
                                                          
8
 Novelty can have many dimensions (Rosenkopf & McGrath, 2011). In this paper it refers to the 
technological means through which firms attempt to solve organizational problems. A technology is novel 
if it represents a solution with elements of knowledge that are new to the firm. Greater novelty indicates 
more elements of knowledge not previously used to solve a distinct problem. 
9
 Accordingly, the two forms of myopia haven been labeled “spatial” and “temporal” myopia (Levinthal & 
March, 1993) 
10
 Failure and success in this study relate to events in R&D which are rare and substantially shape the 
organizational context as they lead to situations of crisis (failure) or long term commercial success (Lampel 
et al., 2009; Rerup, 2009). 
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which differ in their degree of technological novelty and distance to commercialization. 
In a first step, we investigate the “myopia” perspective and determine if established firms 
have the tendency to search “locally,” i.e., overlook those opportunities with novel 
elements of knowledge and which are distant from commercialization. In a second step, 
we examine how prior successes and prior failures solving R&D problems may shape 
whether firms go beyond “local search” in partnership formations pursue partnerships 
with novel elements of knowledge and opportunities that only promise payoffs in the 
distant future.  
Doing so allows us to integrate views on both myopia and the role of failures and 
successes to advance our understanding of organizational search (Greve, 2011; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). We argue that firms overlook partnering opportunities with novel 
elements of knowledge, as they narrow the range of technological alternatives considered 
feasible for partnering to those in the neighbourhood of already pursued technological 
solutions.
11
 To recognize partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge, 
established firms need to consider a broader range of possible technological alternatives 
(Gavetti, 2012), which we argue is contingent on experiencing prior successes and 
failures. While prior failures challenge the established firm’s conventional ways of 
problem solving and allow them to pursue novel elements of knowledge (Cyert & March, 
1963; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005; Madsen & Desai, 2010), prior 
successes may reinforce existing representations of how problems should be solved and 
guide firms to pursue partnering opportunities in the neighbourhood of previous attempts 
(Audia et al., 2000; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992). 
                                                          
11
 Greve (2011) terms this type of myopia ”positional rigidity.”  
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Firms overlook opportunities distant from commercialization as they build 
commercialization routines leading to preferences for those opportunities with immediate 
payoffs (March, 1991). To recognize partnering opportunities that are more distant from 
commercialization, established firms must be willing to forgo short term for potential 
long term gains, which we again suggest is shaped by the firm’s prior failures and 
successes in solving R&D problems. Namely, prior successes may generate an 
organizational context in which established firms more readily consider a long term 
perspective, allowing them to pursue partnering opportunities with more distant payoff 
time horizons. Conversely, prior failures may lead firms to fail to consider opportunities 
which are distant from commercialization as feasible alternatives to solve their problems 
(Cyert & March, 1963). Altogether, our arguments suggest that failures and successes 
very differently shape a firm’s receptivity towards solutions containing novel elements of 
knowledge and solutions with payoffs in the distant future. 
The context for the study is the global pharmaceutical industry during the period 
from 1997 to 2006. We assemble a unique dataset that includes information on 
established firms’ internal R&D and external partnering in product development. We 
examine partnership formations between established firms and new biotechnology firms 
(henceforth, startups). Within this industry, established firms increasingly rely on startups 
to generate new technological solutions and then form partnerships with them to develop 
new products  (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a). We identify 852 unique startup partnering 
opportunities between 1997 and 2006 that could have been pursued by established firms 
and then examine the partnerships which were ultimately concluded. Our analysis is 
conducted on the dyadic level between the established firm experiencing failures and 
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successes solving a range of therapeutic problems (e.g., cancer, neurology) and startups 
offering new technological solutions in these therapeutic areas.  
Consistent with our arguments, we find that, given a range of partnering 
opportunities, established firms tend to search locally, as they overlook distant “places” 
(novel technological solutions) and distant “times” (early stage technological solutions). 
However, once we take into account the firms’ prior successes and prior failures, the 
tendency to search locally does not always hold. In line with our predictions, we find that 
prior failures increase the likelihood of pursuing novel solutions and prior successes 
allow firms to tap into solutions which are more distant from commercialization. We also 
find partial evidence that prior failures may lead firms to prefer partnering opportunities 
which are close to commercialization (in line with problemistic type search (Cyert & 
March, 1963)). We do not, however, find any evidence that a prior successes lead 
established firms to overlook novel technological partnering opportunities (Audia et al., 
2000). These results account for unobserved differences across firms and changes over 
time, and are robust to a number of alternative econometric specifications and 
operationalization of key variables. 
This study is a first attempt to systematically identify the reaction of established 
firms to emerging technological opportunities by explicitly taking into account forces of 
myopia as well as successes and failures. While scholars have identified the tendency of 
firms to remain local in their selection of partnering opportunities (Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008), at most, they have focused on search for novel elements of knowledge but did not 
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explicitly consider the time dimension (in the form of distance to commercialization)
12
 
and have only started to explicate the roles of success and failure as important boundary 
conditions (Greve, 2011).  
We demonstrate that when opening up to external startups, established firms 
follow local patterns. Hence, merely opening up to new external solutions may not be a 
panacea, as firms may still not add knowledge that substantially differs from what they 
already know and do not pursue technological opportunities at an early stage of 
development. At the same time, we explicate the role of prior failures and successes to 
clarify when firms are more likely to pursue “non-local” partnering opportunities. We 
hence contribute to research which has attempted to identify the organizational 
antecedents necessary to overcome myopic challenges in recognizing and seizing 
knowledge located outside the firm (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Danneels & Sethi, 2011; 
Jansen et al., 2005). 
The findings from the study also inform the literature on the role of learning from 
failures and the related idea of problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2011; 
Madsen & Desai, 2010). We illuminate that failures play an important role in shaping 
search direction but have a different effect on the two types of myopia. This helps to 
resolve conflicting arguments that failures lead to both local (Cyert & March, 1963) or 
distant search in form of “experimentation, change, and innovation” (Levinthal & March, 
1993:105). In a similar vein, the study contributes to our understanding of how prior 
successes influence firm behaviour. While some researchers have suggested that 
successes may lead to strategic persistence and can actually ‘trap’ firms from changing 
                                                          
12
 A notable exception is Monteiro (2011), who examines the concept of market “proofness” in the context 
of seeking external knowledge. 
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(Audia et al., 2000), we do not find this perspective in the domain of partnership 
formations to be supported. Conversely, the paper reveals that prior successes may enable 
firms to consider partnering opportunities with technologies more distant from 
commercialization.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Recognizing Partnering Opportunities & Local Search 
Established firms increasingly cross organizational boundaries and access new 
and potentially disruptive technological opportunities by forming partnerships 
(Hagedoorn, 1993, 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Startups, i.e., young and nascent 
firms, have taken an important role in the generation of new ideas and are believed to 
substantially push technological change forward (Foster, 1986; Rothaermel, 2001). The 
result is that in some industries, a division of innovative labor has emerged in which 
startups initiate new innovative solutions and then partner with established firms that 
possess the complementary assets to develop and commercialize the startups’ 
technologies (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  
Before established firms can pursue any partnerships with startup firms, they, in a 
first step, need to recognize and understand the startup’s potentially valuable external 
technological opportunities (Arora & Gambardella, 1994b; Lane et al., 2006; Todorova & 
Durisin, 2007). This, however, may be challenging as the interpretation of external 
information may be subject to organizational myopia, which inhibits firms from pursuing 
distinct types of technological solutions. Two salient forms of myopia (Levinthal & 
March, 1993) are reflected in firms’ tendencies to a) overlook distant “places”, i.e., 
opportunities that contain novel elements of knowledge and b) distant “times,” i.e., 
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opportunities which are distant from commercialization in the formation of partnerships 
by established firms.
13
 Next, we explore each form of myopia in the context of 
partnership formations. 
Overlooking novel partnering opportunities: It is well-known that firms’ internal 
R&D attempts tend to be in the neighborhood and are local to what they already know 
(Katz & Allen, 1982; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 
1982). In a similar vein, firms may not consider technological solutions that are distant to 
their prior ways of solving problems when evaluating a range of partnering opportunities. 
Over time, organizations build distinct competencies, which shape their 
fundamental cause-and-effect representations of how problems and solutions are 
interrelated (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Itami & Roehl, 1991; Lei, Hitt, & Bettis, 1996). 
While this facilitates the recognition of partnering opportunities close to prior 
technological solutions, it, at the same time, makes it challenging to identify “distant” 
ones i.e., partnering opportunities with elements of knowledge novel to the established 
firms (Levinthal & March, 1993; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). First, partnering 
opportunities that attempt to solve problems in different ways may not be recognized by 
established firms as they do not conform to the current logics of problem-solving 
(Danneels, 2007; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Winter, 2000). Firms often define ex ante 
what technological solutions are considered feasible, which is guided by their internal 
preferences in solving problems (Dijksterhuis, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 1999). Once 
firms direct their attention and position their “radars” (e.g., those employees responsible 
for providing information about new technologies to the firm) towards a subset of 
                                                          
13
 Other myopic tendencies, unrelated to the technological solutions of potential partners are related to the 
choice of geographic location (Baum et al., 2000b)  or the choice of partners (Li & Rowley, 2002). 
29 
 
 
 
solutions in the external environment, they are constrained from considering 
technological solutions that depart from the agreed subset of possible alternatives (Jansen 
et al., 2005; Monteiro, 2011).
14
  
Second, firms consist of coalitions with divergent interests that compete for power 
and control over scarce resources (Bower, 1970; Cyert & March, 1963; Pfeffer, 1992; 
Reitzig & Sorenson, 2012). This may lead firms to not consider partnering opportunities 
which do not support and reinforce previous internal R&D attempts (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Todorova & Durisin, 2007). In the extreme case, organizational coalitions may actively 
resist novel technological solutions, especially if they are perceived to render internal 
competencies obsolete (Gilbert, 2005; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) or if they violate 
industry recipes (Spender, 1989) that represent legitimate solutions within the industry. 
Combining those arguments, we expect myopia to be salient in partnership formations as 
firms overlook those opportunities with novel elements of knowledge.  
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of an established firm forming a partnership with a 
new startup decreases with the novelty of the startup’s technological solutions to the 
established firm. 
 
Overlooking opportunities distant from commercialization: A general tendency of 
firms is to prefer short term over future gains (March, 1991). Applying the idea to the 
recognition of emerging technological opportunities suggests that firms may prefer 
opportunities closer to commercialization, while overlooking opportunities which are at 
an early stage of development. 
                                                          
14
 As an example, Henderson and Clark (1990) demonstrate how external new ways of problem solving in 
the photolithographic alignment equipment industry were screened out by established firms. In a similar 
vein, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) found strong support for the idea that technological similarities drive 
partnership formation between established firms and startups. 
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Over time, established firms invest substantially in complementary assets and 
build competences and routines to develop and commercialize new products (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982; Teece, 1986). Simultaneously, aging and larger firms gradually shift their 
emphasis from future- (exploration) to short term-oriented gains (exploitation) as the 
existence of complementary assets (e.g., substantial experience in product development, a 
large sales force) allows established firms to effectively create immediate value (March, 
1991). Accordingly, researchers have suggested that as a general industry pattern, 
partnerships with more immediate payoffs will be more prevalent than those  that require 
more time to generate value (Koza & Lewin, 1998). A technology at an early stage of 
development is associated with high uncertainties that stem from doubts about the 
technology per se and its applicability to commercial domains (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 
2001; van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, & Duysters, 2009). Moreover, early stage 
technologies have not yet revealed how well they will fit existing commercialization 
routines, which increases potential adaptation costs for established firms. Given the 
distinguished competencies and routines of established firms in commercializing new 
products (Gilbert, 2005), established firms may prefer those partnering opportunities 
which can be readily converted into immediate returns. At the same time, internal 
coalitions may prefer immediate payoffs and lower risks to maintain and strengthen their 
positions of power, as evidenced by top  management preferences of short over long term 
gains (Sanchez, 1995; Tyler & Steensma, 1995).  
Combining all arguments, established firms exposed to a range of external 
partnering opportunities may overlook those which are distant from commercialization. 
While extant research has not tested this relationship explicitly, there is evidence that 
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established firms at least pay more attention to solutions which are already 
commercialized and have a proven track records (Monteiro, 2011). We follow this 
argument and suggest that firms may shy away from partnering opportunities with 
outcomes distant in “time.”  
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of an established firm forming a partnership with a 
new startup decreases the more distant the startup’s technological solutions are from 
commercialization. 
 
Firms that overlook novel technological solutions may be confined to pursuing 
technological solutions similar to their own internal problem-solving attempts but miss 
technological solutions that can be disruptive and render the firm’s existing competences 
obsolete (Gavetti, 2012; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In a similar vein, recognizing 
technological opportunities at an early stage allows firms to have first mover advantages 
and avoid substantial premiums paid at a later stage of development due to the increased 
bargaining power of the technology supplier (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Rothaermel & 
Boeker, 2008). It is hence important to understand when firms pursue partnering 
opportunities with novel and early stage technologies. To that end, we suggest 
considering a firm’s prior successes and failures as possible contingencies which are 
known to influence intensity and direction of organizational search and shape 
organizational learning in general (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Greve, 2011; Madsen 
& Desai, 2010). Hence, we next explore prior successes and failures as important 
boundary conditions for the types of solutions established firms ultimately pursue in 
partnering activities. 
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Failure, Success and Local Search 
Extant research highlights the role of experiencing failure and success as 
important drivers affecting organizational change (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Cyert 
& March, 1963; Greve, 2003b). In a similar vein, prior failures and successes may 
influence how firms interpret and make sense of emerging external partnering 
opportunities.  
Motivated by the behavioral theory of the firm, researchers have shown that 
organizational actions may be differently affected by events of failures and successes 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010). In the R&D context, firms make 
substantial financial and organizational investments and develop expectations about the 
likelihood that their R&D initiatives will succeed. Ultimately, this leads to events of 
failures and successes as R&D initiatives to which the firms have committed substantial 
resources either fail or lead to to new marketable products. We argue that distinguishing 
events of successes and failures helps us understand a firm’s tendency to overlook distant 
“places” and “times” when it chooses among a range of partnering opportunities. The 
idea follows previous research which identified that prior successes and failures affect 
organizational learning (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011), 
R&D search intensity (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b) and organizational risk-
taking (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2011). We extend this perspective in the direction 
of technological search and highlight that a firm’s prior failures and successes 
differentially shape the likelihood of partnership formations for opportunities with novel 
elements of knowledge and opportunities which are distant from commercialization. 
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Failure & Novelty: Organizational knowledge is not static; firms continuously 
rely on prior experiences to draw new inferences from previous problem-solving attempts 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Huber, 1991). Experiencing failures may influence a firm’s 
willingness to pursue partnering opportunities with novel technological solutions.  
Researchers have long argued that a firm’s perception of the external environment 
may be shaped by events that force it to react to given stimuli (Zahra & George, 2002).  
In particular, experiencing failure in problem-solving attempts may serve as such a 
stimulus and most likely broadens the range of alternative solutions that established firms 
will consider feasible when searching among partnering opportunities. First, prior failures 
serve as an impetus for established firms to re-evaluate their conventional technological 
solutions and challenges their current logic as to how problems and solutions are 
interrelated (Greve, 1998; Jansen et al., 2005; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Lampel et al., 
2009). Prior failures hence increase the range of possible alternatives considered to solve 
R&D problems (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & Desai, 2010), which in turn increases 
the likelihood that firms will form partnerships for more technologically distant startup 
opportunities. At the same time, startups developing solutions that are similar to those of 
the established firm may become less attractive, as established firms may not wish to 
pursue solutions that are close to those that have previously failed.  
Second, prior failures alter the power structure within the firm and the units 
making decisions about which partnering opportunity to pursue. Extant research has 
shown that failure puts substantial pressure on the firm from external stakeholders 
(Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Girotra, Terwiesch, & Ulrich, 2010; Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1978). Applied to the R&D context, failure compels internal coalitions to change 
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direction in the types of solutions used to solve problems. It is also more likely that 
failure alters a firm’s internal power structure, which directly affects the resource 
allocation process in such a way that internal coalitions cannot use external initiatives as 
a mere extension of internal R&D activities. This increases the likelihood that 
partnerships are formed with startups pursuing technological solutions novel to the firm. 
Taken together, our arguments suggest that when exposed to a range of possible 
partnering opportunities, established firms are more likely to seek technological solutions 
with novel elements of knowledge if the firm has experienced failures in the past.  
Hypothesis 3a: An established firm’s prior failures solving R&D problems 
positively moderate the relationship between the novelty of the startup’s technological 
solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the startup. 
 
Success & Novelty: In a similar vein, prior successes in R&D may also influence a 
firm’s willingness to pursue partnering opportunities with novel technological solutions. 
It is well known that prior success leads to confidence in firms about their existing 
routines and ways of solving problems and helps firms specialize in problem-solving 
(Audia et al., 2000). As such, prior successes may reinforce existing representations of 
cause and effect and further guide firms towards partnering opportunities enhancing the 
firm’s specialized knowledge. Increasing specialization, however, may further lead firms 
onto paths of local search (Levinthal & March, 1993) and exacerbate their tendency of 
“overlooking” novel partnering opportunities. This is supported by prior research, which 
indicates that successes indeed cause firms to not challenge existing assumptions and can 
limit the variety of information processed (Lant & Montgomery, 1987; Sitkin & Pablo, 
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1992). The result is that successes may “trap” firms (Audia et al., 2000; Leonard-Barton, 
1992) into specialized knowledge paths.  
Prior successes also strengthen the power structure of units within the firm 
(Levinthal & March, 1993), increasing their discretion to allocate resources. Given that 
there is no external pressure to change direction, it is likely that coalitions tend to use 
their discretion to further specialize and reinforce existing R&D paths. Hence, firms with 
prior successes most likely will not pursue novel solutions which, in the extreme case, 
challenge their existing (and successful) ways of solving problems.  
Combined, our arguments imply that when exposed to a range of possible 
partnering opportunities, established firms that have experienced successes in R&D 
adhere to existing problem-solving routines, exacerbating their tendencies to search 
locally and “overlook” partnering opportunities with novel elements of knowledge.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: An established firm’s prior successes solving R&D problems 
negatively moderate the relationship between the novelty of the startup’s technological 
solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the startup. 
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The proposed effect of hypotheses 3a and 3b are shown in Figure 5 and 6.  
Figure 5: Chapter 2 –  
Conceptual Hypothesis 3a 
Figure 6: Chapter 2 -  
Conceptual Hypothesis 3b 
  
 
Basically, we expect that prior failures will flatten and potentially reverse 
(hypothesis 3a) a firm’s tendencies to search locally, i.e., overlooking novel technological 
solutions (Figure 5). Conversely, Figure 6 shows the expected reinforcing effect of prior 
successes on local search, which is reflected by a steepening of the local search curve. 
In a comparable vein, prior failures and successes may very differently affect the 
established firm’s receptivity towards partnering opportunities that are distant from 
commercialization, i.e., at an early stage of development. We explore this next. 
Failure & Distance to Commercialization: We identified that prior failures induce 
established firms to change direction by pursuing partnering opportunities with novel 
elements of knowledge. At the same time, however, several explanations indicate that 
prior failures may intensify myopic tendencies towards solutions at an early stage of 
development. First, failures may create a sense of urgency when evaluating partnering 
opportunities. Extant research has suggested that firms facing crises and situations of 
37 
 
 
 
failures try to avoid the repetition of this experience in subsequent attempts (Madsen & 
Desai, 2010). While this implies the pursuit of novel ways of solving problems, it, at the 
same time, suggests that firms with a history of failures pursue partnering opportunities 
with a higher likelihood of success as exemplified by technologies closer to 
commercialization. The idea resonates with the observation that when experiencing a 
crisis, firms sometimes limit the range of information processed towards those that have 
immediate performance outcomes (Staw et al., 1981) and that firms confronted with 
problems search “problemistically,” i.e., are motivated towards specific solutions (Cyert 
& March, 1992:170). Given the long time lags in innovation, partnering opportunities 
that are distant from commercialization may not be considered as feasible alternatives the 
more firms have experienced prior failures, as such opportunities do not promise 
immediate payoffs.  
Similarly, coalitions with prior failures may be dominated by efficiency concerns 
(Staw et al., 1981) to seek technological opportunities which can be easily integrated, 
provide immediate results and have a lower risk of further undermining the coalition’s 
power. The result is that the more coalitions have experienced failures, the more actively 
they avoid opportunities distant from commercialization because they do not want to be 
accountable for decisions that will not have an immediate impact on the firm’s top and 
bottom lines and that potentially, may lead to another failure. In summary, both 
arguments suggest that partnering opportunities with technologies distant from 
commercialization may not be perceived as feasible solutions for firms which have 
experienced large number of failures. 
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Hypothesis 4a: An established firm’s prior failures solving R&D problems 
negatively moderate the relationship between the distance from commercialization of the 
startup’s technological solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the 
startup. 
 
Success & Distance to Commercialization: Prior successes may quite differently 
shape a firm’s willingness to take a long-term approach when considering a range of 
possible partnering opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1981). The aforementioned 
tendency to further specialize after experiencing success may allow firms to more clearly 
understand specific problems (Kim et al., 2009) and apply their knowledge towards 
partnering opportunities which are more uncertain to commercialize, as with 
opportunities distant from commercialization. Moreover, prior successes allow firms to 
attend to a broader time horizon in general as they face less urgency to address specific 
problems. This may mean that firms can stick to existing plans, which usually combine 
both short term and long term considerations. The result is that prior successes allow 
firms to more readily enrich their partnering decisions with partnering opportunities more 
distant from commercialization. 
Firm coalitions that have experienced prior successes may also find it easier to 
take accountability for decisions which will not have immediate performance outcomes 
as they are less pressured towards efficiency (Staw et al., 1981). This resonates with 
Cyert and March’s (1992:189) suggestion  that “success tends to breed slack” that acts as 
a buffer for “risky” decisions, ultimately allowing firms to be more lenient in allocating 
resources to early stage partnering opportunities. Taking all of these arguments together, 
we posit that successes have the opposite effect from failures in influencing the 
relationship of early partnering opportunities (i.e., distant from commercialization) and 
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the likelihood that established firms will pursue these opportunities through partnership 
formations. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: An established firm’s prior successes in solving R&D problems 
positively moderate the relationship between the distance from commercialization of the 
startup’s technological solutions and the likelihood of forming a partnership with the 
startup. 
 
The proposed effect of hypotheses 4a and 4b are shown in Figure 7 and 8. 
Basically, we expect that prior failures reinforce local search tendencies, i.e., overlooking 
technological solutions distant from commercialization, which is reflected by a 
steepening of the local search curve in Figure 7 (Hypothesis 4a). Conversely, Figure 8 
shows reverse effect as we expect prior successes to flatten and potentially reverse 
(Hypothesis 4b) firms’ tendencies to search locally 
 
Figure 7: Chapter 2 -  
Conceptual Hypothesis 4a 
Figure 8: Chapter 2 -  
Conceptual Hypothesis 4b 
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METHODS 
Background - Partnerships in the Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry  
To test our hypotheses, it was mandatory to identify a range of partnering 
opportunities that established firms could pursue as well as capture those partnerships 
which were ultimately formed. Both types are observable in the bio-pharmaceutical 
industry in the form of compounds that represent technological solutions. The bio-
pharmceutical industry is also characterized by very frequent partnership formations 
(Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Our data come from various 
sources, including Recombinant Capital (ReCap), Pharmaprojects and Adis R&D 
Insights.
15
  
 
Sample  
Our sample included the top 40 publicly traded pharmaceutical firms (by sales in 
1997)
16
 which were actively pursuing new drug development
17
 and that are actively 
searching for new technologies through partnerships.
18
 Limiting the sample to the leading 
firms ensured that we observed a large portion of partnerships in the industry and at the 
same time, facilitated the data collection process across multiple databases. This 
                                                          
15
 ReCap is a database tracking partnerships in the life science industry (Schilling, 2009). Pharmaprojects 
and Adis R&D Insights are databases tracking new drug development in the pharmaceutical industry 
(Girotra et al., 2010; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). Additional databases used for control variables are 
Compustat and the Derwent Innovation Index. 
16
 We limited ourselves to the Top 40 firms to strike a balance between the number of firms included and 
the number of total observations based on a risk-set approach. Firms beyond the Top 40 contribute an equal 
number of observations, but tend to have fewer realized partnerships, substantially increasing the sample 
without adding new information. Results are very similar using the Top 50 firms. 
17
 Active drug development was measured as new compounds in development in Pharmaprojects in 1997. 
This way, we excluded firms only pursuing generic drugs, formulation technology or diagnostics. Sample 
firms had to be actively developing novel therapeutics as evidence in their activity in Pharmaprojects pre 
1997. The majority of the firms in our sample are incorporated in the US (45%), followed by Europe (35%) 
and Japan (20%). 
18
 Evidenced by any partnering activity between 1997 and 2006, which we extract from Recap 
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approach is consistent with prior research examining established firms’ management of 
technological change (Anand et al., 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Rothaermel, 2001). 
They include established pharmaceutical firms (e.g., Merck & Co. and Pfizer) as well as 
three biotechnology firms with established product portfolios (Amgen, Genentech and 
Chiron).
19
 The focal firms are among the largest and most active publicly listed 
companies in drug development and, based on the global revenue figures from 1997, 
account for approximately 70% of all worldwide sales of globally listed pharmaceutical 
firms. The average revenue for all firms in the sample is $13.6BN. 
We identified opportunities for partnering by observing partnerships with startups 
in preclinical trials (clinical development candidate selection and investigation of a new 
drug preparation), Phase 1 trials (evaluation of drug stability, side effects and dosage), 
Phase 2 trials (drug’s efficacy) and Phase 3 trials (large scale clinical testing) between 
established and new startup firms.
20
 We limited ourselves to these stages as startups have 
usually filed patents and signalled their intent to further develop their technologies 
through partnering. Put differently, at those stages, partnering opportunities are clearly 
visible to established firms.  
Using Recap, we identified 311 startup partners trading (preclinical-Phase III) 
with the Top 40 established firms between 1997 and 2006, which we used as a basis to 
generate a set of partnering opportunities for each established firm in a given years. We 
                                                          
19
 While we treated Amgen and Genentech as established firms in 1997, we excluded them in robustness 
tests completed to verify our results to limit the sample to established firms that started in the chemical-
based drug development paradigm. 
20
 We defined startups as those firms founded in or after 1985 (during the biotechnology revolution) which 
did not yet have a commercialized product on the market in 1997 (examples include 3-Dimensional 
Pharmaceuticals, Actelion or Nektar Therapeutics). We took such a long time window because reaching 
Phase III trials involves a very long time period (12 years and more). 
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first considered that partnering opportunity were available in the year before an actual 
partnership was concluded. Based on this analysis, we identified 429 years in which 
startup firms had technology available for partnering.
21
 To complement these partnering 
opportunities, we examined in which other years, between and inclusive of 1996 to 2005, 
the 311 startups had technologies (i.e., compounds) available for partnering. By tracking 
the pipelines of the small startups and determining if any compounds of the firms were 
flagged as a “Licensing Opportunity” in Pharmaprojects,
22
 we identified an additional 
423 partnering opportunities by startups, which represented years in which a compound 
became available by the startup. We combined the 429 observations (based on 
partnering) and 423 observations (based on technology availability) into one risk set for 
years in which startups had technologies available for partnering. We then made the 
assumption that each established firm could observe and evaluate all 852 possible 
partnering opportunities, leading to 34,080 possible combinations between startups with 
partnering opportunities and established firms between 1997 and 2006.
23
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 These 429 opportunities lead to 451 partnerships ultimately formed, as we observed 20 cases in which a 
startup partnered with more than one established firm in a given year. We also found 5 cases in which a 
startup and an established firm formed 2 or 3 partnerships in a given year. Due to the small number, we 
opted to keep our analysis to a simple analysis of partnership formed or not formed (and not an intensity 
measure). 
22
 Pharmaprojects report a licensing opportunity if Pharmaprojects has received information from the 
pharmaceutical company concerned that the product is available for licensing. This information can come 
in the form of a press release, annual report, information reported at conference or from a direct 
communication with the company (taken from Pharmaprojects online manual) 
23
 Established firms merge (e.g., Aventis and Sanofi-Synthelabo; Bayer and Schering AG) so that not all 40 
initial firms are active in all years, reducing the sample. Further, the construction of the independent 
variables and missing data reduce the final sample. In robustness tests, we demonstrated that results hold, 
with a larger sample. 
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Measures 
Dependent Variable: 
 Partnership Formed – We coded the dependent variable as a binary variable 
taking the value of 1 if an established firm did form a partnership with a new startup firm, 
which had partnering opportunities (preclinical-Phase 3) available in the prior year and 0 
otherwise. In total, we observe 451 formed partnerships. 
Independent Variables: 
Novelty of partnering opportunity: To arrive at a measure for Novelty, we 
compared partnering opportunities available from new startups to the recent and ongoing 
drug development of the established pharmaceutical firms. We took into consideration 
fine-grained product development data using Pharmaprojects and observed the 
compounds at risk of being partnered from the startups and compared them to the drug 
development of established firms.  
It is important to understand that biotechnology as a term is often associated with 
all new firms that were founded after the biotechnology revolution in the early 1980s. 
Biotechnology in a narrow sense means the development of large protein-based 
molecules as therapeutic solutions (e.g., recombinant proteins or monoclonal antibodies). 
However, most of therapeutic solutions, even those developed by small biotechnology 
firms, are still chemical-based small molecules. In our sample, the underlying compounds 
associated with the partnering opportunities can be divided into 38% biologics (large 
molecules), 58% chemicals (small molecule), with the remainder derived from natural 
plants. 
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Not all chemistry-based solutions are similar as they differ as to which 
mechanisms in the human bodies they address, a critical element of scientific and 
technological knowledge incorporated in therapeutic solutions (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). 
To identify novelty, we hence incorporated the underlying material of the solution 
(biologics, chemicals and natural products) and the mechanism of action.
24
 While, in 
principle, the origin of material gives a distinction between chemistry and the various 
derivatives of biotechnology, the mechanism of action classifies the pharmacological 
effect through which the drug may have an effect in the human body.
25
  
In addition to all other experience-based independent variables, we chose a 
window of 4 years in drug development initiatives by established firms to examine how 
the partnering oportunites relate to the drug development experience (the origin of 
material and mechanism of action) by the established firms. Appendix 2 shows the way 
in which the variable Novelty is constructed for a specific startup-established firm 
combination. Novelty takes scores between 0 and 2, with 0 indicating that the established 
firm has used the same mechanism and origin of material in the broad therapeutic domain 
and a value of 2 if the startup’s technological opportunity uses a mechanism and origin of 
                                                          
24
 We further inferred the relevance of the mechanism of action and the origin of material by reviewing the 
literature on drug discovery (e.g. Swinney & Anthony, 2011). Also, we examined the search guidelines 
outlined by pharmaceutical firms, which explicitly take into account the mechanism of action of potential 
drugs and the distinction between chemistry and biologics. An example can be found at 
 http://www.merck.com/licensing/areas_of_interest.pdf. 
25
 For example, Cox-2 inhibitors (one of our mechanism of action categories) prevent the production of 
PHG (prostaglandin) from arachidonic acid, which causes inflammation. Pharmaprojects contains 
thousands of mechanisms, and we employed a consulting firm to assess which mechanisms could be 
aggregated to reflect an important category of knowledge associated with the drug in development. A 
pharmacology expert with 26 years in drug development and a biotechnology graduate student did the 
classification separately (resulting in 310 unique pharmacology codes in our sample). We report our results 
based on the classification by the consulting firm after clarifying where some of the mismatches between 
the student and the PhD expert originated (overall agreement between the two classifications was 93%). 
Using the original code from Pharmaprojects leads to very similar results to the ones reported. The 
conversion table from the pharmaceutical consultant can be downloaded under : http://bit.ly/12SHdto  
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material previously not used by the established firm in a therapeutic area.
26
 For example, 
if the opportunity is in the therapeutic domain of cancer, we examined if the mechanism 
of action and origin of material was used by the established firm in previous problem 
solving attempts in treating cancer. Examining technological opportunities at the 
therapeutic level is consistent with research that has examined partnership formations 
between established and startup firms (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). 
We argue that higher scores of novelty signal a strong departure from prior 
problem solving attempts as firms need to incorporate new knowledge in both the origin 
of material and mechanism of action. Whenever we identified more than one compound 
available for partnering by a startup in a given year, we averaged the novelty score as 
illustrated in the example in Appendix 2.   
Distance of partnering opportunity to Commercialization: We captured the 
Distance to Commercialization by determining in which stage of the bio-pharmaceutical 
drug approval process the compound was at the time it became available for partnering. 
We distinguished the stages as being Preclinical (0), Phase I (1), Phase II (2) and Phase 
III (3). For a startup having more than one compound available for partnering, we 
selected the latest stage of all available compounds.
27
 The variable Distance to 
Commercialization is reverse coded, so that Phase III opportunities receive as less distant 
from commercialization receives a score of (0) and preclinical opportunities, the most 
distant category from commercialization in our sample  receive the highest scores (3). 
 
                                                          
26
 Throughout the analysis, we excluded partnering opportunities if the established firms had no experience 
whatsoever in a broad therapeutic areas as it is unlikely that established firms actively search for new 
partnering opportunities in such areas (see robustness tests). 
27
 Results are robust using the average stage. 
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Moderators: 
Prior Failures and Successes: Using the history of drug development for each 
established firm, we determined if firms had experienced successes or failures in the 
therapeutic area of the technological opportunity (see Appendix 3). Successes are rare in 
the bio-pharmaceutical industry, with less than 30 total new drugs approved in many after 
1996. We measured Prior Successes as the number of successful drugs launched in the 
last 4 years  in the therapeutic area addressed by the startup’s technological solutions 
(Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012) (see Appendix 3).
28
 We only considered successes when 
we had evidence of regulatory approval in either the US, Europe or Japan.  
Given that most attempts in R&D are ultimately abandoned, we did not consider it 
realistic to call an early stage departure from drug development a failure. We adopted the 
perspective that failures can be defined as alternative outcomes to successes, which 
means that firms discontinued product development attempts to which they had 
committed substantial resources and time (Girotra et al., 2010). These commitments are 
particularly large once bio-pharmaceutical firms start efficacy and large scale clinical 
testing, which is at Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the drug development process. At these stages, 
firms develop expectations of success that, if not met, result in experiences of failure 
(DiMasi et al., 2003; Shepherd et al., 2011). Similar to Prior Successes, we used a 
window of four years (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012) and counted the number of Phase 2 
and Phase 3 failures within the broad therapeutic area of the partnering opportunity to 
generate the variable Prior Failures.
29
 
                                                          
28
 As a result, failure and success are rather rare events even for large bio-pharmaceutical firms (Lampel et 
al., 2009). 
29
 At Phase II, firms are expected to have passed the proof of concept stage.  
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When a startup had technological opportunities spanning more than one broad 
therapeutic area, we averaged the number of failures and successes per compound to 
calculate an overall score indicating the average Prior Successes and Prior Failures by 
the established firms in the therapeutic domains addressed by the startup.  
 
Controls: 
We controlled for various factors that could drive partnering formation. First, we 
took into account that startups with a larger number of available compounds (Compounds 
Available ) in a given year may be more attractive for partnering. Moreover, we 
controlled for the main therapeutic area in which the startup is active. We also generated 
several dyadic measures between established firm and startup which could drive 
partnership formation. We used ReCap to capture partnerships within the same research 
community, which we defined by the broad therapeutic areas (e.g., cancer) of the startup 
firm. Prior research indicates that being part of a network and research community may 
affect subsequent partnering behavior (Gulati, 1999). ReCap indicates the therapeutic 
area in the “disease” field, by which we could classify them to one of the broad 13 
therapeutic areas.
30
 Partnerships is a count of all agreements in the past four years by the 
established firms in the same therapeutic area of the partnering opportunity. While the 
startups are all young firms and do not have a large history of partnering with established 
firms, we still controlled through an indicator variable if the established firm and the 
startup had a previous partnership (Prior Partnership), which is well-known to drive 
subsequent partnership formations (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Given that it may be 
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 We matched the therapeutic area in Recap to the therapeutic area from Pharmaprojects using a 
conversion table, which can be downloaded under: http://bit.ly/ZIoSdJ 
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difficult to spot opportunities outside the firm’s geographic boundaries (Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003), we also captured geographic differences between startups and 
established firms by adding the indicator variable Same Country, which is 1 if firms have 
their HQ in the same country. Finally, we also examined the overlap of knowledge on the 
technical level between the startup and the established firm. Following prior research, we 
proxied this overlap between the established firm and the startup’s overall knowledge 
basis (independent from the available opportunities in a given year) through their overlap 
in patenting activity (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Jaffe, 1986). We used the method 
suggested by Sampson (2007) to calculate the technological proximity based on patents 
between two firms (i and j). The distribution of knowledge is captured by a 
multidimensional vector    (  
    
 ), where   
  represents the number of patents 
assigned to firm i in patent class s.
31
 Knowledge overlap between established firm i and 
startup j is defined as:  
                  
    
 
√(    
 )(    
 )
 
The variable is 1 when firms are identical in their patenting (strong overlap) and 0 
if they are completely orthogonal (no overlap).  
We also controlled for the overall activity of an established firm in the therapeutic 
domains addressed by the technological opportunities of the startup. First, we controlled 
for the established firm’s total number of projects (preclinical to Phase 3) in the 
therapeutic domains of the partnering opportunity (Project Pipeline), as established firms 
                                                          
31
 We used a four year window and consider all 4digit IPCs associated with a patent family in Derwent, 
which more thoroughly captures the firms’ underlying knowledge bases (Benner & Waldfogel, 2008).  
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may tend to partner in areas in which they are most active. We also considered if the 
established firm has a history of addressing the same indication in the broad therapeutic 
area (e.g., Alzheimer’s as subcategory within neurogenerative diseases). The variable 
Prior Indication is 1 if the firm has already had projects addressing this indication in the 
prior four years and 0 if not.
32
 We controlled for the historic tendency to explore new 
elements of knowledge in a therapeutic area Exploration Orientation as a ratio of projects 
in which firms deviated (in the mechanism of action or origin of material) from what they 
already knew internally versus all projects initiated in a given therapeutic area (i.e., the 
variable New Projects) in a 4 year timeframe. Exploration Orientation is a ratio which is 
bounded between 0 and 1. A higher score reveals a greater tendency of firms to explore 
new knowledge. We also proxied for the availability of complementary assets by 
determining if the established firm had any Top selling drug (Top 100 Drug)
33
 in the 
therapeutic areas addressed by the startup (indicator variable). 
Additionally, we added various financial controls of the established firms and 
available resources, as they may affect partnership formation. We used the Current Ratio 
to proxy “financial slack” by the firm in a given year, which is the ratio of its current 
assets divided by its current liabilities (Greve, 2003b). We also included Total Assets 
(logged) as a proxy for the firm’s size and performance in the form of Return on Assets 
(RoA), which is known to affect firm search (Chen & Miller, 2007).  
 
                                                          
32
 The information about indication is from Pharmaprojects. In general, this information is not always 
complete as many drugs are categorized into an “Other” category, in particular, those designated for the 
treatment of cancer. 
33
 We obtained the Top 100 selling drugs from drugs.com and Verispan and linked them to the therapeutic 
area through Pharmaprojects. 
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Empirical specification 
We examined the full risk set as well as a choice-based sample with 4 control 
cases (unrealized in the same year) per realized partnership
34
 (a similar approach has 
been used for example by Hansen & Løvås, 2004). Throughout our analysis, we added 
firm fixed effects using logistic regression analysis wherein the fixed effect is specified 
for the established firm. This means that the variation explained will be within (and not 
across) firms. We note that the full risk set approach has been criticized as the total 
number of realized deals is low (around 1.32%) compared to the unrealized ones, which 
may affect standard errors (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). We mitigated these concerns by 
additionally examining a choice-based sampling approach. Following the guidelines set 
by King and Zeng (2001), we included all partnering opportunities realized plus a small 
number (4) of partnering opportunities for which partnerships did not occur; recently, 
similar techniques have been used to study dyadic partnership formations (Mitsuhashi & 
Greve, 2009) or in the evaluation of partnering opportunities (Tyler & Steensma, 1995).
35
 
We employed logistic regression with clustered standard errors. We verified that choice-
based results are robust using the rare logit modification suggested by King and Zeng 
(2001) as, for each realized partnership. we added 4 control cases. All independent 
variables are constructed with a lag structure so that we observed all independent 
variables in t-1, when we defined a partnering opportunity as available and then observed 
partnering formation in the next year. 
 
                                                          
34
 The sample is reduce to 2255 (451 partnerships + 4*451 control cases) 
35
 The paper outlines various partnering scenarios, which are evaluated by all managers participating in the 
study. 
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Table 3: Chapter 2 - Summary Statistics and Correlation Table 
   :  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Partnership Formation 1.00                                   
2 Startup Age 0.01 1.00                                 
3 Compounds Available 0.02 0.01 1.00                               
4 Partnerships (TA) 0.06 0.03 -0.03 1.00                             
5 Prior Tie  0.06 0.13 0.03 0.09 1.00                           
6 Same Country  0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.06 1.00                         
7 Overlap  Knowledge 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.09 0.07 1.00                       
8 New Projects (TA) 0.06 0.00 -0.05 0.66 0.09 0.00 0.15 1.00                     
9 Exploration (TA) 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 1.00                   
10 Prior Indication 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.25 0.05 -0.03 0.13 0.27 0.00 1.00                 
11 Top 100 Drug (TA) 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.26 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.34 -0.03 0.17 1.00               
12 Total Assets  0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.28 0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.39 -0.04 0.24 0.35 1.00             
13 Return on Assets 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.20 -0.05 0.07 0.18 0.24 1.00           
14 Financial Slack -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.16 -0.17 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.44 -0.14 1.00         
15 Prior Failures (TA) 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.30 0.04 -0.08 0.11 0.44 -0.08 0.19 0.25 0.24 0.08 -0.09 1.00       
16 Success (TA) 0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.43 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.44 -0.09 0.18 0.33 0.22 0.12 -0.06 0.21 1.00     
17 Novelty -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.29 -0.07 0.01 -0.11 -0.30 -0.01 -0.27 -0.15 -0.26 -0.06 0.11 -0.18 -0.19 1.00   
18 
Distance 
Commercialization -0.02 -0.11 0.13 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 1.00 
  mean 0.02 7.75 1.58 2.33 0.06 0.35 0.67 5.00 0.51 0.79 0.32 9.20 0.12 2.51 0.83 0.70 0.96 2.17 
  sd 0.13 5.36 1.06 2.67 0.23 0.48 0.15 4.77 0.32 0.38 0.47 1.28 0.12 2.33 1.13 0.86 0.67 1.02 
  min 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.40 -0.16 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  max 1.00 19.00 10.00 18.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 34.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 11.73 0.38 18.39 9.00 6.00 2.00 3.00 
    n=27697 (based on Full Sample), TA – based on therapeutic area of partnering opportunity 
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RESULTS  
Table 3 shows the summary statistics and correlation table. Examining the 
correlations, we do not find evidence that multicollinearity might be a cause of concern. 
The mean VIF for the full models is below 3.34 and individual VIFs for the independent 
variables and moderators are below 2.33.  
We next examine both the entire sample and the choice-based sample (1 realized 
partnering opportunity 4 unrealized) in parallel to test our hypotheses (Table 4). Model 
1a/1b show the effect of the control variables on the likelihood of partnership formation. 
Consistent with prior research, we find that geographic proximity (Same Country) and 
Prior Partnering have a positive direct effect on the likelihood of forming a partnerships 
with a startup. Moreover, we find that established firms pursue partnerships in problem 
areas where they were successful in launching new drugs (Success), already having 
experience in the therapeutic indication (Prior Indication). The number of Compounds 
Available by startups is also an important factor influencing partnership formation. In the 
full sample, we find evidence that Knowledge Overlap affects partnership formation but 
the result does not hold in the choice-based model. Surprisingly, we do not find evidence 
suggesting that the overall activity in a therapeutic area (New Projects) drives partnership 
formation and also find no direct effect of Failure.  
Model 2a/2b add the Novelty and Distance to Commercialization measures of the 
partnering opportunity to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. We expected the two forms 
of myopia to have a negative effect on partnership formation. As can be seen in both 
models, Novelty has a strong negative effect on the likelihood of partnership formation. 
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Table 4: Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample  
DV Partnership Formation (1a) 
Full 
Sample 
(1b) 
Choice 
Based 
(2a) 
Full 
Sample 
(2b) 
Choice 
Based 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
Main Therapy Area Effect Y Y Y Y 
Startup Age 0.002 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
Compounds Available 0.115** 
(0.041) 
0.129** 
(0.041) 
0.146*** 
(0.040) 
0.160*** 
(0.040) 
Partnerships (TA) 0.030 
(0.035) 
0.031 
(0.027) 
0.027 
(0.035) 
0.026 
(0.028) 
Prior Tie  0.768*** 
(0.135) 
0.871*** 
(0.138) 
0.770*** 
(0.136) 
0.901*** 
(0.138) 
Same Country  0.421** 
(0.140) 
0.437** 
(0.157) 
0.414** 
(0.141) 
0.437** 
(0.161) 
Overlap  Knowledge 0.987* 
(0.384) 
0.811 
(0.512) 
0.958* 
(0.382) 
0.830 
(0.517) 
Project Pipeline (TA) 0.018 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.016) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
Exploration Orient. (TA) 0.250 
(0.175) 
0.301 
(0.195) 
0.241 
(0.173) 
0.304 
(0.190) 
Prior Indication 0.605*** 
(0.191) 
0.601*** 
(0.191) 
0.542** 
(0.178) 
0.609** 
(0.193) 
Top 100 Drug (TA) 0.357+ 
(0.184) 
0.349* 
(0.152) 
0.347+ 
(0.182) 
0.339* 
(0.156) 
Total Assets  0.295 
(0.247) 
0.047 
(0.059) 
0.284 
(0.250) 
0.031 
(0.051) 
Return on Assets 1.141 
(0.909) 
-0.102 
(0.293) 
1.173 
(0.918) 
-0.147 
(0.269) 
Financial Slack -0.094 
(0.085) 
-0.034 
(0.026) 
-0.094 
(0.085) 
-0.028 
(0.024) 
Prior Failures (TA) 0.025 
(0.051) 
0.058 
(0.047) 
0.021 
(0.052) 
0.059 
(0.049) 
Prior Successes (TA) 0.138* 
(0.068) 
0.151* 
(0.066) 
0.135* 
(0.067) 
0.147* 
(0.068) 
Novelty 
  
-0.221** 
(0.075) 
-0.234** 
(0.087) 
Distance Commercializat. 
  
-0.190*** 
(0.052) 
-0.205*** 
(0.055) 
Novelty X Prior Failures 
    Novelty X Prior Successes 
    Constant -9.033*** 
(2.602) 
-3.470*** 
(0.719) 
-8.899*** 
(2.631) 
-3.257*** 
(0.639) 
Log Likelihood -2127.76 -1071.79 -2115.88 -1061.51 
Observations 27697 2255 27697 2255 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (TA based on therapeutic area of opportunity) 
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Table 4 (continued) : Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample  
DV Partnership Formation (3a) 
Full 
Sample 
(3b) 
Choice 
Based 
(4a) 
Full 
Sample 
(4b) 
Choice 
Based 
Firm & Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
Main Therapy Area Effect Y Y Y Y 
Startup Age -0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
Compounds Available 0.149*** 
(0.040) 
0.161*** 
(0.039) 
0.147*** 
(0.039) 
0.160*** 
(0.039) 
Partnerships (TA) 0.030 
(0.034) 
0.031 
(0.026) 
0.029 
(0.035) 
0.031 
(0.026) 
Prior Tie  0.770*** 
(0.136) 
0.914*** 
(0.138) 
0.771*** 
(0.136) 
0.906*** 
(0.139) 
Same Country  0.413** 
(0.141) 
0.423** 
(0.163) 
0.415** 
(0.141) 
0.438** 
(0.159) 
Overlap  Knowledge 0.957* 
(0.382) 
0.851+ 
(0.509) 
0.957* 
(0.384) 
0.858+ 
(0.515) 
Project Pipeline (TA) 0.017 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.002 
(0.016) 
Exploration Orient. (TA) 0.224 
(0.174) 
0.284 
(0.190) 
0.233 
(0.174) 
0.283 
(0.191) 
Prior Indication 0.514** 
(0.179) 
0.584** 
(0.196) 
0.526** 
(0.180) 
0.587** 
(0.195) 
Top 100 Drug (TA) 0.338+ 
(0.181) 
0.324* 
(0.155) 
0.341+ 
(0.180) 
0.323* 
(0.153) 
Total Assets  0.283 
(0.253) 
0.022 
(0.054) 
0.284 
(0.252) 
0.029 
(0.057) 
Return on Assets 1.170 
(0.918) 
-0.167 
(0.276) 
1.165 
(0.924) 
-0.149 
(0.283) 
Financial Slack -0.092 
(0.085) 
-0.028 
(0.025) 
-0.092 
(0.085) 
-0.026 
(0.025) 
Prior Failures (TA) 0.073 
(0.052) 
0.087 
(0.061) 
0.021 
(0.052) 
0.062 
(0.050) 
Prior Successes (TA) 0.138* 
(0.066) 
0.153* 
(0.066) 
0.173* 
(0.071) 
0.228** 
(0.076) 
Novelty -0.282*** 
(0.076) 
-0.318*** 
(0.090) 
-0.231** 
(0.078) 
-0.280** 
(0.097) 
Distance Commercializat. -0.192*** 
(0.052) 
-0.205*** 
(0.055) 
-0.191*** 
(0.052) 
-0.204*** 
(0.055) 
Novelty X Prior Failures 0.140*** 
(0.040) 
0.179*** 
(0.047) 
  Novelty X Prior Successes 
  
0.082 
(0.071) 
0.123 
(0.076) 
Constant -8.876*** 
(2.660) 
-3.131*** 
(0.653) 
-8.899*** 
(2.648) 
-3.251*** 
(0.688) 
Log Likelihood -2113.19 -1057.96 -2115.25 -1059.49 
Observations 27697 2255 27697 2255 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (TA based on therapeutic area of opportunity) 
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In a similar vein, the Distance to Commercialization of the partnering opportunity 
significantly reduces the likelihood of subsequent partnership formation (the marginal 
effects are equally significant at p<0.01 holding all other variables at their mean values).  
To test Hypotheses 3a,b and 4a,b, we added interactions to the model. We started 
in Model 3a/3b by interacting Novelty with Prior Failures. Supporting Hypothesis 3a, we 
find a positive effect of the interaction, indicating that firms that have experienced failure 
in solving therapeutic problems related to the partnering opportunity are more likely to 
pursue partnerships with novel elements of knowledge. We demonstrate this effect 
graphically in Figure 9, where we plot the moderation of Novelty at various levels of 
Prior Failures.  
Figure 9: Chapter 2 - Moderation Novelty and Prior Failures 
 
Figure 9 indicates the persistent tendency of established firms to search for 
partnering opportunities in the neighborhood of existing solutions. We see, however, that 
this tendency is much less salient once firms have experienced failures and is reversed 
when failures in the therapeutic areas addressed by the startup firm are at very high 
levels. Overall, the results provide support for Hypothesis 3a.  
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Table 5: Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample – Continued 
DV Partnership Formation (5a) 
Full 
Sample 
(5b) 
Choice 
Based 
(6a) 
Full 
Sample 
(6b) 
Choice 
Based 
Firm Fixed and Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
Main Therapy Area Effect Y Y Y Y 
Startup Age -0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
Compounds Available 0.146*** 
(0.040) 
0.159*** 
(0.040) 
0.152*** 
(0.039) 
0.160*** 
(0.039) 
Partnerships (TA) 0.027 
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.028) 
0.027 
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.026) 
Prior Tie  0.775*** 
(0.135) 
0.912*** 
(0.137) 
0.760*** 
(0.137) 
0.890*** 
(0.135) 
Same Country  0.415** 
(0.140) 
0.447** 
(0.159) 
0.413** 
(0.142) 
0.443** 
(0.162) 
Overlap  Knowledge 0.947* 
(0.383) 
0.781 
(0.517) 
0.944* 
(0.394) 
0.871+ 
(0.503) 
Project Pipeline (TA) 0.018 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.016) 
Exploration Orient. (TA) 0.239 
(0.173) 
0.296 
(0.189) 
0.245 
(0.173) 
0.311 
(0.191) 
Prior Indication 0.542** 
(0.179) 
0.603** 
(0.192) 
0.550** 
(0.177) 
0.632*** 
(0.191) 
Top 100 Drug (TA) 0.348+ 
(0.182) 
0.337* 
(0.154) 
0.349+ 
(0.182) 
0.343* 
(0.158) 
Total Assets  0.284 
(0.250) 
0.035 
(0.053) 
0.285 
(0.247) 
0.034 
(0.056) 
Return on Assets 1.174 
(0.920) 
-0.117 
(0.270) 
1.167 
(0.922) 
-0.168 
(0.268) 
Financial Slack -0.094 
(0.085) 
-0.028 
(0.024) 
-0.093 
(0.085) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
Prior Failures (TA) 0.014 
(0.054) 
0.057 
(0.049) 
0.022 
(0.052) 
0.050 
(0.049) 
Prior Successes (TA) 0.135* 
(0.067) 
0.156* 
(0.067) 
0.142* 
(0.063) 
0.153* 
(0.063) 
Novelty -0.219** 
(0.075) 
-0.234** 
(0.087) 
-0.226** 
(0.075) 
-0.229** 
(0.087) 
Distance Commercialization -0.171** 
(0.053) 
-0.171** 
(0.064) 
-0.249*** 
(0.057) 
-0.260*** 
(0.064) 
Novelty X Prior Failures     
Novelty X Prior Successes     
Distance Comm. x Failures -0.051+ 
(0.029) 
-0.069+ 
(0.039) 
  
Distance Comm. x Successes   0.132** 
(0.042) 
0.145** 
(0.054) 
Constant -8.897*** 
(2.636) 
-3.261*** 
(0.640) 
-8.948*** 
(2.601) 
-3.334*** 
(0.678) 
Log Likelihood -2114.26 -1060.11 -2111.20 -1057.71 
Observations 27697 2255 27697 2255 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, (TA based on therapeutic area of the opportunity) 
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Table 5 (continued): Chapter 2 - Results – Logit - Full and Choice Based Sample – Continued 
DV Partnership Formation (7a) 
Full Sample 
(7b) 
Choice Based 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Y Y 
Main Therapy Area Effect Y Y 
Startup Age -0.003 
(0.013) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
Compounds Available 0.156*** 
(0.039) 
0.161*** 
(0.039) 
Partnerships (TA) 0.031 
(0.035) 
0.031 
(0.024) 
Prior Tie  0.768*** 
(0.137) 
0.916*** 
(0.135) 
Same Country  0.411** 
(0.141) 
0.444** 
(0.159) 
Overlap  Knowledge 0.935* 
(0.386) 
0.857+ 
(0.492) 
Project Pipeline (TA) 0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
Exploration Orient. (TA) 0.223 
(0.176) 
0.267 
(0.192) 
Prior Indication 0.518** 
(0.178) 
0.590** 
(0.193) 
Top 100 Drug (TA) 0.339+ 
(0.180) 
0.315* 
(0.154) 
Total Assets  0.283 
(0.250) 
0.030 
(0.065) 
Return on Assets 1.153 
(0.928) 
-0.154 
(0.286) 
Financial Slack -0.090 
(0.085) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
Prior Failures (TA) 0.060 
(0.052) 
0.085 
(0.062) 
Prior Successes (TA) 0.160* 
(0.067) 
0.224** 
(0.071) 
Novelty -0.295*** 
(0.077) 
-0.352*** 
(0.095) 
Distance Commercialization -0.223*** 
(0.057) 
-0.222** 
(0.071) 
Novelty X Prior Failures 0.139** 
(0.044) 
0.166*** 
(0.045) 
Novelty X Prior Successes 0.028 
(0.074) 
0.120 
(0.074) 
Distance Comm. x Failures -0.076* 
(0.032) 
-0.087+ 
(0.045) 
Distance Comm. x Successes 0.156*** 
(0.045) 
0.157** 
(0.054) 
Constant -8.909*** 
(2.633) 
-3.232*** 
(0.727) 
Log Likelihood -2106.21 -1050.98 
Observations 27697 2255 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, (TA based on therapeutic area of the opportunity) 
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Hypothesis 3b predicted an opposite effect as a history of success would reinforce 
local tendencies and lead firms to not consider opportunities with novel elements of 
knowledge. When interacting Novelty and Prior Successes (Model 4a/4b respectively), 
we do not find the predicted effect. Instead of the expected negative interaction, we find a 
positive albeit insignificant effect. We hence do not find support for Hypothesis 3b, 
which suggested that Prior Successes would lead firms to seek technological solutions 
knowledge in the neighborhood of previous problem-solving attempts.   
We next tested Hypotheses 4a. Models 5a/5b (Table 5) show the interaction of 
Distance to Commercialization with Prior Failures. We do not observe overall strong 
support for the theorized effect as we only find marginal significance for the moderation 
of Prior Failures and Distance to Commercialization, which is low given the number of 
observations. This effect is graphically explored in Figure 10. It gives at least partial 
support for Hypothesis 4a, that at high levels of Prior Failures, established firms at least 
marginally prefer partnering opportunities that are close to commercialization. 
Figure 10: Chapter 2 - Moderation Distance to Commercialization and Prior Failures 
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We observe the opposite effect in Models 6a/6b, which examine the interaction of 
Distance to Commercialization and Prior Successes. Namely, the more Prior Successes, 
the more firms tend to pursue partnering opportunities distant to commercialization. The 
effect is demonstrated graphically in Figure 11 and supports Hypothesis 4b. Overall, the 
findings for Hypothesis 4a and 4b indicate that failures and successes quite differently 
shape the relationship of Distance to Commercialization and Partnership Formation but 
the effect of Prior Failures is only marginally supported through our empirical results. 
Figure 11: Chapter 2 - Moderation Distance to Commercialization and Prior Successes 
 
Model 7a/7b demonstrate that all interactions that were supported individually 
also hold in a full model. Interestingly, these models show that when considering both 
interactions of Distance of Commercialization with Prior Successes and Prior Failures 
simultaneously, we indeed find that they have the expected opposite effects on the 
likelihood of partnerships formations (at least in the full model). While Prior Failures 
lead firms to shy away from opportunities distant from commercialization (early stage), 
Prior Successes have the opposite effect as firms more readily pursue early stage 
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solutions. Both Prior Failures and Prior Successes are correlated at 0.21, which may 
affect the result. However, their level of correlation does not cause concern in terms of 
multicolinearity, lending some support for Hypothesis 4a, while 4b remains supported in 
the full model. 
Table 6 showcases the marginal effects of Novelty and Distance to 
Commercialization at different levels of the moderators. We examined the 25
th
 and 75
th
 
percentile value of Prior Failures and Prior Successes, which again supports Hypotheses 
3a, 4a (partially) and 4b.  
Table 6: Chapter 2 - Marginal effects: 
Marginal Effects of Novelty/Distance to Commercialization at different levels of 
moderators: 
STATA - Margins Novelty 
Distance to 
Commercialization 
When Prior Failures is at 25
th
 percentile 
-0.0611*** 
(0.0138) 
-0.0182 
(0.0116) 
When Prior Failures is at 75
th
 percentile 
-0.0320* 
(0.0149) 
-0.0411*** 
(0.0090) 
Changes in the marginal effect  0.0709** 0.0229+ 
When Prior Successes is at 25
th
 percentile not significant 
 -0.0452*** 
(0.0108) 
When Prior Successes is at 75
th
 percentile not significant 
-0.0224* 
(0.0092) 
Changes in the marginal effect  not significant 0.0228* 
 
Robustness Tests: We conducted several additional checks to establish the 
robustness of the findings (Table 7). First, we relaxed the assumption that all established 
firms in the sample were at risk of establishing a partnership in a given year. Omitting 
those years in which an established firm did not pursue a partnership equally supports our 
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results (Model R1).
36
 In a similar vein, we show that results are robust when considering 
a risk set which includes those partnering opportunities in which the established firms 
had no prior experience in the broad therapeutic area (R2). We note that in this model, we 
would have to assume that firms would search for technologies in therapeutic areas, in 
which they are not currently active, which is very rarely observed in our data. In a final 
check related to the sample, we also excluded firms which had substantial revenues but 
were not founded in the chemistry-based drug development paradigm (Amgen, 
Genentech and Chiron). Results remain robust when we only consider established firms 
that traditionally focused on chemistry-based drug development.  
We also operationalized our key variables in different ways. Namely, we used 
indicator variables for Prior Failures and Prior Successes, in which failures and 
successes are operationalized by binary variables (Models R3a and R3b). The results are 
very similar to using the count variables in Tables 4 and 5. We alternatively deployed a 
depreciated failure and success experience in which we considered the complete drug 
development history (starting 1988) and a discount factor of 80% each year (Model R4a, 
R4b). Again, results are in line with the main findings. However, it is interesting to note 
that the significance for the Distance to Commercialization and Failure interaction in 
models R4a and R4b is slightly lower than before.
37
 We conducted further robustness 
tests, operationalizing Novelty and Distance to Commercialization differently. Namely, 
                                                          
36
 The result of a two-stage Heckman (1977) estimation, including the inverse Mills ratio generated from a 
first stage (formed partnership in a given year), also provides support for our hypotheses even if we only 
consider years in which firms formed a partnership (results available from the authors). 
37
 Both Prior Failures and Prior Successes hold when operationalized as cumulative counts of the prior 3 
years only and Prior Failures holds when only capturing Phase III and not Phase II discontinuations. 
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we individually examined if Novelty constructed using only the origin of material or only 
the mechanism of action lead to similar results.
38
 This is shown in model R5a/b and 
R6a/b, which support our main results but with slightly weaker significance. Namely, the 
choice based model, in which we operationalize Novelty through the mechanism of action 
only, leads to a marginally significant effect for the interaction with failure. Still, when 
examining the moderations, we observe that both operationalization show quite similar 
effects, further supporting our findings.  
  
                                                          
38
 The two alternative variables are correlated at 0.16. 
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Table 7: Chapter 2 - Robustness Tests – Logit - DV Partnership Formation  
DV Partnership Formation 
 
 
(R1) 
Sample:  
Only Years 
in which 
firms had at 
least one 
partnership 
(R2) 
Sample: 
All therapy 
codes 
(including 
where firms 
not active) 
(R3a) 
Full 
Sample: 
Failure & 
Success -
indicators 
 
(R3b) 
Choice 
Based: 
Failure & 
Success - 
indicators 
(R4a) 
Full 
Sample: 
Failure & 
Success - 
depreciated 
stock 
(R4b) 
Choice 
Based: 
Failure & 
Success - 
depreciated 
stock 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main Therapy Area E. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Failure (TA) 0.052 
(0.044) 
0.064 
(0.052) 
0.115 
(0.124) 
0.087 
(0.149) 
0.001 
(0.058) 
0.066 
(0.065) 
Success (TA) 0.162** 
(0.061) 
0.191** 
(0.068) 
0.537*** 
(0.138) 
0.649*** 
(0.142) 
0.212* 
(0.087) 
0.297** 
(0.098) 
Novelty -0.311*** 
(0.079) 
-0.375*** 
(0.072) 
-0.419*** 
(0.125) 
-0.469** 
(0.150) 
-0.274*** 
(0.075) 
-0.331*** 
(0.094) 
Distance Commercializ. -0.221*** 
(0.057) 
-0.230*** 
(0.057) 
-0.325** 
(0.103) 
-0.318* 
(0.139) 
-0.212*** 
(0.053) 
-0.219*** 
(0.062) 
Novelty X Prior Failures 0.141*** 
(0.039) 
0.162*** 
(0.045) 
0.342** 
(0.119) 
0.269+ 
(0.142) 
0.159** 
(0.057) 
0.162** 
(0.061) 
Novelty X Success 0.033 
(0.070) 
0.076 
(0.069) 
-0.009 
(0.167) 
0.125 
(0.154) 
0.062 
(0.081) 
0.128 
(0.083) 
Distance Com. x Failures -0.071* 
(0.030) 
-0.074* 
(0.031) 
-0.200+ 
(0.112) 
-0.212+ 
(0.123) 
-0.076+ 
(0.041) 
-0.077+ 
(0.042) 
Distance Com. x Successes 0.150*** 
(0.044) 
0.165*** 
(0.045) 
0.400** 
(0.124) 
0.392** 
(0.149) 
0.132** 
(0.050) 
0.152** 
(0.053) 
Constant -6.167*** 
(1.116) 
-9.005*** 
(2.406) 
-9.230*** 
(2.590) 
-3.426*** 
(0.838) 
-9.023*** 
(2.629) 
-3.112*** 
(0.694) 
Log Likelihood -1953.56 -2260.37 -2099.86 -1047.91 -2107.35 -1052.13 
Observations 16683 33532 27697 2255 27697 2255 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; variables not shown but included in the models: Startup Age, 
Compounds Available, Partnerships, Prior Tie, Same Country,  Overlap Knowledge, New Projects, 
Exploration Orientation (not in R2), Prior Indication,  Top 100 Drug,  Total Assets, Return on Assets, 
Financial Slack 
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Table 7 (continued): Chapter 2 - Robustness Tests – Logit - DV Partnership Formation  
DV Partnership Formation 
 
 
(R5a) 
Full 
Sample: 
Novelty – 
Origin of 
Material 
 
(R5b) 
Choice 
Based: 
Novelty – 
Origin of 
Material 
 
(R6a) 
Full 
Sample: 
Novelty – 
Mechanism 
of Action  
 
(R6b) 
Choice 
Based: 
Novelty – 
Mechanism 
of Action 
 
(R7a) 
Full 
Sample: 
Distance 
Comm. 
indicator 
(R7b) 
Choice 
Based: 
Distance 
Comm. 
indicator 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main Therapy Area E. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Failure (TA) -0.032 
(0.063) 
0.008 
(0.053) 
-0.056 
(0.071) 
-0.057 
(0.061) 
-0.001 
(0.061) 
0.042 
(0.050) 
Success (TA) 0.141* 
(0.062) 
0.138* 
(0.065) 
0.137 
(0.075) 
0.138+ 
(0.076) 
0.272*** 
(0.078) 
0.330*** 
(0.083) 
Novelty -0.249* 
(0.125) 
-0.303* 
(0.142) 
-0.236* 
(0.099) 
-0.315** 
(0.121) 
-0.298*** 
(0.077) 
-0.359*** 
(0.096) 
Distance Commercializ. -0.227*** 
(0.057) 
-0.227** 
(0.069) 
-0.222*** 
(0.057) 
-0.224** 
(0.069) 
0.439*** 
(0.129) 
0.457** 
(0.158) 
Novelty X Prior Failures 0.190* 
(0.095) 
0.199* 
(0.094) 
0.118+ 
(0.067) 
0.196* 
(0.076) 
0.140** 
(0.044) 
0.175*** 
(0.044) 
Novelty X Success 0.027 
(0.119) 
0.171 
(0.141) 
0.039 
(0.090) 
0.085 
(0.099) 
0.028 
(0.074) 
0.120 
(0.074) 
Distance Com. x Failures -0.078* 
(0.032) 
-0.089* 
(0.038) 
-0.077* 
(0.032) 
-0.089* 
(0.039) 
-0.1901+ 
(0.098) 
-0.231+ 
(0.123) 
Distance Com. x Successes 0.156*** 
(0.045) 
0.158** 
(0.054) 
0.153*** 
(0.045) 
0.161** 
(0.054) 
0.380*** 
(0.093) 
0.354** 
(0.113) 
Constant -8.907*** 
(2.629) 
-3.128*** 
(0.772) 
-8.937*** 
(2.595) 
-3.120*** 
(0.709) 
-8.996*** 
(2.638) 
-3.349*** 
(0.749) 
Log Likelihood -2109.22 -1054.42 -2110.48 -1054.58 -2106.73 -1050.37 
Observations 27697 2255 27697 2255 27697 2255 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; variables not shown but included in the models: Startup Age, 
Compounds Available, Partnerships, Prior Tie, Same Country,  Overlap Knowledge, New Projects, 
Exploration Orientation (not in R2), Prior Indication,  Top 100 Drug,  Total Assets, Return on Assets, 
Financial Slack 
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It is also interesting to note that while the Origin of Material strongly predicts 
myopia (Hypothesis 1), we do not find this effect significant from the Mechanism of 
Action (negative effect but significance at p<0.13). Finally, we operationalized Distance 
to Commercialization through an indicator variable, in which we split opportunities if 
they are before proof of concept (preclinical-Phase) or after (Phase II and Phase III). We 
also ran additional graphical checks using the inteff command in STATA to understand 
the interaction effects (Ai & Norton, 2003; Zelner, 2009). Graphical inspection is 
recommended  to  investigate  whether  most observations have a Z-statistic above 2 (for 
hypotheses 3a and 4b) and below 2 (for hypotheses 3b and 4a). Appendix 4 indeed 
showcases that for all significant interactions, we find that the majority of observations 
are above/below significant at p<0.05 further strengthening our results.  
DISCUSSION 
This paper examines how established firms react to emerging technological 
opportunities from startup firms, which are considered an important generator of 
innovative and often radical technological solutions. We take into account that the 
interpretation, recognition and pursuit of partnering opportunities is influenced by 
myopic tendencies, as firms tend to overlook technological solutions that are novel or that 
will result in payoffs in the distant future. We hence demonstrate that merely opening up 
to external startups does not necessarily alleviate the tendency of firms to search locally 
with respect to novelty and distance to commercialization of partnering opportunities. 
We further consider that the recognition of external opportunities may be shaped 
by a firm’s prior successes and failures. We combine both perspectives and investigate 
how successes and failures shape the reaction of established firms to external partnering 
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opportunities that differ both in their degree of technological novelty to the established 
firm and their distance to commercialization. 
In doing so, we clarify how prior failures and prior successes differently shape the 
two forms of myopia. While prior failures generate an organizational environment in 
which firms become more open to novel ways of solving problems, they, at the same 
time, may push firms to seek partnering opportunities which promise immediate payoffs. 
Conversely, prior successes may enable firms to take the long term perspective of adding 
partnering opportunities with more distant payoffs. The study hence argues for the value 
of integrating perspectives on myopia and local search with studies examining events of 
failures and successes (Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012) to understand decisions made 
concerning firm partnering.  
While recent studies have examined if failures or successes have a stronger effect 
on organizational learning (Madsen & Desai, 2010), the insight of our study is that prior 
failures and prior successes cannot unambiguously be associated with a distinct search 
directions as they influence the various forms of myopia in different ways. For example, 
while failures challenge the firm’s current assumptions, they simultaneously generate 
urgency, leading not only to pursuing opportunities with novel elements of knowledge 
but also opportunities with immediate payoffs. At the same time, we do not find evidence 
that prior successes “trap” organizations into local paths (Audia et al., 2000). Conversely, 
in our setting, a history of successes may generate an organizational environment in 
which firms consider partnering opportunities more distant from commercialization. 
Hence, both failures and successes may play an important role in adding variety of 
different forms to firms’ innovation pipelines.  
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We also shed light on some underlying activities that may shape a firm’s ability to 
recognize external partnering opportunities. While previous researchers have generally 
emphasized the importance of internal R&D per se in sensing and seizing external 
technological solutions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), we provide a more nuanced view as 
to how prior success and failure in R&D shape this ability. Given that firms today 
continue to face scrutiny of their own internal investments in R&D and are heavily 
penalized for failure, we argue that this study reveals that failure may actually have some 
benefits as it opens the firms up towards new ways of problem-solving.  
The study has a number of limitations, which should provide ample opportunities 
for future research. First, it was conducted in the context of a single industry and the 
generalizability of our findings and their boundary conditions would need to be validated 
through explorations in other empirical contexts. The bio-pharmaceutical industry as a 
research context, however, allows us to readily capture success and failure in R&D, 
which is challenging in other industry settings. In addition, while, in pharmaceutical 
partnering, opportunities can be readily identified, this may not be possible in other 
industries. Relying on patents may not be the best strategy as it is unclear if patents are 
actually available for partnering or licensing by the startup firm.  
Second, and in a similar vein, the study currently only considers reactions to 
emerging external technological opportunities through partnering. However, established 
firms possess a broad variety of tools to tap into external knowledge, including 
acquisitions or CVC investments (Keil et al., 2008; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003). The 
study hence only captures a subset of actions at the disposal of established firms. 
Restricting our analysis to partnering, however, allows us to identify an unambiguous risk 
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set of opportunities available for partnering. With an acquisition, firms gain access to the 
full knowledge of a startup, including all patents and prior projects – it is hence more 
difficult to define what really was at risk before the acquisition transaction took place. 
Conversely, partnering is limited to specific products in development, which allows us to 
more accurately identify technological opportunities versus those pursued. The expansion 
of the study to include acquisitions, however, provides an interesting area for future 
research as there may be differences in what type of opportunities firms partner for and 
acquire.  
Finally, the partnerships observed in this study only constitute a subset of all 
partnerships in which established firms engage. In this study, we do not capture very 
early stage discovery partnerships or commercialization partnerships that occur when 
drugs are already approved. Future research may attempt to expand the study to a broader 
set of value chain activities. Given that it is difficult to unambiguously identify the 
partnering opportunities when no compound is yet available, we opted to exclude very 
early stage research partnerships (at discovery stage). An important limitation hence is 
that the startups we observe already have some history and products in development, 
which in the bio-pharmaceutical industry can take already a decade of research. At the 
same time, firms already having commercialized compounds available may behave very 
differently in partnering as incentives and bargaining power change substantially 
(Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011). Firms with such partnering opportunities may themselves 
have already invested in complementary assets and started their transition to become 
more like established industry players, which mostly likely changes the dynamics in 
partnership formations. 
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CONCLUSION 
We combine perspectives on organizational myopia and organizational learning to 
investigate how prior successes and failures shape the reaction of established firms to 
external partnering opportunities. Comparing potential and realized partnerships between 
established and startup firms, we illustrate that myopic tendencies are highly salient in the 
partnering formation process between established and startup firms. However, we also 
outline the role of prior failures and successes in illustrating when firms go beyond local 
search in partnership formation. We find that while prior failures are important to firms’ 
consideration of novel technological solutions, prior successes can make them more 
receptive to solutions at an earlier stage of development. Hence, both failures and 
successes may make firms more receptive to different types of emerging partnering 
opportunities.   
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CHAPTER 3: SWIMMING AGAINST THE CURRENT:  
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RADICAL INNOVATION AND 
STARTUP FIRM MARKET VALUE 
An important line of inquiry within the technological change literature highlights 
that in environments characterized by rapid technological change, new startup firms 
frequently emerge that challenge the ways in which incumbent firms solve problems and 
come up with radically new solutions and products (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; 
Foster, 1986; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Radical innovations, i.e., innovations that are 
“based on a substantially new technology relative to what already exists” (Govindarajan 
& Kopalle, 2006:13) and “involve methods and materials that are novel to incumbents” 
(Hill & Rothaermel, 2003) are at the heart of Schumpeter’s (1942) theory of creative 
destruction, which suggests that startup firms – unencumbered by aging and embedded 
competencies – nimbly push technological change forward and ultimately gain the 
“attacker’s” advantages (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Cooper & Schendel, 1976; 
Foster, 1986; Henderson, 1993; Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). 
At the same time, however, established firms often retain possession of 
specialized downstream complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel, 
2001; Taylor & Helfat, 2009), which leads to challenges for startup firms pursuing 
innovations different from the existing industry conventions and recipes (Spender, 1989). 
It is, hence, not surprising that empirical findings testing the relationship of radical 
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innovation and performance outcomes for startup firms remain inconclusive at best (Li & 
Atuahene-Gima, 2001).
 39
  
In this paper, we consider startup firms located in an industry in which established 
firms retain control of downstream complementary assets. In a first step, we examine if 
pursuing radical product innovations in such a setting generates higher or lower market 
valuations, a key performance indicator for startup firms (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009; 
DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999; Zott & Amit, 2008). We next take into 
account the unique dependencies between startups and established firms and, in a second 
step, examine under which conditions pursuing radical product innovation may be 
associated with higher market valuations for startups.  
Drawing on the literature on startup performance and inter-organizational 
partnering (Baum et al., 2000a; Stinchcombe, 1965; Stuart et al., 1999; Tushman & 
Anderson, 1986), we argue that pursuing radical ways of solving problems compound 
legitimacy issues and resource constraints leading to lower market valuations for startups. 
Considering the unique interdependencies between startups and established firms, 
however, suggests that under distinct conditions, startups pursuing radical innovations 
may mitigate these constraints. In particular, we examine the formation of 
commercialization partnerships (Baum et al., 2000a; Stuart et al., 1999) and the maturity 
of technologies in development (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) by the startup, as well as 
failure in R&D efforts by established firms (Cyert & March, 1963; Madsen & Desai, 
2010) as important conditions mitigating legitimacy and resource constraints for startups 
pursuing radical innovations.  
                                                          
39
 Li and colleagues are not explicit about the radicalness of innovation but consider innovations new to the 
firm and /or the market as product innovation in general.  
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We test our hypotheses in the global biopharmaceutical industry by examining the 
product innovation by New Biotechnology Firms (labeled startups in this paper). In the 
1990s, hundreds of biotechnology entrants pursued the bio-pharmaceutical industry in the 
hope of dramatically altering the industry landscape (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; 
Schweizer, 2005). We assembled a unique panel dataset that includes information on 144 
startups with an IPO during the 1991-1999 and track them between 1991 and 2008. By 
comparing the startups’ products in development to those of incumbent firms in the 
industry, we are able to generate a unique time-variant measure for innovation 
radicalness, which avoids any ex post classification of the radical nature of the startups’ 
technological solutions (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). 
Consistent with our arguments, we find that there is a severe penalty associated 
with pursuing radical product innovation in an industry where established firms remain in 
possession of important complementary assets. At the same time, however, this penalty is 
substantially reversed for startups forming commercialization partnerships and for those 
startups pursuing radical innovations in therapeutic areas where incumbent firms 
experience failures in their own product development attempts. We find only limited 
evidence that the downsides of pursuing radical innovations may be offset by the 
maturity of the startup’s technological solutions. Our results account for unobserved 
differences across firms and over time, and are robust to a number of alternative 
econometric specifications and operationalization of key variables. 
This study is a first attempt to systematically and longitudinally identify radical 
product innovations for startup firms, while taking into account the unique dependencies 
between startups and established firms. Previous studies have predominantly focused on 
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established firms and their ability to cope with radical technological change per se (Hill 
& Rothaermel, 2003; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005), but have less taken into account the 
consequences for startups pursuing radical innovations when established firms retain 
complementary assets. 
We show that in environments where established firms retain complementary 
assets, there are no clear attacker’s advantages (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Foster, 
1986) and startups pursuing radical innovations are actually penalized in their market 
value. This complements the literature on the liability of newness and smallness  
(Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983; Stinchcombe, 1965), which has identified that young 
and nascent firms are facing a unique set of challenges threatening their survival. We 
suggest and find that to fully comprehend the severity of challenges for startup firms, it is 
important to differentiate how new and young firms are positioned in their innovation 
attempts versus the established firms. 
To our knowledge, our study is also the first to consider failure by incumbent 
firms as an important environmental factor influencing the relationship between radical 
product innovations and startup market valuations. While scholars previously considered 
failure by other players in the industry as an important driver of vicarious learning 
(Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010), we demonstrate that in an 
environment where established firms tend to “set” the rules for the industry (Abernathy & 
Clark, 1985; Martin & Mitchell, 1998), benefits from failure by established firms are 
accrued by startups pursuing more radical innovations. Methodologically, the paper 
extends studies on innovation radicalness, which have started to define radicalness not as 
an ex post, but as a dynamic construct through the comparison of current R&D initiatives 
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by the startup versus the ones pursued by established industry players (Dahlin & Behrens, 
2005).  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Swimming Against the Current - Pursuing Radical Innovations  
Startup firms frequently challenge the ways in which incumbent firms solve 
problems (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Schumpeter, 1942; Tushman & Anderson, 
1986) and introduce radical technological innovations that differ substantially to what 
already exists in the industry (Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006:13). At the same time, 
however, startups that reject industry conventions and select technological solutions 
outside the range of acceptability of the industry may be perceived as less reliable and 
legitimate (Suchman, 1995). These challenges are particularly severe in industries where 
established firms’ complementary assets are preserved as startups may depend on 
established firms for developing their radical technological solutions. In such 
environments, pursuing radical innovations is associated with substantial challenges, 
which may adversely affect a startup’s market value.  
First, startups with radical innovations face ambiguity as to whether their 
technological solutions are actually feasible and legitimate technological alternatives for 
the industry (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Technological solutions at the initial stage of their 
lifecycle are often a mix of poorly defined tacit “know-how” and cannot be easily 
evaluated (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989:7). This is particular salient for radical product 
innovations that lack comparable industry templates and cannot be easily juxtaposed to 
existing product development attempts of established firms (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007). 
Technological solutions that do not conform to the existing conventions and industry 
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recipes set by established firms may not be considered feasible alternatives as they 
violate existing cause-and-effect representations of how problems and solutions are 
interrelated (Itami & Roehl, 1991; Lei et al., 1996; Spender, 1989). As a result, startups 
which pursue radical innovations may be less visible and are not legitimate to their 
environment,
40
 which we expect to result in a discount in their market value.  
Second, and related to the first point, startups pursuing radical innovations face 
challenges in securing the necessary assets, be they financial (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 
2009), network related (Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009; Baum et al., 2000a) or 
organizational (Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009), to transform their preliminary ideas 
into new products (Teece, 1986). When complementary assets are retained by 
incumbents, startups may be unable to commercialize the technology on their own but 
instead participate in the division of innovative labor and partner with established 
industry players (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a; Rothaermel, 2001). However, these 
established firms prefer partnering with new startups that pursue technological 
innovations similar to their own R&D (Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008) while “overlooking” 
innovations with elements of knowledge novel to them (chapter 2). Absent access to 
complementary resources from established firms, however, startups pursuing radical 
product innovations face severe obstacles in developing and commercializing their 
products. The problem is exacerbated as radical innovations often require substantial 
investments to modify development tools and commercial channels and hence require 
more resources in the first place (Maine & Garnsey, 2006; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & 
                                                          
40
 The observations apply to all stakeholders, who feel uncertain about the trustworthiness and 
predictability of startups pursuing radical innovations, leading to a lack of legitimacy (Choi & Shepherd, 
2005; Suchman, 1995).  
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Lyman, 1990). All arguments taken together suggest that startups pursuing radical 
product innovations face severe challenges, as the technological solutions of such startups 
lack legitimacy and the startups themselves face difficulties in assembling all required 
resources leading to adverse effects in the startup’s market value.  
Hypothesis 1: In an industry where established firms retain control over 
complementary assets, the more radical a startup’s innovation, the lower the 
startup’s market value.  
 
Given that pursuing radical innovations is associated with a lack of legitimacy and 
resource constraints, it is important to determine when startups can mitigate these 
challenges. The radicalness of innovation stems from startups pursuing innovations 
different from those of established firms. Hence, it may be important to further examine 
the relationship between startups and established industry firms. Next, we outline how 
forming commercialization partnerships with external partners as well as the failure in 
R&D attempts by established firms affect the startup’s legitimacy and resource 
availability.  
 
Formation of Commercialization Partnerships 
Researchers have long argued that partnering is a key strategy for startups’ 
commercialization attempts (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009; Henderson, Orsenigo, & Pisano, 
1999; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Startups pursuing radical innovations may benefit in 
particular from the formation of such partnerships as they resolve issues of legitimacy 
and resource constraints.  
An important form of partnerships for startups is to engage with another party that 
utilizes the startup’s technology with the intention of development and commercialization 
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(henceforth, commercialization partnerships).
41
 It is well-known that startups enjoy direct 
benefits when forming commercialization partnerships that positively affect market value 
(DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Stuart et al., 1999). At the same time, commercialization 
partnerships may “alter the system of constraints and dependencies confronting the 
organizations” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978:267), which is particularly salient for startups 
pursuing radical innovations. First, finding partners to develop and commercialize 
technological solutions is an important signal that validates the usefulness of the startup’s 
radical innovations and hence provides legitimacy (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2008; Spence, 
1973). The formation of partnerships provides valuable information to outside 
stakeholders and increases the perceived quality and reliability of the startup’s products 
in development (Gulati, 1998). This is particularly useful for firms that lacked legitimacy 
in the first place, as their innovations were perceived as “too” radical compared to the 
incumbent industry players. In a similar vein, Stuart and colleagues (1999) demonstrated 
endorsement effects in partnerships
42
 as firms with higher uncertainty
43
 benefited most 
from forming partnerships with high reputation firms. We extend this argument and 
consider the radicalness of the startup’s innovations as a key cause for legitimacy 
constraints so that startups pursuing radical innovations benefit mostly when forming 
commercialization partnerships.  
Second, beyond the signaling value, the formation of commercialization 
partnerships provides concrete resources to the startup firms. Given the elevated resource 
needs of startups pursuing radical innovations (Maine & Garnsey, 2006), forming 
                                                          
41
 An alternative type of partnership is that the startup sources-in knowledge or technologies to create 
value.  
42
 The authors examine the prominence of partners rather than partnerships per se. 
43
 Uncertainty was captured by the age of the startups in this study. 
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commercialization partnerships may allow them to share the risks in development and 
commercialization and endow them with the necessary resources to develop and 
commercialize their technologies. Moreover, engaging in commercialization partnerships 
also gives firms better access to network resources (Gulati, 1998). We identified that 
startups pursuing radical innovations often have difficulty finding new partners. 
However, once such poorly embedded firms are able to conclude a partnership, they 
become more embedded in the network, making it more likely that they are able to secure 
additional resources through subsequent partnering (Ahuja et al., 2009). Taking all 
arguments together, we expect startups pursuing radical product innovations to 
disproportionally benefit from the formation commercialization partnerships. 
Hypotheses 2: Forming commercialization partnerships positively moderates the 
relationship between the radicalness of a startup’s innovation and that startup’s 
market value.  
 
While the formation of commercialization partnerships with external partners may 
be driven by the startup firms themselves, environmental factors may also affect the 
legitimacy of startups pursuing radical innovations (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). We 
next examine incumbent firms’ failures in product development as important events 
shaping both legitimacy and resource availability for startups. 
 
Failure in product development by established firms 
Failure by another organization has been identified as an important mechanism 
through which firms can learn to avoid similar mistakes (Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002). 
At the same time, failure by established industry firms may not only be associated with 
learning (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010) 
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but also improves the legitimacy of radical technological solutions that depart from 
existing industry conventions. 
Extant research indicates that incumbent firms pursue dominant designs which 
serve as an initial orientation point and shape expectations for all other firms in the 
industry (Klepper, 1997; Spender, 1989; Utterback, 1987). Failure of problem-solving 
attempts by incumbent firms may trigger substantial shifts in the industry as to which 
ways of solving problems are considered feasible.
44
 This benefits startups with 
technological solutions pursuing radical innovations that lacked legitimacy in the first 
place. First, failure in product innovation by incumbents serves as an impetus for all 
industry players to re-evaluate their conventional technological solutions and challenges 
their current logic as to how problems and solutions are interrelated (Greve, 1998; Jansen 
et al., 2005; Lampel et al., 2009). This may positively alter legitimacy for startups 
pursuing radical product innovation, especially as they provide alternative solutions to the 
conventional ways of solving problems. Indeed, research on vicarious learning suggests 
that other industry actors can benefit from failure as they learn what actions to avoid 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Kim & Miner, 2007; Madsen & Desai, 2010). We extend this 
argument by highlighting that as firms avoid solutions that have failed, the pursuit of 
alternative ways of solving problems may become more legitimate. The role of failure in 
triggering an industry re-evaluation resonates with studies which have identified that 
experiencing failure tend to increase search intensity (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 
                                                          
44
 For example, in our context, Pfizer discovered in Phase III that Torcetrapib, a drug targeting 
cardiovascular diseases, had an imbalance of mortality and cardiovascular events. The drug was an 
inhibitor of cholesterol ester transfer protein (CETP) for the treatment of atherosclerosis and many other 
incumbent firms were pursuing projects using CETP. Subsequently, incumbent firms discarded cholesterol 
ester transfer protein (CETP) and looked for new ways of solving the atherosclerosis challenge.  
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2003b) and organizational risk-taking (Audia & Greve, 2006; Greve, 2011). Following 
these arguments, we consider failure by established firms a key environmental factor, 
leading industry players to consider a broader range of possible alternatives so that 
startups that do not conform to conventional ways of solving problems are considered to 
be more legitimate.   
Second, given that failure leads incumbents to consider alternative paths to solve 
problems, they may allocate more resources towards startups pursuing radical 
innovations. Extant research shows that failure may change the pattern of resource 
allocation by incumbent firms as external stakeholders put substantial pressure on 
established firms to change direction (Abrahamson & Park, 1994; Cyert & March, 
1992:43; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978; Useem, 1996). The result is that failure may shift 
resource allocation by incumbents to more likely consider partnerships with startups 
pursuing technological solutions which were previously not considered by the established 
firms (chapter 2). Put differently, failure by established firms may lead to an environment 
in which resources more readily flow towards startups pursuing radical innovations. 
Taking both arguments in tandem, we expect that failure by established firms in the 
industry provides an important contingency for pursing radical innovations.  
Hypotheses 3: Failure in product innovation by incumbent firms positively 
moderates the relationship between the radicalness of a startup’s innovation and 
the startup’s market value.  
 
Innovation Maturity 
While both commercialization partnerships and industry failures depend 
substantially on other firms in the industry, startups may also mitigate legitimacy 
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concerns and resource constraints by demonstrating that their radical innovations are 
feasible industry solutions.  
The more a startup’s technological solutions mature, i.e., move closer to 
commercialization, the technologies become codified, thus increasing the amount of 
information available about them. Moreover, more mature innovations have an existing 
track record and may even have working prototypes and templates demonstrating their 
effectiveness (Jensen & Thursby, 2001; Mowery & Rosenberg, 1989). Moving 
technological solutions downstream towards commercialization is also associated with 
achieving intermediate milestones, which, in our context (bio-pharmaceuticals), is 
reflected in intermediate approvals by regulatory authorities. 
The more information about the innovation becomes available, the easier it is for 
outsiders to evaluate its technology. Working prototypes reduce uncertainty about the 
technology’s replicability (Jensen & Szulanski, 2007) as they signal competence 
(Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008), which reduces ambiguity about the technology’s potential 
value. Put differently, the more mature the startup’s innovations, the more likely it is that 
they can be successfully commercialized, which increases legitimacy with external 
stakeholders. While these direct benefits of having more mature innovations are well 
understood, it stands to reason that startups pursuing radical innovations benefit 
particularly when they hold more mature innovations. Firms pursuing radical innovations 
lacked existing industry prototypes and were not perceived as feasible industry solutions 
in the first place. It also seems reasonable that startups pursuing radical innovations may 
benefit most when their technological solutions become more legitimate industry 
solutions as signaled by their maturity. 
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Having more mature technologies also indicates a transition for startups as they 
become independent from established firms in commercializing their technologies. 
Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt and Lyman (1990) explicitly argued that progress in product 
innovation is important for startups to gain cash flow for financial independence. At the 
same time, startups with more mature innovations may have more bargaining power over 
the established firms when forming partnerships, which is beneficial to their resource 
availability (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011). Hence, we expect that startups pursuing 
radical product innovations benefit disproportionally from having more mature 
innovations that have cleared substantial hurdles in the innovation process.  
Hypotheses 4: The maturity of a startup’s innovation positively moderates the 
relationship between the radicalness of a startup’s innovation and the startup’s 
market value.  
 
METHODS 
Background - Bio-Pharmaceutical Industry  
We chose the bio-pharmaceutical industry as a research setting in which to test 
our hypotheses. It is an industry which has seen a continous influx of new startups trying 
to devise new and innovative therapeutic solutions (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). We 
captured innovation by these startups by their products in development as we could 
readily compare products in development by incumbent and startup firms. We limited our 
analysis to startups pursuing innovative new drug development, which are new chemical 
molecules (small-molecule) or biological-based solutions (protein, monoclonal, gene 
therapy, etc.), rather than startups pursuing re-formulations or generic drugs. Products in 
the pharmaceutical industry become visible once firms move them into preclinical trials, 
which begin when a firm has discovered a chemical compound or biological-based large 
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molecule that is considered to be an appropriate candidate for development. Only 2.5% of 
compounds identified in research (target identification, lead identification and lead 
optimization) are considered for such development (Giovannetti & Morrison, 2000; Hess 
& Rothaermel, 2011), and the development stages following (i.e., clinical trials) are the 
most resource intensive steps in the innovation process (Rydzewski, 2008). A unique 
characteristic of the industry in the 1990s was that firms went public very early in the 
development process, a point at which the product may have only been in the preclinical 
or early clinical stages (Burns, 2005). We were hence are able to capture the value of 
such firms based on publicly available information despite the fact that those startups at 
IPO generated minimal revenue and (with the exception of two startups) had substantial 
negative income at IPO. Our data merged various sources, including SDC (Securities 
Data Company), ReCap (Recombinant Capital), Pharmaprojects and Adis R&D Insights 
and Compustat
45
.  
 
Sample  
We queried SDC to obtain a list of biopharmaceutical firms with an IPO in 1991 
and 1999 active in drug development and observe the market value of these firms from 
1991-2008. During the 1990s, new biotechnology firms usually became public at a very 
early stage at which they had no foreseeable revenues. To be included in the sample, the 
startup a) had to be founded after 1984, so we only capture firms in the late 
biotechnology era (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) so, in 1990, were at most 5 years old; b) 
                                                          
45
 SDC provides detailed information on new issues of shares in the stock market. Pharmaprojects and Adis 
R&D Insights are databases tracking new drug development in the pharmaceutical industry (Girotra et al., 
2010; Sosa, 2011). ReCap, a proprietary database tracking partnerships in the life science industry, is 
considered to be one of the most comprehensive publicly available data sources (Schilling, 2009). 
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had an IPO during 1991 and 1999 on an American stock market (usually NASDAQ); c) 
did not have any approved product at IPO; and d) engaged in innovative new drug 
development (i.e., had compounds visible in Pharmaprojects). Using these criteria, we 
identified 144 startups for which we had both financial and product development data 
available and tracked them up to the year 2008, leading to 1559 firm-year observations. 
The sample included firms like Cephalon, MedImmune, which became multi-billion 
dollar businesses.  
 
Measures 
Dependent Variable – Market Value: 
We used the market capitalization of equity based on Compustat (in $M in every 
year at year end) as dependent variable. Given the skewed nature of this variable, we took 
the natural log of the Market Value as dependent variable. Measures of realized 
performance, such as ROA, ROE, or Tobin’s q, are less appropriate as dependent 
variables as the startup firms often have few tangible assets and limited revenues (as well 
as mostly negative earnings) (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999; Lavie, 2007; Sanders & Boivie, 
2004; Zott & Amit, 2008). Market Value V is calculated as: V = p * s, where p is the 
price of the firm’s shares on the last day of the year, and s is the total number of shares 
outstanding at that time. We log-transformed Market Value to achieve the desirable 
statistical properties under the linearity, homoskedasticity, and independence assumptions 
(Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009).  
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Independent Variable –Innovation Radicalness: 
To arrive at a measure for radical innovation, we compared products in 
development (i.e., compounds) from startups to the ongoing drug development of major 
established pharmaceutical firms. This entailed taking into consideration fine-grained 
product development using Pharmaprojects and examining over 8000 R&D projects 
pursued by incumbent and startup firms between 1991 and 2008.
46
 
It is important to understand that biotechnology as a term is often associated with 
all new firms that were founded following the biotechnology revolution in the early 
1980s. Biotechnology in a narrow sense means the development of large protein-based 
molecules as therapeutic solutions (e.g., recombinant proteins or monoclonal antibodies). 
However, most of therapeutic solutions, even those developed by small biotechnology 
firms, are still chemical-based small molecules. But not all chemistry based solutions are  
similar as they differ as to which mechanisms in the human bodies they attempt to 
address, a critical element of scientific and technological knowledge incorporated in 
therapeutic solutions (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998).
47
 To examine radicalness, we considered 
small (chemistry-based) and large (biology-based) molecules as well as naturally derived 
molecules and examined how they differed from the drug development initiatives by 
incumbent firms (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005; Govindarajan & Kopalle, 2006) . 
  We started by identifying the therapeutic area of the drug in development (from 
Pharmaprojects, 13 broad categories in total, including, for example, cancer or 
                                                          
46
 Two researchers independently constructed the history based on the information from Pharmaprojects on 
each drug. Missing data was complemented through a second database (ADIS Insights) and searches on the 
web. When researchers did not find the same date, we used the earlier one found, if it was from a credible 
news source.  
47
 For our sample of 144 sample firms, 35.5% of all drugs are biologic based, 61.5% are chemical based 
(small molecule) and the remainder are derived from natural plants. 
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dermatology). Next, we examined the underlying material of the solution and its 
mechanism of action.
48
 The origin of material links very closely to the large vs. small 
molecule distinction and includes different type of biological-based technologies (e.g., a 
proteins, monoclonal antibody or viral vector) as well as chemical-based solutions and 
natural products (derived from plants). The mechanism of action classifies the 
pharmacological effect through which the drug may have an effect in the human body.
49
 
Previous research has tended to distinguish only chemistry- and biology-based solutions, 
but was not able to identify variety within the chemistry-based products, which still 
represents the majority of all drugs candidates. Pharmaprojects contains over 2000 
mechanisms, and we employed a consulting firm to assess which mechanisms could be 
aggregated to reflect an important category of knowledge associate with drugs in 
development. A pharmacology expert with 26 years in drug development and a 
biotechnology graduate student did the classification separately (resulting in 340 unique 
pharmacology codes in our sample).
50
  
We then compared both elements, origin of material and mechanism of action of 
the startups’ products in development with products in development of incumbent firms 
that are active in the same therapeutic area for the same year.
51
 Put differently, we 
                                                          
48
 We inferred the relevance of the mechanism of action and the origin of material through interviews with 
scientists responsible for technological search at Merck and Johnson & Johnson and by examining the 
search guidelines outlined by pharmaceutical firms. An example can be found at 
 http://www.merck.com/licensing/areas_of_interest.pdf. 
49
 For example, Cox (Cyclooxygenase)-2 inhibitors (one of our mechanism of action categories) prevents 
the production of PHG (prostaglandin) which may cause inflammation. 
50
 We report our results based on the classification by the consulting firm after clarifying where some of 
the mismatches between the student and the PhD expert originated (overall agreement between the two 
classifications was 93%). Using the original code from Pharmaprojects leads to very similar results. The 
conversion table from the pharmaceutical consultant can be downloaded under : http://bit.ly/12SHdto  
51
 We took the Top established international 50 firms active in drug development based on revenue in 1991 
(these include firms like Merck & Co, Pfizer, Eli Lilly) to identify incumbent firms active in a therapeutic 
87 
 
 
 
captured if, in a given therapeutic area (e.g., cancer), the startups used: a) the same 
mechanism of action; and b) the same origin of material is deployed by established firms. 
We assigned a value of one if one of the two elements was not used by an established 
firm and a value of two if both elements were new to the firm. We then averaged all 
scores (startup vs. Top 50 established firms) to arrive at an average measure of 
technological radicalness, which is similar to the idea of Dahlin’s and Behrens’s (2005) 
to measure radical innovation measure as average overlap to other industry players. A 
technological radicalness score of zero indicates that the startup does nothing new (with 
respect to mechanism and origin of material) as all established firm active in the 
therapeutic area work on the same type of solution. Conversely, a radicalness score of 2 
indicates that none of the established firms active in a therapeutic area had products in 
development similar to the ones of the startup.
52
 Appendix 5 provides a simplified 
example of the way in which Innovation Radicalness was calculated for a startup in a 
given year.  
Moderators: 
Commercialization Partnerships: We counted the number of Commercialization 
Partnerships a startup pursued in a given year using Recap (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; 
Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Recap indicates which firm in a partnership is the 
technology provider, allowing us to explicitly distinguish Commercialization 
                                                                                                                                                                             
area. We, however, observed several horizontal mergers between these firms (e.g., Astra merging with 
Zeneca). As an alternative, we extract the Top internal 100 pharmaceutical firms in 1991 and for each year, 
take the Top 50 (remaining) firms up to 2008 as incumbents. The results are unchanged using 50 incumbent 
firms in each year. The R&D budget of these large established R&D firms dwarfed those of our sample 
firms; a single firm in the Top 10 R&D spenders (e.g., Merck & Co) invested more in R&D than all sample 
firms in a given year in the 1990s. 
52
 The actual minimum and maximum values are 0.13 and 1.95 respectively. 
88 
 
 
 
Partnerships, which we define as any partnerships in which an in-sourcing firm (usually 
larger than the startup) deploys the startups technologies or compounds. These 
commercialization partnerships can be at an early or late stage of the drug development 
process and usually entail upfront payments and royalty fees for the startup firm (Burns, 
2005).  
Incumbent Failure: Failure is very common in innovation, which is why we 
limited ourselves to a few substantial failure events within the industry. Extant research 
indicates that late stage failure can have profound consequences for pharmaceutical firms 
(Girotra et al., 2010). Failure hence is defined as product development attempts in which 
the firm committed substantial resources but ultimately failed, which is at the stage of 
Phase III large scale clinical trials.
53
 To arrive at an overall measure for Incumbent 
Failure for the startup in a given year, we counted the number of failed product 
development attempts in the year for the Top 50 bio-pharmaceutical (based on the 
identification in 1991) in the therapeutic areas addressed by the startup. Using this 
measure, we can generate a unique Failure Incumbent score for each startup in each year. 
We demonstrate the calculation of this variable in Appendix 6. 
To capture Innovation Maturity, we generated two measures. First, Late Stage 
Projects is a count of products in development (DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) which have 
reached proof of concept, which usually is either in Phase II or Phase III (late stage 
clinical trials). Moving products in development down the value chain signals the 
viability of the innovative solution as well as its approval by regulatory authorities which 
must approve intermediate steps in the clinical trial process. While Late Stage Projects 
                                                          
53
 We verify that the effect holds when including Phase II failure, which also has a high likelihood of 
leading to a new product. 
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are rather frequent, we observed only 65 actual drugs being approved for active startup 
biotechnology firms with an IPO in 1991-1999. Still, as an alternative variable for 
Innovation Maturity, we captured the approval of a drug in a given year as an indicator 
variable. We limited ourselves to approvals in the US, Europe and Japan so that 
Approved Drug is 1 if the startup received the regulatory approval for a drug in a given 
year and 0 if no drugs were approved.  
Controls 
We controlled for various factors that may affect the firm’s market value. First, 
we controlled for various financial measures, including a firm’s size Total Assets 
(logged) and the firm’s availability of financial resources through the Current Ratio (both 
measures taken from Compustat). Firm size has been associated with the liability of 
smallness (Freeman et al., 1983) and a high Current Ratio signals the availability of 
financial resources in the form of financial slack (Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley, 
2008), which may affect market value. 
Second, we took into consideration that firms have a broad range of tools with 
which to engage with other partners (Keil et al., 2008; van de Vrande et al., 2009). Extant 
research has highlighted that partnering per se and not only commercialization 
partnerships may affect startup performance (Baum et al., 2000a). We used ReCap to 
count partnerships in which the startup sourced-in knowledge from other firms (i.e., was 
the client of the transaction). The knowledge flow represented by the variable Sourcing 
Partnerships is in the opposite direction compared to Commercialization Partnerships as 
it is through them that a startup acquires and assembles new (mostly early stage) 
technologies and knowledge.  
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Acquisition is an indicator variable that is 1 if the startup acquired a company in a 
given year and 0 otherwise. The information is taken from Recap. Moreover, we added 
an indicator if the startup received an Equity investment (value 1 and 0 if no equity 
investment) by another firm in a given year, which may affect the startup’s market value 
(Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003).  Given that startups themselves are frequently acquired 
(usually by larger incumbent firms) and this may affect startup market value in advance, 
we added an indicator Year before Acquisition to the analysis, which takes 1 in the year 
prior to the acquisition (when no more market values are available for the startup at year 
end). The value is 0 in all other years. Following previous research, we also included firm 
Age in our analysis, which has been used a proxy for a firm’s liability of newness 
(Freeman et al., 1983; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Finally, we captured other activities related to the new product development of 
the startup directly, using Pharmaprojects. Similar to Late Stage Project, we also counted 
the number of Early Stage Projects in a given year by a startup (in preclinical and Phase 
I). While not a proxy for maturity, Early Stage Projects represent the future of the 
development pipeline of the firm, which may affect market value. Given that market 
performance may be sensitive to the ultimate failure in product innovation by the startups 
themselves, we also added indicator variables for the startups’ own Development Failure 
in Phase III (1 if the firm had a failure in a given year, 0 if not). To capture very early 
stage R&D activities, we counted the number of Patent Applications of the startup in a 
given year using data from the Derwent Innovation Index.  
Finally, in a similar vein to the Failure Incumbent variable, we counted the 
number of successful drugs by incumbent firms (Success Incumbents) in the therapeutic 
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areas in which the startup  is active. We considered the final approval of a drug as an 
event of success and hence counted the number of drugs approved by the Top 50 
incumbent firms. Appendix 6 shows a simplified example of how the Success Incumbents 
variable is generated. Again, Success Incumbents varies over time and for each startup, as 
it is dependent on the therapeutic areas in which the startup is active. 
Empirical specification 
The dependent variable (log Market Value) is a continuous and normally 
distributed variable, making an OLS regression approach appropriate. We had an 
unbalanced panel during the years 1991 and 2008. To control for unobserved firm-level 
and year-level heterogeneity, we included firm and year fixed effects (estimations are 
done using STATA xtreg procedure with FE option). This means that the variation 
explained will be within each firm. We clustered the standard error on the level of the 
startups for robust estimates. All variables used in interactions are mean centered. As the 
dependent variable is captured at year end, we did not lag our independent variables (see 
robustness tests).  
RESULTS 
Table 8 shows the summary statistics and correlation table. Examining the 
correlations, we did not find evidence that multicollinearity might be a cause of concern. 
The mean VIF for the final models is below 2.44 and individual VIFs for independent 
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and moderation variables are below 4,
54
 all well below the recommended cutoff levels 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003)
55
.  
                                                          
54
 Age as control has the highest VIF with 6.8 – taken age out of the model does not change the results. 
55
 We further examined multicollinearity through the collin command in STATA. Neither tolerance nor 
conditioning index raised any concerns. 
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Table 8: Chapter 3 - Summary Statistics & Correlation Table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Market Value (log) 1.00                                 
2 Total Assets (MM) 0.59 1.00                               
3 Financial Slack 0.02 -0.04 1.00                             
4 Year before Acq. (0,1) 0.12 0.16 -0.02 1.00                           
5 Development Failure (0,1) 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.00 1.00                         
6 Approved Drug (0,1) 0.19 0.12 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 1.00                       
7 Startup Age 0.13 0.22 -0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.05 1.00                     
8 Patent Applications (log) 0.26 0.16 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.00 1.00                   
9 Late Stage Projects 0.28 0.18 -0.06 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.24 0.23 1.00                 
10 Early Stage Projects 0.23 0.19 -0.07 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.28 1.00               
11 Equity Investment (0,1) 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 0.07 1.00             
12 Acquisition (0,1) -0.03 0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.08 1.00           
13 Sourcing Partnerships 0.27 0.33 -0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.04 1.00         
14 Commercializ. Partnership 0.21 0.13 -0.10 0.09 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.09 0.14 0.27 0.36 0.09 0.26 1.00       
15 Failure (Incumbents) 0.18 0.09 -0.04 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.26 0.41 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.16 1.00     
16 Approved (Incumbents) 0.11 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.16 0.23 0.46 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.51 1.00   
17 Innovation Radicalness   -0.15 -0.18 0.13 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.19 -0.07 -0.18 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.00 1.00 
  mean 5.19 156.50 8.87 0.16 0.03 0.04 8.21 2.1 1.61 4.60 0.17 0.08 0.74 0.96 4.86 5.83 1.14 
  sd 1.47 360.34 10.62 0.48 0.17 0.18 5.11 1.90 1.57 3.76 0.38 0.26 1.23 1.45 4.33 4.77 0.36 
  min -0.14 0.94 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 
  max 10.75 7018.5 140.29 5.00 1.00 1.00 22.00 7.44 7.00 17.00 1.00 1.00 8.00 9.00 19.00 20.00 1.95 
        n=1559 
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Table 9: Chapter 3 - Results – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) 
  (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Total Assets (MM) 0.900*** 
(0.133) 
0.857*** 
(0.136) 
0.887*** 
(0.138) 
0.867*** 
(0.135) 
Financial Slack 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
Year before Acquisition (0,1) 0.064 
(0.056) 
0.066 
(0.057) 
0.061 
(0.057) 
0.070 
(0.056) 
Development Failure (0,1) -0.290+ 
(0.155) 
-0.297+ 
(0.154) 
-0.265+ 
(0.155) 
-0.287+ 
(0.150) 
Approved Drug (0,1) 0.383*** 
(0.109) 
0.370*** 
(0.109) 
0.390*** 
(0.108) 
0.392*** 
(0.107) 
Startup Age -0.024 
(0.021) 
-0.039+ 
(0.020) 
-0.042* 
(0.020) 
-0.044* 
(0.021) 
Patent Applications 0.079 
(0.077) 
0.065 
(0.066) 
0.069 
(0.071) 
0.070 
(0.071) 
Late Stage Projects 0.094* 
(0.037) 
0.094* 
(0.038) 
0.095* 
(0.037) 
0.099* 
(0.038) 
Early Stage Projects -0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
Equity Investment (0,1) 0.102 
(0.072) 
0.109 
(0.071) 
0.094 
(0.072) 
0.103 
(0.071) 
Acquisition (0,1) -0.445*** 
(0.105) 
-0.446*** 
(0.105) 
-0.450*** 
(0.105) 
-0.436*** 
(0.104) 
Sourcing Partnerships 0.038 
(0.024) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.037 
(0.024) 
0.037 
(0.023) 
Commercialization 
Partnerships 
0.065** 
(0.024) 
0.065** 
(0.023) 
0.072** 
(0.022) 
0.064** 
(0.023) 
Failure (Incumbents) 0.006 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
Approved (Incumbents) 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Innovation Radicalness    -0.533* 
(0.238) 
-0.675** 
(0.250) 
-0.715** 
(0.243) 
Innovation Radicalness  X  
Commerc. Partnerships 
  0.201** 
(0.061) 
 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Failure (Incumbent) 
   0.048** 
(0.017) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Late Stage Projects 
    
Innov. Radicalness X  
Approved Drug 
    
Constant 4.279*** 
(0.282) 
4.499*** 
(0.271) 
4.542*** 
(0.269) 
4.574*** 
(0.274) 
Log Likelihood -1851.75 -1844.00 -1837.55 -1839.72 
Observations 1559 1559 1559 1559 
Number of Firms 144 144 144 144 
R
2
 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 9 (continued): Chapter 3 - Results – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) 
  (M5) (M6) (M7) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Total Assets (MM) 0.873*** 
(0.139) 
0.864*** 
(0.137) 
0.899*** 
(0.139) 
Financial Slack 0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
Year before Acquisition (0,1) 0.071 
(0.057) 
0.060 
(0.057) 
0.059 
(0.056) 
Development Failure (0,1) -0.276+ 
(0.149) 
-0.296+ 
(0.154) 
-0.259+ 
(0.152) 
Approved Drug (0,1) 0.368*** 
(0.105) 
0.536*** 
(0.154) 
0.562*** 
(0.150) 
Startup Age -0.043* 
(0.020) 
-0.040+ 
(0.020) 
-0.047* 
(0.020) 
Patent Applications 0.070 
(0.071) 
0.069 
(0.067) 
0.067 
(0.067) 
Late Stage Projects 0.107** 
(0.039) 
0.092* 
(0.037) 
0.098** 
(0.037) 
Early Stage Projects -0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
Equity Investment (0,1) 0.098 
(0.070) 
0.110 
(0.070) 
0.090 
(0.072) 
Acquisition (0,1) -0.434*** 
(0.103) 
-0.447*** 
(0.104) 
-0.442*** 
(0.103) 
Sourcing Partnerships 0.035 
(0.024) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.037 
(0.024) 
Commercialization 
Partnerships 
0.066** 
(0.023) 
0.066** 
(0.023) 
0.071** 
(0.022) 
Failure (Incumbents) 0.006 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.007 
(0.010) 
Approved (Incumbents) 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
Innovation Radicalness   -0.765** 
(0.262) 
-0.546* 
(0.237) 
-0.869*** 
(0.253) 
Innovation Radicalness  X  
Commerc. Partnerships 
  0.184** 
(0.060) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Failure (Incumbent) 
  0.042** 
(0.016) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Late Stage Projects 
0.131 
(0.080) 
  
Innov. Radicalness X  
Approved Drug 
 0.781+ 
(0.412) 
0.780+ 
(0.410) 
Constant 4.567*** 
(0.274) 
4.514*** 
(0.271) 
4.619*** 
(0.274) 
Log Likelihood -1839.20 -1841.38 -1831.84 
Observations 1559 1559 1559 
Number of Firms 144 144 144 
R
2
 0.35 0.36 0.37 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 9 shows the regression results. Model 1 only includes the control variables. 
Consistent with prior literature, we find a positive direct effect from Commercialization 
Partnerships, which have been identified as an important driver for startup performance. 
Clearly, market value is also a function of firm size (Total Assets). The number of Late 
Stage Projects also drives market value but we see no effect from the number of Early 
Stage Projects. While market value is positively affected by the Approval of a drug by 
the startup, we also observed that Acquisitions by the startup tend to lower market value. 
This is consistent with the ideas that acquirers quite often pay a premium for acquisitions 
and that small firms undertake acquisitions when they have performed poorly and need to 
team up with another firm (Anand & Delios, 2002). Age has a negative (albeit not 
significant) effect, which is very different from prior studies (Stuart et al., 1999). 
However, we note that the negative age effect is fully driven by the year 2008 (the year of 
the financial crisis – see robustness tests). Finally, Failures in drug development by the 
startup at least marginally show a negative effect on market value.  
In Hypothesis 1, we predicted that Innovation Radicalness has a negative effect 
on Market Value. This prediction is supported as demonstrated in Model 2. The more 
radical the startup’s product innovations, the lower the startup’s market value. This 
confirms that pursuing radical innovations is associated with market value penalties. In 
the next models, we examine the moderation effects with Innovation Radicalness. In 
Hypothesis 2 we predicted that the negative effect of Innovation Radicalness would be 
reversed if firm engage in Commercialization Partnerships. We test the effect, entering 
the interaction in Model 3. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find a positive interaction 
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effect, indicating that the penalty of pursuing highly disruptive technological solutions is 
reversed once firms are pursuing partnerships to develop and commercialize their radical 
innovations. We demonstrate the effect of this interaction graphically in Figure 12, which 
shows that the effect of innovation radicalness for startups forming partnerships is far less 
steep. Only at very high values for Commercialization Partnerships, however, is the 
market value penalty actually reversed.  
Figure 12: Chapter 3 - Moderation Radical Innovation and Commercialization Partnerships 
 
In Model 4, we add the interaction Innovation Radicalness and Failure 
(Incumbents) to test Hypothesis 3. In line with our expectations, we find a positive 
moderation, indicating that startups pursuing more radical innovations benefit the more 
incumbent firms have failed in own product development attempts. The interaction is 
plotted graphically in Figure 13. It indicates that startups with low radicalness in 
innovation have an advantage at low failure rates of established firms whereas startups 
with high innovation radicalness receive higher valuations (or are not penalized) when 
incumbent firms have experienced more failures, supporting Hypothesis 3.  
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Figure 13: Chapter 3 - Moderation Radical Innovation and Failure Established Firms 
 
Finally, we examine Hypothesis 4, which predicted that the penalty of pursuing 
radical innovations may be reversed once startups are able to move their product 
innovations close to commercialization (Innovation Maturity). We test the Late Stage 
Projects (Model 5) as well as the Approved Drugs (Model 6) as potential moderator. We 
observe marginal support for our prediction as the Approved Drugs interaction is only 
marginally significant - so we cannot reject the Null-Hypothesis that Innovation Maturity 
has no effect on the relationship between Radical Innovation and startup Market Value.  
Hypothesis 4, hence, does not receive support. Model 7 shows the full model with all 
interactions and demonstrates that results remain robust in the full model for Hypothesis 
1, 2 and 3, while the non-effect (or only marginal effect) for Hypothesis 4 remains.  
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Table 10: Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) 
  (R1) Q1 (R2) MV/AT (R3) (R4) 
Firm & year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Approved Drug (0,1) 0.440** 
(0.156) 
1.194*** 
(0.344) 
0.390*** 
(0.108) 
0.398*** 
(0.108) 
Sourcing Partnerships 0.023 
(0.024) 
-0.031 
(0.053) 
0.037 
(0.024)  
Commercialization Partnerships 0.072** 
(0.023) 
0.051 
(0.049) 
0.072** 
(0.022)  
Failure (Incumbents) 0.005 
(0.009) 
0.024 
(0.020) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
Approved (Incumbents) 0.006 
(0.009) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
Innovation Radicalness   -0.977*** 
(0.256) 
-1.427** 
(0.458) 
-0.677** 
(0.243) 
-0.598* 
(0.246) 
Innovation Radicalness  X  
Commercialization Partnerships 
0.178** 
(0.061) 
0.328* 
(0.127) 
0.201** 
(0.062)  
Innov. Radicalness X  
Failure (Incumbent) 
0.044** 
(0.016) 
0.132** 
(0.040)   
Innov. Radicalness X  
Approved Drug 
0.720+ 
(0.426) 
1.450 
(0.933)   
Innov. Radicalness X Sourcing Partner.  
  
0.004 
(0.071)  
Commercialization Partner (Top 50) 
   
0.097*** 
(0.029) 
Innovation Radicalness  X 
Commercialization Partner (Top 50)    
0.233* 
(0.093) 
Sourcing Partner (Top 50) 
   
0.035 
(0.094) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Sourcing Partner (Top 50)    
0.132 
(0.270) 
Commercialization Partner (0,1) 
    
Failure PII/III (Inc.) 
    
Innovation Radicalness  X 
Commercialization Partner (0,1)     
Innov. Radicalness X Failure PII/III 
(Inc.)     
Innov. Radicalness X Approved (Inc.) 
    
Innov. Radicalness X  
Development Failure     
Log Likelihood -1777.93 -3144.90 -1837.55 -1846.18 
Observations (144 firms) 1559 1559 1559 1559 
R
2
 0.38 0.21 0.36 0.35 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 , not shown but included in the models:  Total Assets (MM),  Financial Slack,  
Year before Acquisition, Development Failure, Startup Age, Patent Applications, Early Stage Projects, Equity 
Investment, Acquisition and the constant 
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Table 10 (continued): Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) 
  (R5) (R6) (R7) 
Firm & year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Approved Drug (0,1) 0.407*** 
(0.105) 
0.389*** 
(0.107) 
0.535*** 
(0.153) 
Sourcing Partnerships 0.033 
(0.024) 
0.036 
(0.023) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
Commercialization Partnerships 
 
0.064** 
(0.023) 
0.065** 
(0.023) 
Failure (Incumbents) 
 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
Approved (Incumbents) 0.003 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
Innovation Radicalness   -0.915** 
(0.273) 
-0.655** 
(0.249) 
-0.539* 
(0.237) 
Innovation Radicalness  X  
Commercialization Partnerships    
Innov. Radicalness X  
Failure (Incumbent)  
0.057*** 
(0.016)  
Innov. Radicalness X  
Approved Drug   
0.710+ 
(0.403) 
Innov. Radicalness X Sourcing Partner.  
   
Commercialization Partner (Top 50) 
   
Innovation Radicalness  X 
Commercialization Partner (Top 50)    
Sourcing Partner (Top 50) 
   
Innov. Radicalness X  
Sourcing Partner (Top 50)    
Commercialization Partner (0,1) 0.200*** 
(0.055)   
Failure PII/III (Inc.) 0.004 
(0.006)   
Innovation Radicalness  X 
Commercialization Partner (0,1) 
0.426** 
(0.135)   
Innov. Radicalness X Failure PII/III 
(Inc.) 
0.022* 
(0.010)   
Innov. Radicalness X Approved (Inc.) 
 
-0.020 
(0.022)  
Innov. Radicalness X  
Development Failure   
-0.247 
(0.456) 
Log Likelihood -1799.34 -1839.15 -1841.18 
Observations (144 firms) 1539 1559 1559 
R
2
 0.36 0.36 0.35 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 , not shown but included in the models:  Total Assets (MM),  Financial Slack,  
Year before Acquisition, Development Failure, Startup Age, Patent Applications, Early Stage Projects, Equity 
Investment, Acquisition and the constant 
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Robustness Test  
We conducted several additional checks to establish the robustness of the findings 
(Table 10 and Table 11). First, we used different operationalizations of the dependent 
variable. Model R1 used the market value a quarter following a focal year to establish a 
clear lag structure. Model R2 used a weighted dependent variable, in which market value 
is divided by total assets. Both models confirmed the results reported in our main results.  
Next, we examined the alternative explanation for Hypothesis 2, i.e., partnering 
per se that may allow startups with high Innovation Radicalness to generate more value. 
While model R3 shows the positive interaction with Commercialization Partnerships, we 
did not find similar effects for Insourcing Partnerships. It suggests that is indeed the 
usage and validation of the startup’s technology and knowledge by other firms that is 
responsible for the effect. Given that we included all commercialization partnerships, we 
next limited the partnerships to the Top 50 incumbent firms. The results in model R4 
confirm the pattern that Commercialization Partnerships positively moderate the 
Innovation Radicalness and Market Value relationship (albeit with lower levels of 
significance). Using the non-Top 50 firms Commercialization partnerships (results 
available from the authors) does not lead to a different finding, suggesting that 
Commercialization Partnerships with the Top 50 established firms as well as other firms 
providing the resources to commercialize the technologies have the positive moderation 
effect.  
In model R5, we tested the alternative explanation that the effect from established 
firms drug development may only be driven by rare events in the drug development in the 
industry (Lampel et al., 2009). We hence compared the effect of drug development 
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Failure by incumbents with success (Approved (Incumbents)). The results demonstrate 
that the positive moderation is attributed to Failure of incumbents. Interestingly the 
Approved Drugs (Incumbents) measure is negative but not significant, which suggests 
that failure and success by established players may very differently affect startup’s 
market values when pursuing radical innovations.  
In Model R6, we tested another alternative explanation and compared Approved 
Drugs and Development Failure by the startups as potential moderators. We find that 
Approved Drugs are marginally significant but the Failure Drug interaction is negative 
and not significant. 
In model R7, we operationalized key independent variables differently. Namely, 
Incumbent Failure was proxied by using both Phase III and Phase II failures by the Top 
50 incumbent firms. Results remained robust but were slightly weaker with respect to 
significance. It is hence clear, that the moderation effect is predominantly driven by 
substantial failure (Phase III) and rare events in the industry (Lampel et al., 2009). Once 
we consider only earlier stage discontinuation as failure (e.g. Phase I failure), we indeed 
do not find the moderation effect to hold (results available from the authors). In model R7 
we operationalized Commercialization Partnerships as an indicator rather than a count 
variable leading to strong support for our results. 
In alternative robustness tests (Table 11), we examined shorter time windows by 
looking at a maximum of 10 observations per startup after their IPO (Model R8), again 
supporting our main results. We also ran all models excluding the year 2008 (the year of 
the financial crisis and stock market crash), confirming the main results reported (Model 
R9). The negative effect of age disappears without the 2008 observations.  
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Table 11: Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests 2 – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) 
  (R8) (R9) (R10) 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y 
Total Assets 0.754* 
(0.356) 
0.888*** 
(0.164) 
19.105*** 
(1.680) 
Financial Slack 0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
Year before Acquisition  0.079 
(0.061) 
0.059 
(0.055) 
 
Development Failure  -0.289+ 
(0.153) 
-0.268+ 
(0.153) 
 
Approved Drug 0.297** 
(0.109) 
0.539*** 
(0.140) 
 
Startup Age -0.044 
(0.040) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
0.060** 
(0.020) 
Patent Applications 0.047 
(0.045) 
0.049 
(0.045) 
0.006 
(0.029) 
Late Stage Projects 0.107* 
(0.046) 
0.095* 
(0.037) 
0.099 
(0.060) 
Early Stage Projects -0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.022) 
Equity Investment (0,1) 0.105 
(0.066) 
0.087 
(0.068) 
0.201 
(0.143) 
Acquisition (0,1) -0.474*** 
(0.117) 
-0.427*** 
(0.105) 
0.954*** 
(0.173) 
Sourcing Partnerships 0.051* 
(0.023) 
0.043+ 
(0.023) 
0.069+ 
(0.039) 
Commercialization 
Partnerships 
0.062* 
(0.025) 
0.075** 
(0.024) 
0.050 
(0.032) 
Failure (Incumbents) 0.006 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.074** 
(0.026) 
Approved (Incumbents) 0.016+ 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.019) 
Innovation Radicalness   -0.919** 
(0.290) 
-0.901*** 
(0.258) 
-0.415* 
(0.208) 
Innovation Radicalness  X  
Comm. Partnerships 
0.181* 
(0.073) 
0.184** 
(0.063) 
0.052 
(0.080) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Failure (Incumbent) 
0.052* 
(0.021) 
0.046** 
(0.016) 
0.153** 
(0.046) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Approved Drug 
0.286 
(0.348) 
0.640+ 
(0.358) 
 
Constant 4.664*** 
(0.263) 
4.573*** 
(0.275) 
2.936*** 
(0.307) 
Log Likelihood -1374.36 -1661.86 -115.54 
Observations 1254 1486 144 
R2 0.36 0.36 0.73 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 11 (continued): Chapter 3 - Robustness Tests 2 – OLS - DV Market Value (Log) 
  (R11) 
Origin of 
Material 
(R12) 
Origin of 
Material 
(R13) 
Mechanism 
of Action 
(R14) 
Mechanism 
of Action 
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
Total Assets 0.878*** 
(0.130) 
0.894*** 
(0.133) 
0.881*** 
(0.136) 
0.917*** 
(0.134) 
Financial Slack 0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Year before Acquisition  0.063 
(0.056) 
0.063 
(0.055) 
0.067 
(0.056) 
0.055 
(0.056) 
Development Failure  -0.310* 
(0.152) 
-0.300+ 
(0.152) 
-0.288+ 
(0.155) 
-0.248 
(0.154) 
Approved Drug 0.378*** 
(0.108) 
0.161 
(0.167) 
0.378*** 
(0.109) 
-0.433 
(0.361) 
Startup Age -0.039+ 
(0.021) 
-0.045* 
(0.021) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
-0.031 
(0.020) 
Patent Applications 0.050 
(0.047) 
0.052 
(0.056) 
0.051 
(0.051) 
0.050 
(0.049) 
Late Stage Projects 0.104** 
(0.039) 
0.102** 
(0.038) 
0.093* 
(0.037) 
0.102** 
(0.038) 
Early Stage Projects -0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
Equity Investment (0,1) 0.112 
(0.071) 
0.099 
(0.074) 
0.104 
(0.072) 
0.095 
(0.070) 
Acquisition (0,1) -0.450*** 
(0.103) 
-0.440*** 
(0.101) 
-0.445*** 
(0.105) 
-0.452*** 
(0.105) 
Sourcing Partnerships 0.035 
(0.024) 
0.038 
(0.024) 
0.039 
(0.024) 
0.032 
(0.024) 
Commercialization 
Partnerships 
0.063** 
(0.023) 
-0.002 
(0.036) 
0.066** 
(0.024) 
-0.151* 
(0.076) 
Failure (Incumbents) 0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
-0.034 
(0.027) 
Approved (Incumbents) 0.007 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Innovation Radicalness   -0.923* 
(0.365) 
-1.340*** 
(0.390) 
-0.387 
(0.313) 
-0.789* 
(0.363) 
Innovation Radicalness  X  
Comm. Partnerships 
 0.175* 
(0.082) 
 0.286** 
(0.100) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Failure (Incumbent) 
 0.049* 
(0.023) 
 0.053+ 
(0.031) 
Innov. Radicalness X  
Approved Drug 
 0.801 
(0.509) 
 1.237* 
(0.575) 
Constant 4.838*** 
(0.335) 
5.099*** 
(0.355) 
4.554*** 
(0.381) 
4.993*** 
(0.406) 
Log Likelihood -1841.30 -1834.59 -1851.04 -1842.94 
Observations 1559 1559 1559 1559 
R2 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Model R10 shows the results of using the first available year and market value of 
the startup as dependent variables. We have 144 IPOs resulting in 144 observations of the 
market value in year one of the IPO. While results differ from the panel results, we find 
evidence that the interaction of Failure (Incumbents) and Radical Innovation holds in the 
first year. However, we do not find the interaction with Commercialization Partnerships 
and Radical Innovation to be statistically significant. One reason could be that at IPO, 
firms are just starting their development and Commercialization Partnerships start at a 
later stage. We also note that using only 144 observations Radical Innovation while 
negative just fails to be marginally significant (p<0.13), when only testing its direct 
effect. 
Finally, while we consider it beneficial to consider mechanism of action and 
origin of material together in defining radicalness, we also tested defining radicalness by 
either the mechanism of action or the origin of material separately.
56
 The results are 
shown in model R11 through R14. Mode R11 and R13 show that both operationalization 
of radicalness have a negative effect on market value but only the origin of material is 
significant. However, when examining the moderations (R12 and R13), we observe that 
both operationalization show quite similar effects. 
In unreported results, we also operationalized Innovation Radicalness using a 4 
year history of drugs in development by the incumbent firms and not only the current 
year. Defining Innovation Radicalness this way does not change the results but rules out 
that we consider a technology as radical, which was discarded by incumbents years ago. 
                                                          
56
 The two alternative variables are correlated at 0.44. 
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DISCUSSION  
Pursuing radical innovation, i.e., innovation which substantially differs from that 
of established industry players, has been suggested to lead to the “attacker’s” advantage, 
which has been demonstrated in many settings (Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; 
Foster, 1986). However, pursuing radical innovations may also lead to severe challenges 
stemming from both legitimacy and resources constraints, in particular, when incumbents 
retain critical downstream complementary assets. The performance outcomes for startups 
pursuing radical innovations in such settings are the focus of this paper. 
Startups operating in such an environment face a dilemma. On the one hand, 
startups have the ability to push technological change forward and pursue technological 
innovations, with elements of knowledge untested by established industry players. On the 
other hand, pursuing such radical innovations may adversely affect their ability to be 
visible and to attract resources from established firms. Indeed, we find a severe 
performance penalty in the form of lower market valuations for startups pursuing radical 
product innovations in the bio-pharmaceutical industry, an industry where established 
firms retain control of critical downstream complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001). 
The study hence expands our understanding of the strategic balances of how being 
different or the same compared to other industry players may affect firm performance 
(Deephouse, 1999). 
In a second step, our study more fully takes into account the unique dependencies  
between startup and established firms (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) to identify the 
conditions under which pursuing radical innovations may allow startup firms to benefit. 
Motivated by previous research, we take into account partnering as a fundamentally 
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important commercialization strategy for startup firms (Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009). While 
prior studies have outlined the importance of partnering for startup firms per se (e.g. 
Baum et al., 2000a), we demonstrate that benefits from such partnerships are particularly 
accrued by firms pursuing radical product innovations, as they disproportionally benefit 
from the legitimacy and resources accessed through such partnerships. Interestingly, the 
results found in a US setting are opposite to findings in emerging markets, in which a 
product innovation strategy had weaker performance when combined with strategic 
partnering in product development (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2001). We hence extend our 
overall understanding on startups cooperative commercialization strategies (Aggarwal & 
Hsu, 2009) and their role when developing and commercializing radical innovations.  
To our knowledge, our study is also the first to consider failure by incumbent 
firms as an important environmental factor influencing the relationship between radical 
product innovations and startup performance. While scholars previously considered 
failure by other players in the industry as a source of vicarious learning (Argote & Miron-
Spektor, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010), we demonstrate that benefits from failure may be 
accrued by those startups that pursue more radical solutions. We hence extend prior 
research that has outlined the fundamental role of failure by other firms in organizational 
learning (Kim et al., 2009; Kim & Miner, 2007), but has not explicitly taken into account 
how established firm failure affects startup firms. The mechanism outlined in this paper 
builds upon organizational learning, as we posit that failure by established firms 
challenges the industry conventions as to what technological solutions are considered 
feasible and alters which solutions are ultimately considered to be legitimate or 
illegitimate.  
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Finally, the paper reveals the importance of using a dynamic lens on radical 
innovation, which changes over time as both startups and established firms modify their 
product development portfolio. We hence extend the literature on what constitutes radical 
innovation (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005) and provide an alternative way through which it 
can be measured in the bio-pharmaceutical space. 
The study has a number of limitations, which should provide ample opportunities 
for future research.  First, it was conducted in the context of a single industry and single 
country and the generalizability of our findings and their boundary conditions would need 
to be validated through explorations in other empirical contexts. In both Europe and Asia, 
biotechnology firms proliferated in the 1990s as well, and including them in the analysis 
may reveal further insights into the relationship between radical innovations and startup 
market performance. We opted to include only startups from one jurisdiction to ensure 
that our results are not sensitive to the regulatory, accounting and reporting rules, which 
may be idiosyncratic to domestic stock markets. The study could also be replicated in 
other industry settings in which established firms maintain complementary assets. In the 
telecommunication industry, for example, wireless telephony was certainly a source of 
radical innovation but the established firms have survived retaining ownership of key 
complementary assets (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). Another extension of the study would 
be to examine distinct radical innovations which also have the potential to be disruptive, 
i.e., requiring a change in the incumbent’s business model (Burgelman, 1985; 
Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). For example, while chemical-based 
solutions and many biologic-based solutions (e.g., Monoclonal Antibodies) in the bio-
pharmaceutical space sustain the existing business model of incumbent firms 
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(Rothaermel, 2001) (i.e., prescribed as a long term treatment often administered at home 
resulting in yearly treatment costs for patients and insurers), newer technologies like gene 
therapy are considered more disruptive (one-off treatment administered by the physicians 
(e.g. Wilson, 2012)). Hence, the traditional revenue model based on regular prescriptions 
is not applicable. Given that we do not capture disruptiveness in our study, it would be 
interesting to further examine the performance implications for startups that engage in the 
pursuit of such disruptive technologies.  
Second, we are unable to draw inferences regarding final commercialization 
outcomes such as product sales or firms’ market share in our analysis as product 
approvals are rare in the bio-pharmaceutical industry and many of the firms never reach 
final product sales on the market. Hence, we observed radicalness based on intermediate 
stages by comparing product development initiatives of startups and incumbent firms. At 
the same time, using product in development captures startup activity at a more advanced 
stage of the startups development as it can take up to ten years until research is translated 
into a commercialized product. In a similar vein, we so far have not considered if 
capturing radicalness at the product development stage differs from patent-based 
measures, which are common when examining innovations by startups (e.g. Sørensen & 
Stuart, 2000). Examining analysts’ reports, however, suggests that the market valuation 
of listed startup firms predominantly depends on the products in development (the 
pipeline) and not on the volume of patents generated by the startups. For example, 
radicalness in patenting per se may not drive market value as the time to develop and 
commercialize an invention is very long in the industry. This is reflected by the fact that 
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only late stage products in development (and not early stage products or patents) have an 
actual effect on the market value of the startups in the panel model. 
Finally, while we identify the positive moderation from incumbent failure for 
startups pursuing radical innovations, we do not directly observe the theorized 
mechanism. While some studies show that established firm failure may open such firms 
up to novel types of technological solutions (chapter 2), scholars using qualitative 
methods could build on our findings to shed light on how startups pursuing radical 
innovations indeed benefit from incumbent firm failure and the role of legitimacy and 
resource availability driving this effect.  
CONCLUSION 
The study explores how pursuing radical innovations shapes market values and 
hence performance expectations for young startup firms. It departs from the typical 
emphasis on the advantages of startups “attacking” established firms and considers a 
setting in which established firms maintain control of critical downstream complementary 
assets. By examining product innovation of the startup relative to established firms, we 
show that pursuing radical innovations may have adverse performance implications in the 
form of market valuations. We also demonstrate the contingent roles of 
commercialization partnerships and failures of established firms in shaping the 
relationship of radical product innovation and market value. The findings argue for 
considering closely the dependencies of startups and established firms to understand 
when startups pursuing radical innovation can create value. 
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CHAPTER 4: NO STRINGS ATTACHED:  
EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOOSELY COUPLED RESEARCH 
PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATIVE PERFORMANCE 
(A research repaper based on this chapter is developed mutually with Felipe Monteiro and Denise Dunlap.) 
Faced with a rapidly changing technological environment, firms are increasingly 
required to combine knowledge from a range of disciplines which no single firm is likely 
to possess (Steensma & Corley, 2000). As a result, inter-firm research partnerships (i.e., 
partnerships to discover new innovative solutions) have grown substantially in both 
number and importance in the last decade (Hagedoorn, 2002; Kale & Singh, 2009; 
Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004).  The intent behind these exploration types of partnerships 
(Koza & Lewin, 1998) is to accelerate the yield from research assets by reducing 
innovation cycle times and gaining access to valuable new elements of knowledge 
(Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). 
While research partnerships in general have been increasing, in this paper, we 
focus on those partnerships in which there is a low level of mutual commitment and 
interdependence between partners, as exemplified by research contracts or licensing 
agreements  These types of research partnerships, which we call loosely coupled (Orton 
& Weick, 1990; Steensma & Corley, 2000; Thompson, 1967), often involve one firm 
paying to have access to specific knowledge from another firm and to reuse such 
knowledge created by the research partner (Murray & O’Mahony, 2007).  Despite their 
importance and prevalence, loosely coupled partnerships are in sharp contrast with tightly 
coupled partnerships (Steensma & Corley, 2000), which rely on the reciprocal exchange 
of knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), high levels of commitment among the 
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partners and the generation of partnership-specific assets (e.g., joint product development 
agreements or equity joint ventures) (Sampson, 2007).  
Previous studies have consistently shown the benefits of tightly coupled 
partnerships based on the fact that innovation more often than not requires the reciprocal 
exchange and recombination of knowledge from the cooperating parts (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Mowery et al., 1996). In a related vein, it has also been suggested that simply 
“handing off” research from one partner to another may not be enough to allow the in-
sourcing firm to innovate (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).
57
 Given that loosely 
coupled research partnerships (e.g., licensing deals and research contracts) typically lack 
those strong reciprocal interdependencies and do not rely on mutual knowledge 
exchange, it should not be entirely surprising that existing empirical evidence indicates a 
weak relationship between loosely coupled research partnerships and a firm’s ability to 
develop innovations new to their industry (Fey & Birkinshaw, 2005; Keil et al., 2008; 
Luo, 2008; Mowery et al., 1996).  
It is striking, then, that loosely coupled partnerships are increasingly prevalent in 
many industries, as exemplified by the widespread use and rapid growth of research 
contracts and licensing deals at very early stages of the innovation cycle in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). 
Intrigued by the mismatch between previous findings pointing to the limited potential of 
loosely coupled partnerships to generate innovations on the one hand, and their 
prevalence in many industries on the other, we examine in this paper whether, why and 
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 This argument is also consistent with the findings in the network literature which show that despite the 
importance of weak ties for the identification of new ideas (Granovetter, 1985), strong ties are essential to 
the transformation of those ideas into actual innovations (Hansen, 1999)  
 
113 
 
 
 
when loosely coupled research partnerships may increase a firm’s innovative 
performance.
58
  
It is important to note that our main goal is not to challenge the findings of 
previous studies that showed the benefits of tightly coupled partnerships. Instead, the 
crux of our paper is to focus exclusively on loosely coupled partnerships and reveal the 
conditions under which they are more likely to spur the in-sourcing firm’s innovation 
performance. Researchers have already suggested that the benefits of loosely coupled 
partnerships may stem from the in-sourcing firm’s ability to add knowledge variety 
while, at the same time, allowing it to remain flexible in a rapidly changing technological 
environment (Danneels, 2003; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Steensma & Corley, 2000). 
Yet innovation often requires firms to not only access a variety of diverse knowledge 
provided by external partners but also to experiment and recombine knowledge in novel 
ways (Levitt & March, 1988), and the length of innovation cycle requires the continued 
allocation of organizational resources, be they financial or managerial, towards research 
projects (Adner & Levinthal, 2008; Cyert & March, 1963).  
Therefore, while loosely coupled partnerships add variety to the in-sourcing 
firm’s knowledge base and this, per se, is important to innovation, their lack of a 
reciprocal knowledge exchange may not induce the experimentation necessary to allow 
that firm to fully benefit from the in-sourced knowledge. Moreover, while loosely 
coupled partnerships are a flexible mode of in-sourcing external knowledge, resources 
gained from them are also withdrawn more easily; therefore, ultimately, they may lack 
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 As we will detail in the methods section below, our operationalization of innovative performance is the 
introduction of solutions which are new to the market. This measure is in line with Teece’s (1986) view 
that the innovator should be the firm that is first to introduce a solution to the market. 
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the continued resources necessary to positively affect the in-sourcing firm’s innovative 
performance (Luo, 2008; Steensma & Corley, 2000). It is hence the purpose of this paper 
to go beyond the mere direct effect of loosely coupled partnerships on innovation 
performance by examining the conditions under which such partnerships are more likely 
to be fully leveraged to benefit the in-sourcing firm. 
We argue that the innovation benefits accruing from research partnerships depend 
on both the external knowledge being in-sourced and the in-sourcing firm’s internal 
context. More precisely, we suggest that, as a baseline model, loosely coupled 
partnerships are beneficial to a firm’s innovative peformance. We argue, however, that 
those innovation benefits are more likely to transpire when certain internal firm factors 
are present. Namely, we hypothesize that the in-sourcing firm’s experimental orientation 
(i.e., a firm’s propensity to experiment internally with projects with elements of 
knowledge novel to the firm) (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001) and its availability of 
financial and managerial resources  (Cyert & March, 1963) positively moderate the 
impact of loosely coupled partnerships on the in-sourcing firm’s innovative performance.  
We test our hypothesis in the global pharmaceutical industry, using a panel 
dataset covering the world’s largest (Top 50) global pharmaceutical firms between 1998 
and 2007 and spanning 454 firm-year observations. In the pharmaceutical industry, the 
discovery of new solutions is pivotal for firm success (Roberts, 1999) and both types of 
research partnerships (i.e., tightly and loosely coupled) are widespread. We assess the 
effect of those loosely coupled research on innovative performance by examining the 
number of new products in development a focal firm is able to add to its  innovation 
pipeline (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011).   
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As we discuss in detail below, our results suggest only a weak direct effect of 
loosely coupled partnerships on a firm’s innovative peformance. More interestingly, 
though, we also show if the in-sourcing has an experimental orientation, it can work as a 
catalyst for using and experimenting with external knowledge accessed through the 
loosely coupled partnerships. In a similar vein, we show the importance of having the 
managerial and financial resources to fully benefit from loosely coupled partnerships. 
Our results account for unobserved heterogeneity across firms and over time, and are 
robust to a number of alternative econometric specifications and operationalization of key 
variables. 
Taken together, our results indicate that while the mere existence of loosely 
coupled partnerships may not be enough for a firm to become more innovative, under 
certain conditions, those same loosely coupled partnerships are able to lead to the 
innovation outcomes (in our case, new product candidates representing solutions new to 
the in-sourcing firm’s industry) typically only attributed, in previous studies, to tightly 
coupled partnerships (Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). The paper hence 
contributes to the growing literature on the role of loosely coupled partnerships and 
emphasizes their role in innovation attempts that goes beyond the exploitation of existing 
knowledge. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical background and 
hypotheses are presented in the next section. A section on our methods follows. We 
subsequently present regression results, various robustness checks and post-hoc analyses. 
Contributions and implications are discussed in the concluding section.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Accessing knowledge through research partnerships 
Firms can access external knowledge through research partnerships in various 
ways. A common distinction that we adopt in this paper is based on the level of 
interorganizational dependence and the level of joint commitment among research 
partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Koza & Lewin, 1998). Tightly coupled partnerships are 
characterized by strong interdependencies in which firms rely on the reciprocal exchange 
of knowledge (Ahuja, 2000; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998). This is 
exemplified by joint ventures, wherein partners commit resources and equity to form a 
completely new organizational entity, or by research alliances in which partners share 
scientific personnel, engineers and management or share resources for joint research 
(Kale & Singh, 2009; Mowery et al., 1996). Conversely, loosely coupled partnerships 
represent forms of accessing knowledge that predominantly rely on the sequential 
interdependence among the partners (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Luo, 2008). As much as in 
extreme cases, loosely coupled partnerships may be limited to an exchange of knowledge 
for money as exemplified by a pure in-licensing contract, where one firm will use the 
knowledge of another firm with limited further interaction (Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Murray & O’Mahony, 2007), in most cases, the loosely coupled partnership involve an 
on-going relationship between research partners. Other examples include research 
contracts through which firms define their research needs ex ante (Mowery et al., 1996).
59
 
The defining characteristic of those research partnerships is the lack of mutual 
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 Although firms may engage in other formal transactions to gain access to external knowledge (e.g., 
corporate venture capital investments), tightly and loosely coupled research partnerships represent the vast 
majority of knowledge-access transactions (Dushnitsky & Lavie, 2010) 
 
117 
 
 
 
collaboration and of a bi-directional exchange of knowledge. In a loosely coupled 
partnership, one partner can be clearly identified as the firm receiving knowledge (i.e., 
the in-sourcing firm) from the other partner, which typically obtains some sort of 
financial compensation.  
 
Loosely coupled partnerships and innovative performance 
Loosely coupled research partnerships are believed to add variety to a firm’s 
knowledge repertoire, which is conducive to innovation. Yet, surprisingly little research 
has empirically investigated the impact of this type of research partnership on the in-
sourcing firm’s innovative performance.  
We posit that loose coupling has desirable benefits for an in-sourcing partner to 
the extent that they provide immediate access to specialized knowledge from external 
partners. Engaging in loosely coupled research partnerships allows firms to effectively 
divide work in research to leverage the specialization of research partners (Arora & 
Gambardella, 1994a). Mowery et al. (1996), for example, confirm that loosely coupled 
partnerships are an important way for firms to benefit from specialization of external 
partners. Engaging in such partnerships adds variety to a firm’s repertoire of knowledge, 
which is important to finding new innovative solutions (Laursen et al., 2010). They also 
provide a firm with flexibility in their research projects as those partnerships are quickly 
initiated and require lower set-up costs (i.e., loosely coupled partnerships tend to not 
generate costly and partner-specific resources and routines) (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 
2002). This allows firms to move quickly once new technologies emerge and to abandon 
those rendered obsolete (Luo, 2008; Steensma & Corley, 2000). Consequently, many 
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researchers have considered loosely coupled partnerships as valuable options in 
environments characterized by high technological uncertainty and change, where, for 
every successful innovation, many failures are likely to occur (Folta, 1998). Recently, 
researchers have started to examine in more detail the role of loosely coupled 
partnerships (e.g., by examining licensing contracts) on innovative performance and have 
found that licensing-in technologies accelerate the introduction of new inventions (Leone 
& Reichstein,  2012) and allow firms to subsequently search for and add more knowledge 
variety (Laursen et al., 2010). Given that firms require a large pool of potential solutions 
at their disposal and the flexibility to react to emerging technological trends, we suggest 
that loosely coupled research partnerships should positively affect a firm’s innovative 
performance. More formally, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Loosely coupled research partnerships increase the in-sourcing 
firm’s innovative performance. 
 
High level of experimentation, financial and organizational resources: the fertile 
ground for loosely coupled partnerships to flourish 
If, on one hand, loosely coupled partnerships provide a flexible way for the in-
sourcing firm to add specialized knowledge to its repertoire, on the other, the nature of 
those partnerships may make their innovation benefits contingent on the presence of 
certain firm level characteristics. Namely, we argue that firms accessing external 
knowledge through loosely coupled partnerships may accumulate sufficient distinct 
elements of highly specialized knowledge, yet may still not experience an increase in 
their innovative performance unless they are able to recombine this knowledge in novel 
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ways through experimentation and support the partnerships through both financial and 
managerial resources. More specifically, in the following sections, we examine how 
accessing knowledge through loosely coupled partnerships interacts with the in-sourcing 
firm’s ability to recombine knowledge in novel ways (its “experimental orientation”), and 
how the availability of managerial resources and financial slack plays a critical role in 
allowing the in-sourcing firm to fully benefit from its loosely coupled partnerships. 
 
Experimental Orientation: Firms differ in their willingness to take risks and experiment 
with new elements of knowledge. We suggest that a firm’s high experimental orientation 
(i.e., a firm’s willingness to pioneer novel solutions) (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001; 
Miller, 1983) may serve as a catalyst for experimenting with knowledge accessed through 
loosely coupled research partnerships.   
In contrast to tightly coupled partnerships, loosely coupled research partnerships 
have a clear delineation between sender and receiver, so the flow of knowledge is 
unilateral. While firms may add specialized new knowledge, the unilateral structure 
inhibits experimentation, which is best achieved through an iterative and reciprocal 
exchange of knowledge (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Galunic & Rodan, 1998). 
Innovation requires firms to challenge their existing paradigms, which results in firms 
redefining their heuristics as to how solutions and problems are interconnected (Lei et al., 
1996). This is best achieved through repeated communication and joint management with 
a partner (Dyer & Singh, 1998), which are seldom present in loosely coupled research 
partnerships. The problem is exacerbated as the in-sourcing party in loosely coupled 
research partnerships may need to define the content of the knowledge exchange ex ante. 
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Given that potential ways of recombining and using knowledge are only revealed over 
time, loosely coupled partnerships may lack the experimentation necessary to develop 
with truly new solutions.  
Previous research has shown that some firms are more willing than others to 
experiment and take risks in strategic actions related to market entry or product 
innovation (Miller, 1983; Roberts, 1999). With respect to innovation, researchers have 
suggested that firms may either take a more incremental approach to innovation or 
become a pioneer in offering new solutions as they challenge current industry 
assumptions (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001). Following this idea, an experimental 
orientation reflects a firm’s willingness to engage in projects where expected returns are 
not foreseeable (Miller, 1983).
60
 This includes but is not limited to top managers’ 
preferences to engage in risky projects but also is reflected in a firm’s incentive and 
reward structures (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994).
61
 An experimental orientation is not 
static but develops over time as firms adjust their communication channels, control 
systems and culture to the level of experimentation that they consider appropriate to 
current challenges (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).   
Extant research highlights the technological benefits of experimenting with new 
knowledge. Ahuja and Lampert (2001), for example, identify that firms that generate 
knowledge without relying on prior elements of knowledge (pioneering technologies) are 
better positioned to generate innovative solutions. Following these arguments, we believe 
                                                          
60
 The notion that some firms may be more experimental than others is related to the seminal work of 
March (1991). March highlighted that some firms more than others emphasize experimental learning by 
trying out new ways of solving problems.  
61
 Experimental orientation through risk taking may be considered as part of a firm’s overall 
entrepreneurial orientation, which entails other dimensions such as proactiveness or competitive 
aggressiveness (Dess, Lumpkin, & Covin, 1997). 
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firms with a strong experimental orientation are more likely to benefit from their loosely 
coupled research partnerships since they are skilled at not only handling greater 
knowledge variety but, at the same time, are able to induce the experimentation required 
to effectively use this variety for innovation to occur.  
First, although the exchange of knowledge between the partners is predominantly 
unidirectional, firms with a stronger experimental orientation will be better equipped to 
subsequently draw upon new external knowledge and recombine it in novel ways. Having 
an experimental orientation hence facilitates firms in complementing their internal 
knowledge with external knowledge (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006) accessed through 
loosely coupled research partnerships. In such cases, knowledge recombination occurs 
independently of the reciprocal and frequent interactions among research partners. 
Second, firms with a strong experimental orientation may also provide incentive 
structures to draw upon knowledge which is not immediately related to the scientists’ 
current projects and activities. This is more likely to encourage scientists to leverage a 
broader variety of knowledge (Itami & Roehl, 1991), which again would make loosely 
coupled partnerships more effective. We suggest that firms with an experimental 
orientation may accrue stronger benefits from loosely coupled partnerships. More 
formally, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: The in-sourcing firm’s level of experimental orientation positively 
moderates the effect of loosely coupled research partnerships on the in-sourcing 
firm’s innovative performance.  
 
Organizational resources: Generally, firms can only sponsor a limited number of 
unique problems and solutions simultaneously (Cyert & March, 1963). This requires that 
they make tradeoffs in allocating resources, be they financial or managerial, among 
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multiple options (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Voss, Sirdeshmukh, & 
Voss, 2008). As a result, loosely coupled partnerships are most effective when 
organizational resources are available. 
  Extant research indicates that organizational resources impose important 
boundary conditions (Penrose, 1959) that affect a firm’s ability to absorb and use external 
knowledge (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001; Ocasio, 1997). These constraints are 
particularly salient for loosely coupled partnerships. Unlike tightly coupled research 
partnerships that quite often have a greater number of dedicated scientific and managerial 
personnel, loosely coupled research partnerships are characterized by lower levels of such 
commitment (Zollo et al., 2002). They are also often endowed with fewer overall 
organizational resources in the first place, which is evidenced by lower governance and 
administration costs (Contractor, 1990). It is hence likely that such partnerships will lack 
dedicated managerial personnel who could act as “champions” to promote and defend the 
partnership and its associated knowledge when, for example, making budget decisions. 
Moreover, resources committed to such projects rely less on building partner-specific 
assets to support the innovation process in the long run (Steensma & Corley, 2000), 
which limits the commitment associated with such partnerships. The result is that 
organizational resources can be more easily withdrawn from loosely coupled 
partnerships, in particular in the presence of alternative paths to develop new innovative 
products (Adner & Levinthal, 2008; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 
2008).  
We focus on two types of organizational resources: managerial, exemplified by 
managerial attention (Cyert & March, 1963; Ocasio, 1997; Penrose, 1959) and financial 
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resources, exemplified by liquid resources beyond what is needed to operate the firm in 
the short term, i.e., financial slack (Singh, 1986; Voss et al., 2008).   
Both types of resources can act as catalysts, making loosely coupled partnerships 
more effective. Innovation is not a one-off event, but a long process that requires firms to 
continuously commit managerial resources to their research activities and provide access 
to decision-making across the organization (Dougherty & Hardy, 1996). Managerial 
resources such as managerial attention are not scale-free (Levinthal & Wu, 2010), 
meaning that firms can usually only attend to a few unique innovation problems. Extant 
research, for example, indicates that fast-growing firms in one period tend to experience 
slower growth in ensuing periods due to a lack of managerial resources (Penrose, 1959). 
In a similar vein, scope-increasing activities are likely to absorb managerial attention, 
leaving only limited managerial resources available for loosely coupled partnerships.  
Conversely, in the presence of limited growth and few alternatives to which 
resources must be allocated, loosely coupled partnerships are more likely to receive the 
managerial attention necessary to convert their knowledge into new innovative products. 
In our empirical setting (pharmaceuticals), firms build large pipelines of product 
candidates to innovate. Following the idea of managerial resource constraints, an increase 
in the pipeline of products in development is likely to absorb mangerial resources. 
However, when growth is limited, managerial resources are more likely to be available so 
that loosely coupled partnerships will be more effective.  
  Financial resources are also likely to act as a catalyst for loosely coupled 
partnerships. Cyert and March (1963:189) highlight that financial slack provides a 
fundamental role in the innovation process as it “provides a source of funds for 
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innovations that would not be approved in the face of scarcity.”
62
 Financial slack 
indirectly supports the innovation process by influencing the decision context in which 
resource allocations for innovative projects are undertaken (Greve, 2003a; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996). Namely, financial slack relaxes the internal monitoring and controls that 
are critical in a firm’s decision-making environment (Bourgeois III, 1981). The idea is 
that slack provides a “cushion” in the event of failure, leading firms to monitor 
performance less strictly (Cyert & March, 1963:43). Researchers have suggested that 
slack is necessary to adapt to a changing technological landscape, so that existing 
resources can complement new innovation activities (Rothaermel, 2001). In a similar 
vein, researchers have identified that the extent of investible resources, i.e., resources 
available for firms to invest, imposes an important boundary condition for subsequent 
firm acquisition activities (Kaul, 2012). 
We suggest that the innovation benefits of loosely coupled research partnerships 
are more likely to materialize in the presence of financial slack in the in-sourcing firm. 
Financial slack can provide the in-sourcing firm with the ability to resist short-term 
performance pressures, thus enabling it to continue to commit the necessary financial 
resources required from its loosely coupled research partnerships (Greve, 2003a). Prior 
research further indicates that slack encourages experimentation (Cyert & March, 1963), 
which we identified as being particularly important for loosely coupled partnerships. In 
the event that additional resources are required by other projects, financial slack can serve 
as a buffer. Thus, loosely coupled partnerships face lower risks that resources will be 
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 Although slack may have many different forms (Voss et al., 2008), researchers have predominantly 
focused on financial slack in the form of financial reserves as an important resource influencing innovation 
(Nohria & Gulati, 1996). 
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withdrawn or re-allocated elsewhere. It follows then that the existence of financial slack 
allows the in-sourcing firm to more fully leverage the knowledge accessed through 
loosely coupled research partnerships. Considering these two arguments (the availability 
of managerial resources and financial slack), we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The in-sourcing firm’s level of managerial resources positively 
moderates the effect of loosely coupled research partnerships on the in-sourcing 
firm’s innovative performance.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The in-sourcing firm’s level of financial slack positively moderates 
the effect of loosely coupled research partnerships on the in-sourcing firm’s 
innovative performance.  
 
METHODS 
Setting: Global pharmaceutical industry  
We tested our hypothesis in the global pharmaceutical industry and examined 
innovative performance in terms of new drug development in a given firm’s year. New 
drug development takes, on average, 7 to 11 years from original discovery to launch 
(Powell et al., 1996), and is a highly regulated process with clearly defined steps. We 
focused on the early stage of drug development, which begins with the discovery of the 
chemical compound (small molecule) or biologically based large molecules. Only 2.5% 
of all drug compounds become lead candidates to enter the preclinical stage, where they 
are tested with animals (Giovannetti & Morrison, 2000; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). This 
innovation cycle allowed us to clearly distinguish between discovery (everything prior to 
preclinical trials) and development (preclinical and beyond). 
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Sample  
We compiled a unique database, merging data from ReCap,
63
 Pharmaprojects, 
Adis R&D Insights and Compustat to track firms’ efforts to access external knowledge 
and drugs in development from a sample of established biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical firms. Pharmaprojects and Adis R&D Insights are databases tracking new 
drug development in the pharmaceutical industry and have been used in prior research 
studies (Adegbesan & Higgins, 2011; Hess & Rothaermel, 2011). 
Our sample was based on a comprehensive list of publicly traded firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry. We opted to use 1997 as a starting point (1 year before our 10 
year study period) and queried the Top 50 research active firms based on compounds in 
development in Pharmaprojects.
64
 Limiting the sample to the leading firms ensured that 
we observed a large portion of loosely coupled partnerships in the industry and at the 
same time, facilitated the data collection process across multiple databases. This 
approach is consistent with prior research examining established firms management of 
technological change (Anand et al., 2010; Kaplan & Tripsas, 2008; Rothaermel, 2001).  
To be included in our sample, a firm had to have at least one compound launched as a 
new molecular entity (or biologic) drug in Pharmaprojects before. We did not capture 
those firms predominantly focused on formulation technologies or generics. Our study 
was interested in the effect of external research agreements and all Top 50 Bio-
pharmaceutical engaged at least in one loosely coupled inter-organizational agreement in 
                                                          
63
 Recombinant Capital (ReCap), a proprietary database tracking the life science industry, is considered to 
be one of the most comprehensive publicly available data sources for the industry (Schilling, 2009).  
64
 This includes firms that do not belong to the bio-pharmaceutical industry per SIC code but are 
considered to be among the Top 50 pharmaceutical firms worldwide according to Pharmaceutical 
Executive. We identified 4 horizontal mergers (e.g., Astra AB and Zeneca forming AstraZeneca) for which 
we combined the data of the two merging firms. To keep a sample of 50 we added 4 firms, until rank 54.  
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ReCap. For each firm, we constructed a detailed history of divisions and subsidiaries 
using the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, LexisNexis and corporate websites to 
ensure that we allocated each drug and collaboration to the right firm at the right time. 
The total sample consisted of 50 firms, which span 454 observations from 1998 to 2007. 
Measures 
Dependent Variable - Innovative performance:  
New product development starts as a process of discovering new knowledge and 
the transformation of such knowledge in a final product (Madhavan & Grover, 1998). 
Given the length of the innovation cycle, we opted to examine an intermediate output of 
the product development process as a proxy for innovative performance. Namely, we 
examined new products in development as a dependent variable. New products in 
development represent a key stage in the innovation process as they reveal a firm’s ability 
to recombine various types of knowledge and have been used in prior research to measure 
a firm’s innovativeness (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004; Shan, 
Walker, & Kogut, 1994). Given that the ultimate goal of firms through loosely coupled 
partnerships is to find a potential product candidate, we considered this intermediate 
output as appropriate to capture if firms can ultimately benefit from loosely coupled 
partnerships.
65
 Using Pharmaprojects, we counted the annual number of new products in 
preclinical trials (Innovative performance) that were introduced by the firm in a given 
year. We used the new chemical entity flag provided by Pharmaprojects to identify 
innovations new to an industry (i.e., the molecule or biologic that represents a new 
                                                          
65
 Counting the number of patents used as in prior studies may be misleading as firms through loosely 
coupled partnerships may actually access rights to use certain patents but not necessarily need to increase 
their patenting output themselves. Important insights gained from loosely coupled partnerships like 
validating biological targets and new mechanism of actions in the human body cannot be patented  
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solution to address a therapeutic need).
66
 For each preclinical compound, we manually 
checked the date in Pharmaprojects to identify when the firm first put this compound in 
preclinical development. We used a second database (Adis R&D Insights) to verify or 
complement missing data for when a drug entered preclinical testing. We used the earliest 
reported date in cases when the databases differed. On average, firms introduce 5.4 new 
molecular entities (including chemical and biologics) into preclinical development each 
year. 
Independent Variables 
Loosely coupled research partnerships: We used ReCap to capture loosely 
coupled research partnerships. We only counted agreements that were signed at the 
earliest research stage. These agreements are flagged in Recap as “discovery” based on 
when the partnership was signed. At the discovery stage, firms have usually not yet found 
an actual compound to be used for further testing and quite often only have an idea of  
what mechanism in the body the potential discovery should target (Rydzewski, 2008). To 
ensure that we only captured agreements in which the research partners had the intention 
to generate new knowledge, we excluded any partnership that addressed reformulations 
of existing drugs or new combinations of existing substances.
67
  We only considered 
partnerships for which we knew that knowledge or technology flows in the direction of 
the incumbent pharmaceutical firm. Recap indicates which firm in a partnership is the 
technology provider and which one is the client, allowing us to explicitly distinguish, 
which firm is the in-sourcing partner. 
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 We also counted biological drugs as new to the industry but excluded biosimilars and generic drugs. 
67
 Results are robust keeping these agreements. 
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Following extant work on partnerships (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000), we 
acknowledged that the effect of accessing external knowledge may not be instantaneous. 
Instead, loosely coupled research partnerships agreements may generate innovation 
benefits over time that can be captured only by tracking their effect over multiple years. 
The idea is that the stock of research agreements, even after the year they are announced, 
may contribute towards innovative performance. We used a four year stock of innovative 
partnerships, reflective of the project time common for early stage research initiatives 
(Rydzewski, 2008).
68
 We followed common conventions when studying the effect of 
interorganizational agreements on performance (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 2000) and tested 
both a depreciated and undepreciated stock of partnerships.
69
 We reported the 
undepreciated four year stock in the results, which are almost identical to using a 
depreciated measure.  More importantly, we operationalized Loosely Coupled Research 
Partnerships as the number of research agreements, which we could unambiguously 
classify as signed during the discovery stage in the last four years wherein the in-sourcing 
firm enters a research partnership in order to access knowledge from a partner in 
exchange for money.  We defined loosely coupled partnerships in our sample as either in-
licensing (Recap code L)
70
 and research contracts (Recap code R) with the in-sourcing 
firm financing and paying royalties for research and technologies of a partner.
71
 We 
                                                          
68
 Results are robust using 4 and 5 years respectively.  
69
 Depreciation of the stock of bilateral partnerships reflects that recent sourcing activities might have a 
stronger effect than research agreements announced at an earlier point in time.  
70
 85% of all the research agreements had a licensing component. 
71
 Some of those research partnerships were classified as “pure licensing,” quite often involving a one-off 
purchase of knowledge (e.g., patent) by the in-sourcing firm. We believe these are extreme cases of a 
loosely coupled partnership (almost like an arm’s length transaction) in which the classification as a 
“partnership” may be questioned. Therefore, as we report in our robustness checks, we ran our models 
excluding all those extremely loosely coupled partnerships. Our results remained qualitatively the same.  
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identified 770 such agreements initiated by the 50 sample firms between 1994 and 
2006.
72
 The baseline relationship between loosely coupled research partnerships and new 
compounds in development (H1) is shown in Figure 14, which situates the variable in the 
empirical context. 
Figure 14: Chapter 4 – Baseline Model (H1) and Empirical Context  
 
Moderators 
Experimental Orientation: Following the literature on entrepreneurial orientation, 
we captured a firm’s overall experimental orientation via their propensity to engage in 
risky innovative projects (Dess et al., 1997). This is similar to Bierly and Chakrabarti 
(1996), who differentiated between experimental vs. non experimental innovation in 
approved drugs. Firms in research have the option to develop drugs using elements of 
knowledge already implemented in prior innovation attempts by the firm. Two important 
elements of knowledge used in drug development are the mechanism of action and the 
origin of material, both of which are available from Pharmaprojects.  
The origin of material gives a broad distinction if the drug development project is 
based on chemistry (small molecule), biology (e.g., a protein or viral vector) or if the 
compound is derived from a natural product. The mechanism of action classifies the 
pharmacological effect through which the drug may have an effect on the human body. 
                                                          
72
 Given the lag structure, we started our analysis in 1998 using partnership stock from 1994-1997. 
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For example, Cox-2 inhibitors (one of our mechanism of action categories) prevent the 
production of PHG (prostaglandin) from arachidonic acid, which causes inflammation.
73
 
We consider the origin of material, mechanism of action and indication as pockets of 
specialized knowledge which are embedded in a technology (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), 
and then examined if projects initiated by the firm in the last four years are based on 
knowledge were novel (experimental) to the firm. 
We counted all compounds in development of each focal firm as reported by 
Pharmaprojects. For each drug in development within the year’s t-1 to t-4, we determined 
if the project was or was not experimental. For example, if a firm had 10 drugs reported 
in development during a three-year timeframe and 3 of them deployed either a new 
mechanism of action or origin of material to solve a given therapeutic problem, its level 
of Experimental Orientation would be 0.3. Higher values of this measure indicate a 
higher propensity to experiment with novel knowledge to the firm.  
Financial slack: We proxied Financial slack by the current ratio of the firm in a 
given year, which is the ratio of its current assets divided by its current liabilities 
(Bourgeois III, 1981; Greve, 2003a; Singh, 1986). Firms with a low current ratio are 
resource-constrained as they have less free financial resources at hand.  
Managerial resources: The availability of managerial resources such as 
managerial attention is difficult to observe as, unlike financial resources, they are not 
found on a firm’s balance sheet. However, a good proxy for the availability of managerial 
resources (or the lack thereof) is the firm’s ongoing product development activities: all 
                                                          
73
 We employed a consulting firm to assess which mechanism of action codes can be further aggregated. A 
pharmacology expert with 26 years in drug development and patented compounds and a biotechnology 
graduate student did the classification separately (resulting in 240 unique pharmacology codes in our 
sample). 
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else being equal, the more products in development, the less managerial resources are 
available to other projects. This resonates with a resource-based perspective in which 
firm growth in a previous period limits the growth of firms in subsequent years (Penrose, 
1959). We constructed a variable called pipeline growth, which captured how the pipeline 
has gown or declined from year t-2 to t-1. We argue that a growing pipeline signals 
scarce managerial resources as the in-sourcing firm has many alternative development 
paths to pursue. Conversely, a decline in the pipeline is a good proxy for the availability 
of more managerial resources. We reverse coded the variable Managerial Resources as 
pipeline decline to indicate the availability of managerial resources.  
Controls 
We first controlled for the effect of other in-sourcing activities. We controlled for 
the effect of Tightly Coupled Research Partnerships, defined as the number of research 
agreements in which a firm engaged in the last three years wherein parties mutually 
shared knowledge and other resources. These arrangements are captured in Recap 
through the addition of distinct agreement types: CoL (Collaboration Agreement) and 
JVs (joint ventures).
74
 We also added an indicator variable Acquisition to control for 
firms that engaged in a research-oriented acquisition in the prior year. Finally, we added 
Exploitation as the number of alliances formed to develop and commercialize existing 
compounds in the previous four years (these partnerships in-source “ready to use” 
compounds and are hence at a later stage of development). 
                                                          
74
 All results are robust when excluding joint ventures. We checked news articles associated with 
approximately 10% of all partnerships (available from Recap) it and found that the Recap classification was 
very much in line with the actual announcements. 
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Second, we controlled for various financial and performance measures that affect 
new product development. We included the variable return on assets (RoA), which 
captures the firm’s performance. Other financial controls included Total Assets as a proxy 
for the firm’s size and R&D intensity (R&D divided by Total Sales), which proxies the 
emphasis firms places on research in general. Finally, we captured internal research by 
adding the number of Patents (logged) a firm applied for in a given year as an important 
input for product development (Murray, 2002).  
Empirical Specification 
All variables were lagged by one year; for example, we predicted new products in 
development in year t by the financial controls from year t-1. The variables spanning 
multiple years (e.g., loosely coupled partnerships and experimentation) include the years 
t-4to t-1. Our dependent variable takes only positive integer values, so it is recommended 
to use a count model. The negative binomial model is appropriate as it relaxes the 
assumption of having a mean equal to the standard deviation. We reported both a fixed 
effect and random effect negative binomial model but the Hausman (1978) test indicated 
that a fixed effect model would be more appropriate. The fixed effect model controls for 
time invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity. Given that firm fixed effects may not be 
robust in this estimation (Allison & Waterman, 2002), we also report a random effects 
model and a fixed-effects Poisson quasi maximum likelihood estimator, which is robust 
when using firm fixed effects (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
RESULTS 
Table 12 depicts the descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlation matrix. The 
summary statistics indicated that our sample firms are large incumbent players in the 
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industry (US$ 12 billion in assets on average). The firms were quite active with external 
partners with an average four year stock of 5.2 loosely coupled research partnerships. 
Table 12 shows that loosely and tightly coupled partnerships are both correlated with 
firm size (Total Assets).
75
   
                                                          
75
 Multicollinearity is not a concern as the mean VIF for the final models was below 2.4 and individual 
VIFs were below 4.6, all well below the recommended cut-off levels. We centered all variables before 
interacting them   (Cohen et al., 2003).  
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Table 12: Chapter 4 - Correlation & Summary Statistics  
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Innovative Performance 1.00                       
2 Exploitation   0.56 1.00                     
3 Acquisition   0.17 0.24 1.00                   
4 R&D Intensity -0.11 -0.13 0.01 1.00                 
5 Tightly Coupled Partnerships   0.62 0.68 0.29 -0.03 1.00               
6 Patents (log) 0.52 0.50 0.16 -0.20 0.46 1.00             
7 RoA 0.31 0.26 0.08 -0.54 0.28 0.32 1.00           
8 Total Assets (BNs) 0.63 0.58 0.26 -0.13 0.70 0.54 0.20 1.00         
9 Managerial Resources 0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.19 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 1.00       
10 Financial Slack -0.34 -0.29 -0.16 0.38 -0.31 -0.36 -0.31 -0.35 -0.02 1.00     
11 Experimental Orientation -0.25 -0.25 -0.10 0.11 -0.22 -0.20 -0.24 -0.27 -0.08 0.06 1.00   
12 Loosely Coupled Partnerships   0.58 0.59 0.22 -0.06 0.65 0.51 0.31 0.59 0.03 -0.28 -0.24 1.00 
  Mean 5.41 5.75 0.45 0.21 5.02 4.35 0.15 12.73 2.42 2.60 0.51 5.22 
  Standard Deviation 6.99 5.71 0.50 0.30 6.03 1.20 0.11 18.05 0.37 1.38 0.18 6.69 
  Minimum Value 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.23 0.00 0.68 0.00 0 
  Maximum Value 47 35 1.00 2.79 38.00 6.89 0.41 123.68 3.00 6.12 1.00 34 
   n=454 
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Table 13: Chapter 4 – Results - Negative Binomial - DV: New product development 
  
(1) 
FE 
(2) 
FE 
(3) 
RE 
(4) 
FE 
Firm Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
Exploitation (4y) -0.017+ 
(0.010) 
-0.018+ 
(0.010) 
-0.015+ 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
Acquisition (4y) -0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.017) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
R&D Intensity (t-1) -0.365 
(0.270) 
-0.365 
(0.269) 
-0.082 
(0.233) 
-0.378 
(0.271) 
Tightly Coupled  
Partnerships (4y) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
0.027** 
(0.009) 
Patents (4y) 0.195* 
(0.098) 
0.196* 
(0.099) 
0.373*** 
(0.065) 
0.194* 
(0.098) 
RoA (t-1) 0.259 
(0.571) 
0.213 
(0.574) 
0.497 
(0.541) 
0.219 
(0.576) 
Total Assets (t-1) -0.388 
(2.571) 
-0.867 
(2.645) 
-0.094 
(2.431) 
0.040 
(2.656) 
Experimental  
Orientation (4y) 
0.523+ 
(0.299) 
0.565+ 
(0.304) 
0.179 
(0.290) 
0.512+ 
(0.299) 
Managerial Resources (t-1) -0.034 
(0.116) 
-0.029 
(0.117) 
0.080 
(0.116) 
-0.042 
(0.116) 
Financial Slack (t-1) -0.087+ 
(0.048) 
-0.085+ 
(0.048) 
-0.085* 
(0.043) 
-0.080+ 
(0.047) 
Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships (4y) 
 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.014* 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Experimental Orientation 
   
0.118** 
(0.042) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Managerial Resources 
    Loosely Coupled X  
Financial Slack 
    Constant 0.751 
(0.626) 
0.717 
(0.627) 
-0.518 
(0.418) 
0.762 
(0.621) 
Log Likelihood -823.23 -822.88 -1042.15 -819.04 
N 454 454 454 454 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 13 (continued): Chapter 4 – Results - Negative Binomial - DV: New product development 
  
(5) 
FE 
(6) 
FE 
(7) 
FE 
(8) 
RE 
Firm Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Effects Y Y Y Y 
Exploitation (4y) -0.021* 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
Acquisition (4y) -0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
R&D Intensity (t-1) -0.437 
(0.272) 
-0.309 
(0.270) 
-0.398 
(0.275) 
-0.188 
(0.237) 
Tightly Coupled  
Partnerships (4y) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
0.028** 
(0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
Patents (4y) 0.204* 
(0.099) 
0.195* 
(0.097) 
0.200* 
(0.097) 
0.337*** 
(0.063) 
RoA (t-1) 0.153 
(0.571) 
0.304 
(0.569) 
0.255 
(0.568) 
0.560 
(0.530) 
Total Assets (t-1) -0.203 
(2.566) 
-0.298 
(2.621) 
0.887 
(2.548) 
2.181 
(2.350) 
Experimental  
Orientation (4y) 
0.553+ 
(0.302) 
0.561+ 
(0.305) 
0.486 
(0.299) 
0.057 
(0.283) 
Managerial Resources (t-1) -0.102 
(0.110) 
-0.022 
(0.117) 
-0.105 
(0.110) 
-0.041 
(0.110) 
Financial Slack (t-1) -0.077 
(0.047) 
-0.072 
(0.048) 
-0.061 
(0.047) 
-0.063 
(0.042) 
Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships (4y) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Experimental Orientation 
  
0.119** 
(0.042) 
0.135*** 
(0.037) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Managerial Resources 
0.032* 
(0.013) 
 
0.033* 
(0.013) 
0.033** 
(0.013) 
Loosely Coupled X  
Financial Slack 
 
0.024** 
(0.009) 
0.024** 
(0.009) 
0.024** 
(0.008) 
Constant 0.760 
(0.627) 
0.751 
(0.615) 
0.843 
(0.612) 
-0.135 
(0.401) 
Log Likelihood -819.53 -819.39 -812.28 -1027.65 
N 454 454 454 454 
       + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
 
138 
 
 
 
Table 13 depicts the results for all hypotheses. Model 1 only shows the control 
variables. Tightly Coupled Partnerships and Patents are strong predictors for new 
products in development. In Models 2 and 3, we added the stock of loosely coupled 
research partnerships. We only found a significant positive effect using a random effects 
model (Model 3) while in the fixed effects model (Model 2), the coefficient, while 
positive, did not reach acceptable statistical significance levels. Overall, these results 
provide only weak support for Hypothesis 1. 
In Model 4, we added the first interaction: experimental orientation with loosely 
coupled partnerships. The results support Hypothesis 2. The interaction effect is best 
demonstrated graphically, which we show in Figure 15. At high levels (75
th
 percentile) of 
Experimental Orientation, firms benefit much more from loosely coupled partnerships 
than at lower levels (25
th
 percentile).  
Figure 15: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnersh. and Experiment. Orientation  
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In Model 5, we entered the interaction of Loosely Coupled Partnerships and 
Managerial Resources (proxied by percentage decline in the number of drug 
development projects the firm has to attend to). As expected, the interaction was positive, 
indicating that the decline in the pipeline may free up managerial resources, thus allowing 
firms to benefit from Loosely Coupled Partnerships. The result is shown graphically in 
Figure 16 plotting Managerial Resources at 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile. 
Figure 16: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnerships and Managerial Resources  
 
Finally, Model 6 shows the interaction of loosely coupled partnerships and 
Financial Slack (current ratio). The results confirmed Hypothesis 4: the availability of 
financial resources allows firms to more effectively benefit from Loosely Coupled 
Research Partnerships. We demonstrate the effect graphically, plotting Financial Slack 
at the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17: Chapter 4 - Moderation Loosely Coupled Partnerships and Financial Slack  
 
To further examine the interaction effect, we reported marginal effects in Table 
14 and compared marginal effects when the values of the three moderators are at the 25
th
 
percentile, the median and at the 75
th
 percentile
76
. Testing the difference among 
coefficients of the 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentile derived from STATA’s margins command, we 
found that the effect of loosely coupled partnerships is significantly stronger at higher 
levels of all moderators. 
Table 14: Chapter 4 – Marginal Effects  
STATA – Margins: Effects of Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships at different levels of moderators y 
y=Experimental 
Orientation 
y=Managerial 
Resources 
y=Financial Slack 
When y is at the25
th
 percentile  0.008 (0.007) 0.005 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006) 
When y is at the median  0.023** (0.008) 0.009 (0.006) 0.023* (0.009) 
When y is at the75
th
 percentile 0.038** (0.011) 0.017* (0.007) 0.046** (0.017) 
Changes in the marginal effect (from 25
th
 to 75
th
 
percentile)  
0.03** chi2= 9.05   0.12* chi2= 6.00 0.39** chi2= 6.94 
 
                                                          
76
 Very similar results are obtained by using mean and a standard deviation above the mean values. 
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Model 7 shows the full model with all interactions, which remain supported; 
results are also similar in a random effects model in Model 8. Overall, these results 
confirmed our contention that firm context in the form of experimental orientation, 
financial slack and managerial resources substantially positively affect a firm’s ability to 
convert loosely coupled research partnerships into innovations. 
Robustness Tests  
We conducted several robustness tests (Table 15). First, we used a fixed-effects 
Poisson quasi maximum likelihood model as the negative binomial fixed effect model has 
been criticized as not providing true fixed effects (Allison & Waterman, 2002). Results 
are in line with our other specifications. We further used alternative operationalization to 
proxy financial slack and managerial resources. For financial slack, we used working 
capital over sales as alternative (Bourgeois III, 1981; Singh, 1986) and found results 
similar to those reported for Hypothesis 3 (Model 11). For Managerial Resources. we 
used the number of Therapeutic Areas (Model 12) and number of Modes (acquisition, 
tight, loose partnering ) pursued by the in-sourcing firm in t-1 to proxy a constraint on 
managerial resources (Model 13). As Models 12 and 13 indicate, our results show a 
sensitivity of loosely coupled partnerships to a lack of managerial resources. In order to 
demonstrate that the moderations are particularly important for loosely coupled 
partnerships, we ran the same analysis interacting Tightly Coupled Partnerships (Model 
14) and found no significant effect except for Experimental Orientation, which is 
marginally significant. Finally, we examined whether our results would be robust if we 
excluded the most extreme cases of loosely coupled partnerships (i.e., pure licensing 
agreements). Our results were robust (Model 15). 
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Table 15: Chapter 4 -  Robustness Tests - Negative Binomial FE 
DV: New products in 
development 
(M9) 
QML 
Poisson 
FE 
(M10) 
FE 
Loosely 
Coup. >0 
(M11) 
Financial 
Slack: 
WC/Sales 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
Exploitation (4y) -0.013+ 
(0.007) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
Acquisition (4y) -0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
Tightly Coupled 
Partnerships (4y) 
0.027*** 
(0.006) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
Patents (4y) 0.175 
(0.133) 
0.176 
(0.107) 
0.151 
(0.103) 
Experimental  
Orientation (4y) 
0.649* 
(0.299) 
0.691* 
(0.342) 
0.502+ 
(0.303) 
Managerial Resources (t-1) -0.138 
(0.103) 
0.010 
(0.134) 
-0.098 
(0.116) 
Financial Slack (t-1) -0.014 
(0.050) 
-0.043 
(0.052) 
0.103 
(0.082) 
Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships (4y) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
0.018+ 
(0.009) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Experimental Orientation 
0.087* 
(0.041) 
0.096* 
(0.045) 
 
Loosely Coupled X 
Managerial Resources 
0.037*** 
(0.007) 
0.024+ 
(0.014) 
 
Loosely Coupled X  
Financial Slack 
0.022** 
(0.008) 
0.021* 
(0.009) 
0.031* 
(0.016) 
Therapeutic Areas (t-1)    
Loosely Coupled X 
Therapeutic Areas 
   
Alternative Modes (t-1)    
Loosely Coupled X 
Alternative Modes 
   
Tightly Coupled X 
Experimental Orientation 
   
Tightly Coupled X 
Managerial Resources 
   
Tightly Coupled X 
Financial Slack 
   
Constant  0.980 
(0.685) 
1.009 
(0.669) 
Log Likelihood -858.11 -704.49 -831.73 
N 454 375 454 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Not shown but included in the models: Total Assets, Return on 
Assets and R&D Intensity 
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Table 15 (continued): Chapter 4 -  Robustness Tests - Negative Binomial FE 
DV: New products in 
development 
(M12) 
Managerial 
Resources 
Alt. 1 
(M13) 
Managerial 
Resources 
Alt 2 
(M14) 
Tightly 
Coupled 
Interac.  
(M15) 
Loosely C. 
(no pure 
licensing) 
Firm and Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Exploitation (4y) -0.017+ 
(0.009) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
Acquisition (4y) -0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.018 
(0.018) 
-0.011 
(0.019) 
-0.029+ 
(0.017) 
Tightly Coupled 
Partnerships (4y) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.028* 
(0.013) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
Patents (4y) 0.185+ 
(0.098) 
0.170+ 
(0.099) 
0.206* 
(0.101) 
0.195* 
(0.097) 
Experimental  
Orientation (4y) 
0.597+ 
(0.306) 
0.602* 
(0.302) 
0.564+ 
(0.305) 
0.424 
(0.299) 
Managerial Resources (t-1) 0.038 
(0.127) 
0.032 
(0.120) 
0.001 
(0.121) 
-0.084 
(0.109) 
Financial Slack (t-1) -0.067 
(0.048) 
-0.080+ 
(0.047) 
-0.079+ 
(0.048) 
-0.072 
(0.047) 
Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships (4y) 
0.047** 
(0.018) 
0.038** 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Experimental Orientation 
   0.170* 
(0.075) 
Loosely Coupled X 
Managerial Resources 
   0.053* 
(0.023) 
Loosely Coupled X  
Financial Slack 
   0.034* 
(0.014) 
Therapeutic Areas (t-1) 0.035+ 
(0.021) 
   
Loosely Coupled X 
Therapeutic Areas 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
   
Alternative Modes (t-1)  0.153* 
(0.063) 
  
Loosely Coupled X 
Alternative Modes 
 -0.020** 
(0.007) 
  
Tightly Coupled X 
Experimental Orientation 
  0.094+ 
(0.055) 
 
Tightly Coupled X 
Managerial Resources 
  -0.008 
(0.018) 
 
Tightly Coupled X 
Financial Slack 
  0.014 
(0.009) 
 
Constant 0.636 
(0.613) 
0.752 
(0.631) 
0.617 
(0.640) 
0.890 
(0.613) 
Log Likelihood -819.47 -817.79 -819.73 -815.23 
N 454 454 454 454 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, Not shown but included in the models: Total Assets, Return on 
Assets and R&D Intensity 
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Endogeneity  
An important concern in our study is that the decision to engage in loosely 
coupled partnerships may be endogenous. To address this issue, we further examined the 
data to determine if some firms systematically do not engage in loosely coupled 
partnerships. In our sample, all firms engaged in at least 1 loosely coupled partnership 
between 1994 and 2006 (the timeframe in which the independent variable is measured). 
Hence, there was no evidence that some firms avoid loosely coupled partnerships 
altogether. This said, in order to further address endogeneity concerns, we conducted the 
following robustness tests. 
First, we limited our sample to firm years in which we observed a stock of loosely 
coupled partnerships (Model 10). This reduced our sample to 377 firm-year observations. 
We then replicated our analysis; the results found similar support compared to the full 
sample. 
Second, we examined if the identified relationships hold only for specific types of 
firms. We split the sample by the size of firms and examined differences between larger 
and smaller incumbents in our sample. The results (available upon request) are very much 
in line with the results for the full sample. These robustness tests, along with using firm 
fixed effects, gave us increased confidence that our results were not driven by the 
selection of loosely coupled partnerships by specific types of firms.   
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DISCUSSION 
Determining how future goods and services are discovered, developed and 
commercialized represents a fundamental question in strategy and innovation 
management research (Ahuja & Morris Lampert, 2001). Our study attempts to illuminate 
how firms manage this process when they opt to access external knowledge via loosely 
coupled partnerships. The study lies at the heart of two core organizational processes: 
interorganizational partnerships and new product development, both of which have a 
profound impact on a firm’s ability to build value-creating strategies. 
We find that accessing external knowledge via loosely coupled partnerships 
matters for innovative performance, but the innovation benefits of such partnerships 
reach their full potential only in specific firm contexts. Namely, we identify the in-
sourcing firm’s experimental orientation, its availability of financial slack and managerial 
resources as three key moderators that allow it to reap the innovation benefits of loosely 
coupled research partnerships.  
Our study makes three main contributions. First, we highlight that scholars may 
need to distinguish between tightly and loosely coupled research partnerships when 
examining their effect on innovative performance in general. In the pharmaceutical space, 
previous studies (Hess & Rothaermel, 2011; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 2003) have found 
surprisingly little evidence of a direct relationship between in-sourcing external 
knowledge through partnering and generating new product development candidates, 
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which may stem from collapsing both tight and loose research partnerships into one 
single category.
77
   
Second, we reveal that although the effect of loosely coupled research 
partnerships on the in-sourcing firm’s innovative performance does not seem to be 
statistically strong, when we look at its interaction with the firm’s experimental 
orientation as well as with its availability of financial and managerial  resources, the 
results are strong and robust to several different specifications. While extant research has 
tended to focus on the benefits of tightly coupled partnerships, we unveil in this paper the 
conditions under which another category of partnerships (i.e., loosely coupled) may 
provide a focal in-sourcing firm with significant innovation benefits. Previous studies 
have already suggested that loosely coupled partnerships may be ideal in settings of rapid 
environmental change as they allow firms to effectively exploit the division of labor and 
gain access to specialized knowledge. Our results highlight that all these potential 
advantages of loosely coupled partnerships are much more likely to be manifested in 
terms of innovation benefits in the presence of a strong experimental orientation, 
financial slack and managerial resources in the in-sourcing firm.  
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on financial slack. While the direct 
effect of slack on innovation continues to be subject to debate (Nohria & Gulati, 1996), 
our study reveals that financial slack may be an important contingency for firms to 
benefit from loosely coupled partnerships. 
In its current form, this study has several limitations. First, the pharmaceutical 
industry is very distinctive as there is a clear delineation between discovery and 
                                                          
77
 For example, Rothaermel and Hess (2011) find no direct effect from upstream (i.e., discovery) 
partnerships on new product development in a similar context. 
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development. For instance, once in development, a compound usually undergoes only 
marginal alterations. This may not be true for other industries. A second concern is that 
the dependent variable (i.e., new preclinical compounds in development) only captures 
new product announcements that are disclosed by the firm. Although the pharmaceutical 
industry is regulated in the clinical trials, this does not guarantee that each compound is 
disclosed early in the preclinical trials. We tried to mitigate this risk by completing 
Pharmaprojects information with ADIS Insights to have two separate databases to 
identify when a compound was first visible. If some firms tend to underreport more than 
others, we hope to have remedied this by using fixed effects. 
Given the firm-level analysis of our study, future research may examine how the 
firm-level factors (experimentation, financial slack and managerial resources) indeed 
influence individual loosely coupled research partnerships at the project level. Moreover, 
the analysis could be extended to partnership agreements beyond the discovery stage and 
closer to commercialization. 
Overall, our paper demonstrates that loosely coupled partnerships can also be 
important vehicles to allow firms to devise solutions new to an industry. This should be 
an important reminder for managers and researchers alike that firms may achieve 
innovations through multiple paths and distinct external knowledge sourcing strategies.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
We’re at a tipping point. We’ve come to the point where internal discovery can no longer 
sustain companies of our size.  And I’ll say that across the field.  We have to get better at 
leveraging the external environment but in a very serious way. …  I do believe that 
there’s disruptive innovation out there and we just have to learn to be externally focused 
instead of contemplating our own (Merck Senior Executive – World Wide Licensing, 
2011) 
 
Contributions 
This dissertation makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to 
understanding the unique relationships of established and startup firms in environments 
characterized by rapid technological change. An overview of the hypothesized 
relationships and the dissertation results is shown in Table 16. Next, I discuss the most 
important findings of the dissertation followed by an exposition on some of the 
dissertation’s most important limitations and potential avenues for future research. 
All essays of this dissertation have in common that they address challenges 
associated with exploration, i.e., the conscious effort to move away from current 
organizational routines and knowledge bases (Katila & Ahuja, 2002:1184; March, 1991) 
in innovation and problem solving. Chapter 1 observes exploration directly in the form of 
the technological opportunities pursued by established firms. While on one hand, 
established firms pursue external partnerships to access exploratory knowledge from 
startups (see the introductory quote of this chapter), I find that established firms may 
“overlook” highly novel and early stage technological opportunities in partnership 
formation. As such, forming exploratory type partnerships may be challenging for firms.. 
Similarly, in chapter 3, I observe exploration of startup firms relative to the established 
industry players. I find that pursuing radical innovations (innovations which differ from 
those of established firms) is associated with severe market value penalties for startups. 
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This suggests substantial difficulties for startup firms to position themselves in a very 
exploratory position versus established industry players. Finally, chapter 4 highlights the 
challenges of established firms to effectively use external knowledge sourced into the 
firms through loosely coupled partnerships with the intention to explore and innovate.  
Table 16: Summary of hypotheses and empirical results 
Ch.  Hyp. Dependent Variable Independent Variable Hyp. 
Effect 
Supported? 
2 1 Partnership Formation Novelty Partnering Opportunity - Yes 
2 2 Partnership Formation Distance to Commercialization of 
Opportunity 
- Yes 
2 3a Partnership Formation Interaction:  Novelty Partnering 
Opportunity x 
Prior Failures 
+ Yes 
2 3b Partnership Formation Novelty Partnering Opportunity x 
Prior Successes 
- No 
2 4a Partnership Formation Distance to Commercialization x 
Prior Failures 
- Partially 
2 4b Partnership Formation Distance to Commercialization x 
Prior Successes 
+ Yes 
3 1 Market Value Startup  Radicalness of Innovation - Yes 
3 2 Market Value Startup  Radicalness of Innovation x 
Formation of Commercialization 
Partnerships 
+ Yes 
3 3 Market Value Startup  Radicalness of Innovation x 
Failure Incumbent Firms 
+ Yes 
3 4 Market Value Startup  Interaction:  Radicalness of Innovation x 
Maturity of Innovation 
+ No 
4 1 New Products in Development Loosely Coupled Partnerships + No 
4 2 New Products in Development Interaction:  Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships x 
Experimentation 
+ Yes 
4 3 New Products in Development Interaction:  Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships x 
Financial Slack 
+ Yes 
4 4 New Products in Development Interaction:  Loosely Coupled 
Partnerships x 
Managerial Resources 
+ Yes 
 
This illustrates that merely adding and accessing external knowledge may not be 
enough for firms to innovate, as the exploration of new knowledge may require both 
adding new knowledge and recombining knowledge in new ways (Fleming & Sorenson, 
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2004). Overall, the dissertation outlines various severe challenges related to exploration, 
even in environments where a division of innovative labor between established and 
startup firms has emerged (Arora & Gambardella, 1994a) 
Importantly, all dissertation essays contribute to our understanding about the 
conditions under which challenges related to exploration hold or do not hold. To that end 
I extend studies examining a firm’s organizational context and, in particular, internal 
R&D as boundary conditions to recognize and use external knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Jansen et al., 2005; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2011; Volberda, Foss, & 
Lyles, 2010). For example, chapters 2 reveals how all experience is not created equal and 
that prior failures and successes in R&D differently shape “spatial” and “temporal” 
myopia in the formation of partnerships. I find that while prior failures lead firms to 
become more open to novel ways of solving problems, they, at the same time, push firms 
to seek partnering opportunities which promise immediate payoffs. These findings 
resolve existing tensions in the literature as to whether prior failures lead to a 
problemistic type search, which is often characterized as local and reactive (Cyert & 
March, 1963; Staw et al., 1981) or if failures can lead to search which is more 
experimental and risk-seeking (Greve, 2011; Madsen & Desai, 2010). In a related vein, I 
find that startups pursuing radical innovations may benefit from failures of established 
firms (chapter 3), which supports the idea that failures make novel types of solutions 
more attractive and trigger a reallocation of resources towards such initiatives.  
Quite differently, I find that prior successes may enable firms to take a long term 
perspective, allowing them to consider partnering opportunities with more distant payoffs 
(chapter 2). This resonates with Cyert and March’s (1992:189) suggestion  that “success 
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tends to breed slack” which acts as a buffer for “risky” decisions, ultimately allowing 
firms to be more lenient in allocating resources to early stage partnering opportunities. 
On the other hand, it challenges ideas that success may ultimately harm subsequent 
innovation attempts as it traps organizations into existing knowledge bases and routines 
(Audia et al., 2000). In chapter 4, I observe financial slack as a proxy for success and 
reveal that slack may be an important condition to effectively utilizing knowledge gained 
from loosely coupled partnerships. All these findings argue for the value of integrating 
perspectives on myopia and local search with studies examining experiences of failures 
and successes as well as organizational slack (Greve, 2011; Laursen, 2012).  
All three essays also contribute to the understanding of partnerships between 
startups and established firms. While the formation of partnerships is studied as an 
outcome in chapter 2, chapters 3 and 4 consider partnerships as important inputs to create 
value for firms. For example, chapter 4 illuminates the unique properties of loosely 
coupled partnerships, which represent an exchange of knowledge absent strong 
collaboration and organizational support (Steensma & Corley, 2000). I find that benefits 
from such partnerships do not necessarily stem from the sourcing relationship per se, but 
are closely linked to the in-sourcing firm’s experimental orientation to pursue risky 
projects and the availability of financial and managerial resources. Finally, chapter 3 
demonstrates that partnering can be an important moderator, shaping the legitimacy and 
resources available for startup firms. I identify that, beyond direct benefits, partnerships 
seem to be particularly important for startups pursuing radical innovations. Interestingly, 
this essay also reveals that even in the absence of partnerships, the relationship between 
startups and established firms remains important. Namely, failures in established firms’ 
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R&D attempts may benefit those startups that pursue product innovations which depart 
from the industry’s existing recipes for problem-solving. Table 17 provides a summary of 
key insights from each chapter of this dissertation and outlines the key arguments made. 
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Table 17: Dissertation Highlights  
  Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Outcome 
Studied 
Established Firm’s Partnership Formation Startup’s Market Value Established Firm’s New Products in 
Development 
Innovation 
Process  
Established firms selecting among a range of 
partnering opportunities from startups. 
Startup firms' pursuit of product innovations relative to industry 
incumbents. 
Innovation benefits accrued from 
loosely coupled research partnerships. 
Exploration 
Challenge 
Established firms face challenges in pursuing 
partnering opportunities with novel technological 
solutions and with payoffs in the distant future.  
Startup firms face challenges when pursuing radical 
innovations, i.e., innovations which differ from those sought by 
established placers. 
Engaging with external partners through 
loosely coupled partnerships may add to 
the firm's variety of knowledge but such 
knowledge may not be effectively used 
to boost innovative performance.  
Theorized 
Mechanisms 
Firms prefer established means-end relation-ships 
in problem-solving (spatial myopia) and prefer 
exploiting existing commercialization routines 
(temporal myopia). 
Pursuing radical innovations leads to a lack of legitimacy and 
resources for startups, adversely affecting market valuations. 
Innovation not only requires elements of 
external knowledge, but also 
experimentation and supporting 
resources, which loosely coupled 
partnerships lack. 
Identified 
Boundary  
Conditions 
Prior Failure and Success shape myopic 
tendencies: 
 
Spatial Myopia: Prior Failures challenges existing 
means-end relations, while prior successes may 
reinforce them. 
 
Temporal Myopia: Prior Failures reinforce 
temporal myopia, while prior successes allow 
firms to more readily consider partnering 
opportunities at an early stage of development. 
Legitimacy and  resources provided through:  
 
Formation of commercialization partnerships (validate 
technology and provide resources to commercialize) 
 
Established firms failures in R&D: Relative legitimacy of 
radical solutions increases. Resource re-allocation of established 
firms signals resource availability for startups with radical 
innovations  
 
Maturing innovations: Increases viability of radical innovations. 
Possible resource independence from established firms. 
Necessary to look within the firm to 
observe when firms benefit from 
external knowledge sourced-in through 
loosely coupled partnerships: 
 
Experimental Orientation: Induces 
recombination and experimentation 
 
Abundant Managerial and Financial 
Resources: Support innovation 
initiatives, which lack managerial and 
financial resources in the first place. 
Main 
Contributions 
"Temporal" and "spatial" myopia salient in the 
formation of partnerships between established 
firms and startups. 
 
Prior failures and successes have a different effect 
on the two types of myopia. Failures open firms to 
partnering opportunities with novel elements of 
knowledge. Prior successes open firms to 
solutions that are distant from commercialization. 
In an environment wherein established firms retain 
complementary assets, pursuing radical innovations is 
associated with market value penalties.  
 
Forming commercialization partnerships and failure in R&D 
initiatives by established firms provide both legitimacy and 
resources to startups pursuing radical innovation, hence 
mitigating market value penalties.  
Innovation benefits may not stem from 
sourcing external knowledge per se.  
 
Benefits contingent on the in-sourcing 
firm’s experimental orientation to 
pursue risky projects and the availability 
of financial and managerial resources. 
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The dissertation also makes important methodical contributions. Focusing on 
innovation associated with compounds in development in all essays allows me to capture 
information in the innovation process that cannot be derived from patent-based studies. 
For example, I am able to unambiguously identify if a technology (i.e., a compound) was 
available for partnering or not (chapter 2) while, for patents, it is often not clear which 
patents are already licensed to other parties and hence not available. Patents also do not 
allow us to capture the “time to commercialization” dimension of exploration, which is 
important to understanding organizational decision-making (chapter 2 and chapter 3). 
Compounds can be unambiguously characterized as being very early or late in the 
innovation process, which is not possible through the mere observation of patents. 
Moreover, compounds are at the nexus of research and commercialization and hence 
represent an important area in which managerial decisions (e.g., the allocation of 
resources) are made. It is here where challenges to exploration may materialize as 
managers need to make compensatory tradeoffs among various investment alternatives 
(Adner & Levinthal, 2008; Klingebiel & Rammer, 2013). A final methodological 
contribution lies in the idea of expanding our toolset to measure radical innovations 
(chapter 3), which follows the fact that prior studies have examined radical innovations, 
not as an ex post, but as a dynamic measure defined through the overlap in innovation 
activities by startups and established firms (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). 
Limitations & Extensions 
This dissertation is not without limitations, which should provide ample 
opportunities for future research. I will focus on the two most important ones as I 
addressed limitations separately in each dissertation chapter.  
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First, I have analyzed a single industry, which poses concerns as results may not 
be generalizable. In particular, I have purposefully chosen an industry in which 
established firms are known to remain in possession of complementary assets. I have not, 
however, contrasted my observations to an industry in which this may not be the case.  
Second, the dissertation currently solely considers partnering as an important 
strategic tool deployed by established firms and startup firms in their innovation 
activities. However, firms possess a broad variety of tools to tap into external knowledge, 
including acquisitions or CVC investments (Keil et al., 2008; Nicholls-Nixon & Woo, 
2003), which in this dissertation only serve as controls. The dissertation hence only 
captures a subset of actions at the disposal of firms. The inclusion of alternative modes 
like acquisitions would, hence, provide an interesting area for future research.  
My goal when generating my dissertation data was to build the most 
comprehensive dataset linking both external activities (from ReCap) and product 
development (from Pharmaprojects). Linking external agreements and product 
development data allows me to more readily compare internal R&D (in product 
development) as well as external R&D. Hence, I have the unique opportunity to study 
internal and external R&D not only by counting activities but by explicating the direction 
firms take (exploration and exploitation).  
This dataset will cover a variety of external agreements including alliances, 
licensing, equity investments and acquisitions, which allows me to a) gain a better 
understanding what types of technological solutions are actually sourced by established 
firm or available by startups and b) track the outcomes related to the external R&D 
activities of both startups and established firms. As an example, I could compare what 
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type of compounds is sourced through acquisitions and which ones through partnerships. 
At the same time, I could track the outcomes related to the in-sourced technologies 
(compounds) and examine how they progress through the development stages. 
Increasingly, the direction of the sourcing relationship between established and 
startup firms is also reversed as more and more established firms not only are opening up 
to external knowledge but also opening up to smaller firms using their external 
knowledge (Rivette & Kline, 2000). As an example, Merck and Pfizer both have initiated 
dedicated organizational units responsible for identifying internal and unused 
technological opportunities to either spin-off or sell to other firms. Understanding what 
technologies are selected by established firms, which are let go and identifying the 
partners which attract such assets expands our current understanding of the division of 
labor between established and startup firms. At the same time, studying such 
relationships, in which knowledge flows from the established to the startup firm, may 
expand our understanding of organizational search as well as exploration and 
exploitation. 
Another extension of this dissertation is to examine in greater detail how firms 
source external knowledge and how this knowledge ultimately is productively used. This 
dissertation illuminated the importance of understanding the organizational context into 
which external knowledge is added for the purpose of innovation. Despite incumbents’ 
investing in the new technology, subsequent innovation and commercialization attempts 
may not materialize, as demonstrated in chapter 4. A rich set of literature highlights that 
beyond investments into new technologies per se, capabilities, routines, managerial 
cognition and resource dependencies need to be accounted for to understand firm’s 
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actions in environments characterized by rapid technological change (Christensen & 
Bower, 1996; Gilbert, 2005; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Data from 
this dissertation allows me to take a closer look at what happens within organizations 
with external knowledge. One extension would be to note that not all technological 
change is the same as some changes have the potential to disrupt the way incumbents 
firms would need to conduct their business (Burgelman, 1985; Christensen, 2006; 
Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). For example, in 1990s, gene 
therapy emerged as a revolutionary therapeutic approach based on genetic engineering to 
treat diseases  (Sosa, 2011). A gene therapy treatment is not taken in the form of a pill at 
home but in the hospital, administered by a doctor via small intramuscular injections. 
Most importantly, gene therapy treatments tend to be one-off, which means that the 
current revenue model based on regular prescriptions would not be applicable (Wilson, 
2012). It is hence interesting to observe how such technologies are effectively used once 
technological knowledge is added into the firm. Accordingly, I have started a project with 
Professor Kapoor to investigate if the impact of upstream R&D investments on 
incumbents’ downstream commercialization is shaped by whether the emerging 
technology is sustaining (i.e., is consistent with) or disruptive to the incumbent’s business 
model (Burgelman, 1985; Christensen, 2006; Christensen & Raynor, 2003). We hope to 
explicate how the different modes of adaptive responses (partnering, acquisitions, internal 
R&D) may differently impact commercialization attempts across sustaining and 
disruptive technologies. 
Another extension is to shift attention from exploration activities to exploitation. 
Throughout the dissertation, I claim the need for exploration, in particular when focusing 
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on the established firms (chapter 2 and chapter 4). However, examining the young 
startups’ industry players (chapter 3) reveals that it may be equally important to 
understand how such startups can more readily exploit their technologies and transition 
towards more predictable types of organizations. While I have attempted to keep startups 
theoretically distinct from established firms within an industry, over time, startups may 
themselves become established industry players as they have commercial success (i.e., a 
product on the market). For example, in the late 1990’s, Amgen, Genentech and Chiron 
were considered to be established firms with billions of revenues but were startups in the 
mid-1980s. Recently, companies I have treated as startups in the 1990s (e.g., Gilead 
Sciences or Vertex Pharmaceuticals) made the transition to becoming important industry 
players. An extension of this dissertation would be to examine what these firms did to 
become more “exploitative.” Given the findings of this dissertation, my expectation is 
that partnerships with established firms to build commercialization competencies played 
a fundamental role in this transition for these startup firms. Examining this phenomenon 
would be also highly interesting from the perspective of the established firms, which on 
the one hand gain access to technologies from the startups but, at the same time, may give 
rise to their next competitor.  
Conclusion 
Overall, understanding how established and startup firms innovate is 
fundamentally important. I believe there is still a great deal to learn about how firms 
explore new ways of solving problems, search beyond their boundaries for new external 
technological solutions, and use partnering as an important tool to innovate and adapt to 
technological change. The current changes in the pharmaceutical industry (e.g., a breakup 
 
159 
 
 
 
of Abbott and the potential breakup of Pfizer (Herper, 2011)), combined with the 
explosion in scientific knowledge, suggest that environmental turbulence will increase in 
the next years, making the industry a highly interesting setting in which to study 
innovation and the role of partnerships between established and startup firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
160 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Chapter 1 - Examples of Partnerships in Recap 
Example: 
Recap  
Supporting Press Release: 
Joint 
Collaborations 
Asklepios Bio and Bayer (Value Chain Activity - Research): 
 
Triangle-based Asklepios Biopharmaceutical Inc., a private development-stage 
biotechnology company and California-based Bayer HealthCare, LLC, Biological 
Products Division have entered into an early-stage research and collaboration 
agreement to evaluate gene therapy for the treatment of hemophilia B. Pending positive 
results of a feasibility study, this collaboration could lead to a joint development and 
commercialization agreement between Bayer Biological Products Division and 
Asklepios for the novel gene therapy treatment for hemophilia B 
(www.bayerbiologicals.com). 
 
KAI Pharmaceuticals and Daiichi Sankyo (Value Chain Activity -  Phase 2): 
 
Sankyo has entered into an agreement with USA-based KAI Pharmaceuticals for the 
joint development and commercialization of KAI-9803. The partnerships will have an 
initial focus on cardiovascular disease. The novel delta protein kinase C inhibitor is a 
first-in-class agent and is currently in a Phase I clinical trial to assess safety.  
 
Partnerships 
with less 
reciprocity 
among the 
partners  
Valentis and Wyeth (Value Chain Activity -  Research): 
 
Valentis, Inc. announced that it has granted a non-exclusive license of the Company's 
GeneSwitch(TM) gene regulation technology to Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the 
pharmaceutical division of American Home Products Corporation. The 
GeneSwitch(TM) system allows researchers to control the level and duration of 
selected genes in transgenic animals and cell cultures, aiding in the identification and 
characterization of a gene's function. 
 
Acacia Biosciences and Bristol-Myers-Squibb (Value Chain Activity -  Research): 
 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and Acacia Biosciences, Inc., today announced an 
agreement in which Bristol-Myers Squibb will license the use of  Acacia's proprietary 
Genome Reporter Matrix(TM) (GRM) to profile 
 pharmaceutical compounds. 
 
Pherin Pharmaceuticals and Organon (Value Chain Activity -  Phase I):  
 
Pherin Pharmaceuticals has signed an agreement with Organon, an Akzo Nobel 
subsidiary, for the development and marketing of drugs based on Pherin's compound 
PH80  which mimic pheromones.    
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Appendix 2: Chapter 2 - Measure Novelty Example (simplified)  
Startup: ZymoGenetics 2000:  
2 available compounds for 
partnering 
Established Firm:  
Merck & Co (1997-2000) 
Novelty score  Average 
Novelty Score  
Compound 1: Atacicept 
Broad Therapy: Immunological 
Merck Experience in 
Immunological: 
2 
(Startup-
Established 
Firm Year 
Level) 
 
 
(2+1)/2=1.5 
Mechanism: B-cell activating 
factor inhibitor 
Mechanism of Action: New 
to Merck (1) 
Origin of Material: 
Biological-Protein, recombinant 
Origin of Material: New to 
Merck (1) 
Compound 2: denenicokin 
Broad Therapy: Cancer 
Merck Experience in Cancer: 
1 
Mechanism: Interleukin 21 
agonist 
Origin of Material: New to 
Merck (1) 
Origin of Material: 
Biological-Protein, recombinant 
Origin of Material: Known to 
Merck (0) 
 
Appendix 3: Chapter 2 – Measure Success, Failure  
Partnering Opportunity: 
Startup: ZymoGenetics in year t-1 
Compound: Atacicept 
Established Firm:  Merck & Co  
Broad Therapy: Immunological 
Moderator: Prior Successes: Count Number of 
Approved Drugs by Merck in Co. in broad Therapy Area 
Immunological between t-4 to t-1 
Broad Therapy: Immunological 
Moderator: Prior Failures: Count Number of Failed 
Drugs (PII/PIII) by Merck in Co. in Therapy Area 
Immunological between t-4 to t-1 
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Appendix 4: Chapter 2 – Inteff – z-statistics  
Moderation Novelty and Prior Failures  
(+ supported):  
 
 
Moderation Novelty and Prior Successes  
(- not supported): 
 
Moderation Distance to 
Commercialization and Prior Failures  
(- some support) 
  
Moderation Distance to Commercialization 
and Prior Successes  
(+ supported) 
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Appendix 5: Chapter 3 - Measure - Innovation Radicalness (Simplified Example) 
Startup in year 2001: Pfizer -2001 (active 
in cancer) 
Merck- 2001 
(active in cancer) 
Independent Variable 
Cancer Compound 1: 
OoM: Chemical 
MoA: 
Phosphodiesterase (PDE) 
inhibitor  
 
Score: 0 (OoM and 
MoA both also in 
development by 
Pfizer in Cancer) 
0 Average: 0/2=0 
Cancer Compound 2: 
OoM: Biological-Viral 
Vector 
MoA: Protein synthesis 
inhibitor 
Score 2 (neither OoM 
nor MoA pursued by 
Pfizer in Cancer) 
2 Average: 4/2=2 
 
 
   Innovation Radicalness 
startup level (average): 
 (0+2)/2 = 1 
OoM-Origin of Material, MoA-Mechanism of Action 
Appendix 6: Chapter 3 - Measure - Failure & Success Incumbents 
Startup active in year 
2001 in: 
Pfizer -2001 Merck- 2001 Moderating 
Variables/Controls 
Therapy Area 1: Cancer   
 
Number of Failures (Phase 
III discontinuation): 1 
 
Number of Successes 
(Drug Approved): 1 
 
Number of 
Failures: 2 
 
 
Number of 
Successes: 1 
 
 
Failure Incumbents 
(Pfizer: 1+0, Merck: 
2+0): 3 
 
 
Success Incumbents 
(Pfizer: 1+1, Merck: 
1+1): 4 
 
 
Therapy Area 2: 
Cardiovascular   
 
Number of  
Failures: 0 
 
Number of  
Successes: 1 
 
Number of 
Failures: 0 
 
Number of 
Successes: 1 
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